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Abstract
This thesis addresses the question as to why multilevel politics is becoming an in-
tegral part of politics in Europe. Multilevel politics is conceptualized as a system
which functions through a complex web of political relations within and across
levels of decision making. The thesis argues that the rise of multilevel politics
can be explained by its institutionalization in terms of the emergence, the evolu-
tion and especially the effects of relevant institutions. Based on a mixed-method
research project, the influence of European institutions on subnational actors and
the alignment of actor motives with institutional characteristics are empirically
shown.
The first chapter of the dissertation establishes the centrality of institutions for
political transformation, examines the role of transnational and domestic institu-
tions for multilevel politics, and contextualizes the research question in terms of
institution-actor relations. The second chapter develops a new-institutionalist the-
oretical framework that explains the emergence, the evolution and the effects of
the institutions, and formulates a series of hypotheses with regard to freestanding
institutional influence, power distribution, material benefits and political identifi-
cation. The third chapter outlines the mixed-method research design which ad-
dresses individual-level and institutional-level variations through a Europe-wide
survey and a comparative case study.
The fourth chapter on survey results shows generally favourable views on
multilevel politics, and strong associations of these views with the independent
variables under scrutiny. The fifth chapter specifies a multivariate model which
includes all posited variables and confirms the majority of the hypotheses. There-
fore, the new-institutionalist argument is broadly confirmed, while there is rela-
tively weak evidence to sustain sociological explanations. The final chapter com-
pares the Committee of the Regions and the Congress of Local and Regional Au-
thorities, and examines the institutional characteristics which correspond to the
hypothesized variables. It is then concluded that the two institutions share several
overarching similarities, and display complementarity in other aspects.
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Introduction
In an article which appeared almost three decades ago discussing intuitive pre-
dictions about what the world order would look like in 2013, Daniel Bell (1987,
pp. 13-14) suggested that ‘the nation state is becoming too small for the big prob-
lems of life, and too big for the small problems of life’. The immediate implication
of this observation is that world politics need more prominent units at both supra-
national and subnational levels at the expense of the national. However, today, one
can find mixed evidence regarding the fate of the nation state. World politics are
still dominated by national actors, yet it is also true that globalization has posed
a fundamental challenge to the primacy of the nation state. In relation to political
units larger and smaller than the nation state, this challenge has often been under-
stood in view of global-local relations (Cox, 1997), or even reconceptualized in
the portmanteau term ‘glocalization’ (Swyngedouw, 1997, 2004). This apparent
relevance of the glocal has ignited academic interest, in both normative and em-
pirical terms, in a possible transformation of world politics connecting all scales
from the local to the global.
The challenges posed by globalization to the nation state constitute a problem
for normative theory because global capitalism leads to ‘deterritorialized law’,
creating opportunities for escaping the political scrutiny of national governments,
that is, the only place where popular sovereignty can be expressed in the con-
ventional system of states (Benhabib, 2007). At the same time, cosmopolitan
norms also rise as the other side of globalization and they have the potential to en-
hance popular sovereignty in a different way which does not exclusively rely on
the nation state (ibid). In this sense, cosmopolitan suggestions to uphold popular
sovereignty in a globalizing world include ‘republican federalism’ at global scale,
and ‘interlocking networks’ across the local, the national and the global (ibid.,
pp. 31-33). Along the same line of cosmopolitan thinking, this can be achieved
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through vertical dispersion of political authority, that is, both centralization and
decentralization among political units of various sizes, none of which should be
predominant by default (Pogge, 1992, p. 54), and popular participation into the
communities closest to the citizens as well as wider political networks in regional1
or global levels (Held, 1995, p. 233). In short, a normatively grounded cosmopoli-
tan democracy prescribes a global political order which consists of equivalent
multiple levels of decision making.
While the ‘ought’ of normative theories may not capture what is actually hap-
pening, more empirically oriented studies also find discrepancies between the
Westphalian system of national sovereignty and the changing conditions of world
politics. One way to approach this problem is challenging territorially enclosed
units, or, in other words, claiming that territory is irrelevant to political functions
and a merely residual aspect of politics (cf. Keating, 2008). However, political
developments during the last decades have shown that territorial politics are per-
sistent, and, indeed, are an essential part of the reshaping of the political system(s)
(ibid). If the ongoing transformation is taken to mean the demise of the nation
state, smaller regional units can be put forward as more adept territorial units for
new global conditions (Ohmae, 1995). But it is also possible to understand the
continuing political relevance of territory without going so far, and by focusing
on the rescaling of the state together with the rise of new spheres of politics and
actors at subnational and supranational territorial levels (Brenner, 1998; Sassen,
2000; Keating, 2009, 2013). Therefore, there are also empirical grounds on which
one can expect a relative equalization of subnational, national and supranational
levels of decision making.
One of the most interesting implications of this development is the emerg-
ing interaction between subnational and supranational levels, in contradiction to
a strictly international system wherein only actors at the national level interact.
On the one hand, from the supranational vantage point, as world politics resemble
1The geographic scope of what is meant by a region is highly variable; it can refer to an area
or unit at a territorial level above or below countries. In order to avoid terminological confusion in
this dissertation, ‘region’ will be used to mean a territorial unit between the local and the national,
which is sometimes labelled as ‘meso’ (Sharpe, 1993). However, in this sentence, it is used with a
larger connotation, such as the area covered by the European Union, as the main point here is the
relevance of all levels between the local and the global.
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more and more what can be called ‘global governance’2, international organiza-
tions at varying scales increasingly expand their bases of participation to diverse
political actors, including those from subnational levels, while local and regional
actors also establish their own transnational organizations (Alger, 2010). For this
reason, it is suggested that ‘those desiring to predict the future of global gover-
nance, and those desiring to develop a vision of preferred future global gover-
nance, are challenged to predict the nature of this inevitable change [in the array
of significant actors and their activities]’ (ibid, p. 74; original emphases). On the
other hand, from the subnational vantage point, local and regional actors increas-
ingly engage in transnational political activities, which is conceptualized by ear-
lier works as multi-layered policy/diplomacy (Hocking, 1993) or paradiplomacy
(Duchacek, 1984; Aldecoa and Keating, 1999).
The main aim of this study is to further the understanding of the transforma-
tion of the world political order as characterized by the simultaneous participation
of actors from multiple levels. Without the disappearance of the national level
but with a redefinition of its role, this transformation will be conceptualized as
the emergence of multilevel politics, as a term covering both the increasing inter-
nationalization of subnational politics and the diversification of actors in global
politics, the significance of which relies on its normative desirability as well as
empirical plausibility. Meanwhile, Europe offers the best place to investigate such
political phenomena; not only has European integration resulted in the strongest
supranational governance structures, but also the continent has witnessed a con-
siderable degree of decentralization in domestic structures which has enabled sub-
national actors to engage in multilevel political activities. Moreover, the parallel
processes of supranational integration and domestic decentralization have also led
to the emergence of vertical links across multiple levels of governance—a set of
practices conceptualized as multilevel governance. Finally, these links are institu-
tionalized by formal organizations, such as the Committee of the Regions within
the EU, but the institutionalization is not limited to the governance of the EU
and also results in equally important organizations such as the Congress of Lo-
cal and Regional Authorities under the Council of Europe. These organizations
2The term ‘governance’ signifies a departure from traditional forms of governing which are
highly structured and mostly hierarchical, towards more interactive decision making processes
with the participation of diverse actors and with less clearly defined hierarchies. The movement
from governing to governance is also discussed in the next chapter.
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can be taken as the institutional embodiment of a multilevel political system, be-
cause they provide local and regional actors with the opportunity to participate
in multilevel political activities, with minimal obstruction due to their national
background.
In this respect, the focus of this thesis will be on multilevel politics in Europe.
It will address the question as to why multilevel politics are emerging against
the background of a system of strictly national sovereignty, and it will argue that
the institutionalization of such new forms of political activity is the major driver
behind this transformation. Institutionalization will be understood as the sum of
the emergence, the evolution, the entrenchment, and the effects of new institu-
tions. Observing that important institutions of multilevel politics have emerged,
evolved and been entrenched in European politics, hence establishing that these
aspects of institutionalization have materialized, the empirical focus will be on the
effects of institutions. In this framework, if multilevel politics is effectively insti-
tutionalized, these institutions will encourage more favourable attitudes towards
multilevel politics on the part of the involved political actors, and display char-
acteristics that match the expectations of actors regarding their presumed effects.
Thus, the main research question is specified as the following: do the influence
of European institutions on subnational poltical actors and the expectations of the
same actors from institutions work towards producing and reproducing multilevel
politics, and if so, why? If the theoretical conceptualization of the rise of multi-
level politics through institutionalization has an empirical counterpart, this should
be visible in the institutional effects over actors and the institutional characteristics
themselves. Therefore, the major analytical aim of the research will be explaining
whether institutional effects and characteristics are indeed related to multilevel
politics and the extent to which they contribute to its institutionalization.
As a comprehensive response to both parts of the research question, it will be
argued that institutions affect individual attitudes to become more favourably dis-
posed to multilevel politics not only by virtue of their existence as the embodiment
of multilevel politics, but also because they are expected to redistribute power and
resources among different groups of actors, to provide effective means of political
action which actors would rationally choose for pursuing their preferences, and to
generate new roles of political activity with which actors may more appropriately
identify themselves. More specifically, the redistribution of competences across
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levels of governance, material incentives which exist for multilevel political activ-
ity, the effectiveness of using transnational organizational channels, and political
identification with roles which challenge the primacy of national allegiance con-
tribute to the effects of the institutions of multilevel politics. In return, it will be
shown that institutions adopt the characteristics compatible with the same quali-
ties.
The main six chapters of the dissertation will develop this thesis and present
the empirical evidence against which a series of hypotheses are tested. The overall
structure of the thesis, hence the contents of each chapter, are summarized in the
next paragraphs.
Chapter 1: Rise of multilevel politics initiates the discussion with a review
of the literature which unpacks the introductory statements made above. In this
sense, it begins with paradiplomacy as an existing concept to address supranational-
subnational links, and the analytical and terminological choice of multilevel pol-
itics as a more comprehensive phenomenon. The main purpose of the chapter is
contextualizing multilevel politics within relevant bodies of academic literature,
specifying an overall approach for its study, and establishing the background of
the research problem. It argues in the first place that institutions are central in
embodying and driving structural transformation, and second, that the ensuing
institutional innovation occurs through interaction with individual actors. The
centrality of institutions is substantiated by showing how European integration
is in essence an institution-building process, and the resulting political system is
shaped by the effects of such institutions. Multilevel governance is best under-
stood in this framework, but the literature built around it tends to emphasize the
disordered practices at the expense of common institutional patterns. When the
institutional dimension is taken seriously in previous studies, it is mostly in the
form of explaining institutional change. In this sense, the research question is
formulated to contribute to this literature by explaining institutional effects, par-
ticularly in terms of their influence over the actors, which is the most underplayed
aspect. A closer look at the relevant institutions shows that cross-national vari-
ation still shapes multilevel relations, but the Committee of the Regions and the
Congress of Local and Regional Authorities stand out as having a high potential to
override the possible repercussions of different domestic competences, hence as
the best embodiment of multilevel politics. Finally, motives of subnational actors
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for taking part in multilevel political activities as posited by existing works can
be best explained in terms of their relationship to institutionalized processes. In
this respect, not only does the institution-actor axis form the most suitable analyt-
ical level for empirical research, but also it remains the area in which academic
contribution is needed the most.
Chapter 2: Institutionalist theory of multilevel politics develops a compre-
hensive theoretical framework for explaining the institutionalization of multilevel
politics. Adopting an eclectic approach to utilize all three strands of new insti-
tutionalism, namely historical, rational choice and sociological accounts, the the-
ory provides a grounded understanding of the institutions of multilevel politics
in terms of their origins, evolution and effects. Accordingly, institutions of mul-
tilevel politics emerge as a response to changing political circumstances, under
which popular sovereignty does not have to be confined to the national sphere.
Once established, they display self-asserting tendencies and their existence be-
comes virtually irrevocable. This process of getting entrenched in the European
political system should work through shaping actor behaviour and adapting to ac-
tor expectations. Therefore, the chapter argues that multilevel politics in Europe
is, indeed, institutionalized by showing that its institutions display qualities that
conform to the theoretical premises of new institutionalism regarding origins, evo-
lution and effects3. Yet the observations in the last aspect remain too broad and
imprecise, which should be complemented by empirical research to ascertain that
institutionalization also materializes in terms of institutional influence on subna-
tional actors. In that respect, new institutionalism also serves as the basis of a
series of hypotheses to guide the research project, which will examine the effects
and characteristics of institutions in view of their very existence, power redistri-
bution, material benefits, effectiveness and political identification.
Chapter 3: Mixed-method approach to multilevel politics describes the method-
ological framework necessary for testing these hypotheses rigorously. The mixed-
method approach aims to capture variation at both individual and institutional
levels in order to discern whether institutions have an independent leverage, that
is, to show that variations in institutional influence and institutional features are
3The theoretical framework follows the outline provided by Hall and Taylor (1996); not only
does new institutionalism consist of the above-mentioned three strands, but also all these strands
are concerned with different aspects of institutions such as origins, evolution and effects.
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associated with the variation in attitudes towards multilevel politics or the institu-
tional embodiment of multilevel politics. The individual-level research is realized
through a Europe-wide survey with subnational political actors, and this chapter
discusses the sampling procedures, the definition of variables, and the methods
of analysis. The institutional-level research is realized through the comparison
of two European organizations, whereby an in-depth qualitative analysis is used
to examine their institutional characteristics with respect to the theorized dimen-
sions. The cases of the Committee of the Regions and the Congress of Local
and Regional Authorities are selected based on their significance for multilevel
politics and their suitability for a comparative logic.
Chapter 4: Subnational attitudes towards multilevel politics presents the re-
sults of the survey and the first stage of quantitative analyses. First, the univariate
analyses explicate the operationalization of variables in the light of collected data,
summarize the responses given by survey participants in quantitative terms, spec-
ify the values assigned to them, and render the distributions amenable to further
statistical analyses where necessary. Second, the bivariate analyses explore the
relationships among variables, which serves two main purposes. On the one hand,
the positive association of the majority of independent variables with the views on
multilevel politics affirm the accuracy of the hypothesized relationships. On the
other hand, the suitability of the data for multivariate modelling is established by
the fact that pairwise correlations are relatively low and reasonably linear, with a
few exceptions which are taken into account in later stages of the analysis.
Chapter 5: Institutional effects and multilevel politics: a multivariate model
presents the main quantitative analysis. First, it specifies a multivariate model
through hierarchical modelling in view of explanatory power and parsimony, and
necessary adjustments as a result of regression diagnostics. In addition, a detailed
examination of country-level variation does not return any systematic patterns, in-
creasing the confidence in using a model wherein the unobserved country charac-
teristics are simply controlled for through fixed effects. The content of the model,
which is specified as offering the best fit to the data and which involves all posited
variables, supports the main argument of the dissertation. More specifically, the
interpretation of the explanatory power of individual variables reveals that the
empirical evidence supports the argument more strongly in terms of the direct in-
fluence of institutions, power distribution and material benefits, but weakly with
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respect to sociological factors of political identification. For this reason, while the
main argument is endorsed overall, it should be accepted with certain reservations
about varying degrees of explanatory power among its constituent hypotheses.
Chapter 6: Institutional forms of multilevel politics: a comparative case study
focuses on the institutional-level variation, and presents the findings from the
comparative case study of the Committee of the Regions and the Congress of Lo-
cal and Regional Authorities. First, the re-examination of the survey data reveals
that there is no observable difference between the two organizations in quantita-
tive terms. Against this background, the qualitative analyses show that respective
institutional characteristics of the two organizations display several comparative
advantages in the context of overarching similarities. In view of their mere exis-
tence, their most fundamental property can be seen as constituting supranational
fora for subnational actors from all over Europe, hence an embodiment of mul-
tilevel politics. As for comparative advantages, while CoR tends towards up-
ward dispersion of authority as a result of the political significance of the EU,
the Congress has a stronger emphasis on downward dispersion as a champion of
subnational democracy. Furthermore, the material benefits of institutionalization
are more visibly present in the case of CoR, thanks to its more effective policy-
making environment. Meanwhile, the Congress is a site of normative debate,
entailing stronger chances of diffusing European and universal ideas of democ-
racy with a subnational emphasis, thus exerting value-driven influence. Overall,
by highlighting non-quantifiable institutional features and the complementarity
of different institutions, the comparative case study shows that the institutional-
ization of multilevel politics works through distinct contributions of institutions
towards a cohesive system as depicted by the main argument.
Finally, a concluding chapter takes stock of these findings and re-evaluates the
argument. It also discusses conceptual, theoretical, methodological and political
implications of the thesis in general. In the light of the empirical research which
confirms the majority of the hypotheses, these implications are generally positive.
First, multilevel politics is proposed as a strong concept to broaden a relatively
narrow focus on governance and the EU. Second, an eclectic new-institutionalist
approach is valuable in itself and for further studies of multilevel politics. Third,
multi-method research design is necessary to address multiple aspects of this phe-
nomenon which are not always reducible to a single type of observation. Fourth,
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the institutional diversity of multilevel politics is also reflected in the complemen-
tarity between highly similar European organizations.

Chapter 1
Rise of multilevel politics
Multilevel politics, as briefly conceptualized in the Introduction, designates a po-
litical system characterized by the participation of actors from multiple levels of
decision making which are not situated in a predetermined hierarchy. The pur-
pose of this chapter is to unpack this conceptualization through an overview of
relevant bodies of literature, examine its political and intellectual context, and
explore the most appropriate approaches to study the subject. In this respect, di-
rect relations between subnational and supranational levels constitute one of the
most fundamental challenges to the existing system of national sovereignty and
academic literature built upon it, and thereby, the concepts of territorial rescaling
and paradiplomacy offer the best starting point to anchor the concept of multilevel
politics in the academic literature.
Both territorial rescaling and paradiplomacy are primarily linked to the pres-
sures posed by globalization (Keating, 1999; Sassen, 2004). Changing economic
conditions alter the functional characteristics of territorial units, for instance by
eliminating the role of the nation state as a protector of subnational units and by
forcing regions to compete globally (Keating, 1998). Yet along the same line of
thinking, politics, institutions and interests should be considered as important as
the functional pressures exerted by globalization (Keating, 2013, p. 49). Broadly
following Michael Keating’s approach, these will be adapted to the present study
which will address the political aspects of multilevel relations, their institutional-
ization, and the influence of institutions on actors. More specifically, he explains
the rise of paradiplomacy through three sets of factors: the weakening of the na-
11
12 Chapter 1. The rise of multilevel politics
tion state, the rise of transnational institutions, and changing motives of subna-
tional actors (Keating, 1999).
In this framework, the weakening of the nation state is not only the cause of
the rise of multilevel politics, but also its consequence, since a systemic change
towards multilevel politics would mean a decrease in the relative importance of
the national level. Thereby, studying the rise of multilevel politics is analogous to
studying the weakening of the nation state. Moreover, these three sets of factors
are not necessarily developing independently from one another, and studying the
interlinkages among them will be as interesting as focusing on each set of factors
separately. For this reason, the focus must be on how the interactions between
institutional and actor-based aspects relate to the rise of multilevel political activ-
ities.
A more recent major work on paradiplomacy (Kuznetsov, 2015) identifies
eleven dimensions of the concept on the basis of a thorough review of the lit-
erature, which can be used to further explicate these three aspects. According to
this categorization, the dimensions of globalization, global economy, and environ-
ment would correspond to exogenous pressures, while the dimensions of national-
ism, borders, diplomacy and separatism can be linked to the actor-related aspects,
and those of international relations and geopolitics to the political context. How-
ever, in spite of mentioning domestic constitutional and federalist dimensions, a
stronger emphasis on transnational institutional dimensions is needed. In the ex-
planatory framework proposed by Kuznetsov (ibid., ch. 5), the institutional focus
is almost exclusively on the domestic sphere, or on the case study of subnational
entities; in this sense, it is arguably missing a crucial aspect of the larger pic-
ture which the present study will attempt to supplement1. Moreover, a conceptual
choice has to be made here for the same reason, since the phenomenon of interest
in this thesis is broader than the external activities of subnational entities. The
meaning of paradiplomacy will thus be taken as limited to these activities, while
multilevel politics will be used more broadly not only to cover paradiplomacy, but
also to integrate political, institutional and actor-related aspects altogether.
1This point is not intended as a criticism of the book, since the author explicitly sets the major
analytical aim as a framework for the case studies on paradiplomacy. However, the study of this
subject as a large-scale political phenomenon, as endeavoured here, requires further dimensions
to be considered. Justifications as to why transnational/international institutions are assumed so
essential are given throughout the literature review offered below.
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Another reason proposed for using a different terminology, such as multi-
layered policy instead of paradiplomacy, is a putative need to abandon domi-
nant paradigms of international politics and foreign policy (Hocking, 1993, 1999).
While acknowledging that multilevel relations potentially imply a radical depar-
ture from the Westphalian system of sovereignty which reserves international pol-
itics exclusively to the nation state, and that the actors in multi-layered political
environments must not be assumed to be unitary and uniform (ibid.), the room for
continuity or dynamics of gradual change should not be disregarded either. Fur-
thermore, neither normative nor explanatory theories prescribe or foresee a com-
plete disappearance of the national level, which would indeed be an unrealistic
and merely speculative position given the existing context of world politics where
the resilience of the nation state cannot be so easily ignored. Multilevel politics
can be more prudently conceived as a hybrid coexistence of old and new forms
of governance and political relations marked by increased degrees of choice and
flexibility instead of a strictly hierarchical one (Loughlin, 2009). Thereby, there
is no self-evident reason to assume that multilevel relations represent a complete
rupture from the existing context and require a completely new approach; instead,
the problem can be appropriately addressed by starting with the scope for transfor-
mation envisaged in existing theories of politics. Accordingly, multilevel politics
can be defined as a political system which functions through a complex web of
horizontal and vertical relations within and across territorial levels of decision
making and which is not primarily orchestrated by the national level.
On this basis, the following sections will try to develop an approach that ex-
tracts the analytically relevant features of multilevel politics with regard to the
political, institutional and actor-related aspects. First, the political aspect will be
examined with a focus on the main properties of the European political system.
This section will show that the current European context of multilevel politics is
marked by the existence of supranational institutions with relative autonomy from
national governments, and that these institutions have indeed evolved towards a
multilevel system. Having thus established the centrality of institutions, the sec-
ond section will describe the institutional context of multilevel relations, broaden-
ing the focus to include the channels both outside the European Union and within
the national sphere. Finally, the third section will show that the motives of actors
for multilevel political engagement cannot be thought independently of such insti-
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tutional developments. In this sense, it will be concluded that the institution-actor
axis represents the best level of analysis for empirical research without necessarily
losing sight of the broader context of the phenomenon, but remains an understud-
ied area of multilevel politics. For this reason, the larger inquiry about political
transformation will be concentrated on a research question of how institutions
affect actor behaviour.
1.1 European context
The rise of multilevel politics is fundamentally at odds with a traditional under-
standing of international politics, according to which national governments are
the only relevant actors. From a realist perspective, the hierarchical nature of do-
mestic systems is radically different from the anarchical nature of the international
structure (Waltz, 1979), ruling out the autonomy of both supranational institutions
and subnational actors. At a theoretical level, institutional liberalism proposes a
strong alternative to this understanding by showing the autonomous leverage of
international institutions (Keohane and Nye, 1977; Keohane, 1984, 2012; Nye,
1988), and the possibility of trans-governmental relations whereby sub-units2 of
states interact within international institutions (Keohane and Nye, 1974).
At an empirical level, European integration as a historical process and the
European Union as its eventual product represent the biggest challenge to the
conventional understanding of the Westphalian system, making it the most likely
case to ascertain the development of multilevel politics. For this reason, this sec-
tion will discuss the meaning of European integration for international politics, its
implications beyond the international relations-based questions, and its evolution
towards a system of multilevel governance.
2The term ‘sub-unit’ does not necessarily mean subnational authorities. It is rather used to
designate any part of the administrative structure of a state which is not conventionally supposed
to perform foreign policy activities. However, subnational authorities can equally be seen as such,
once the functional distribution of competences and the hierarchical organization of a national
government can be disaggregated for international political purposes.
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1.1.1 European politics: from integration to governance
Although European integration can be seen as a special case of international poli-
tics, theories of integration have come to be recognised as a distinct set of theories
in their own right (Rosamond, 2000), including those which are quite incompati-
ble with a mainstream understanding of international politics, such as federalism
(Burgess, 2000) or confederal consociation (Chryssochoou, 2001). Yet the stan-
dard theories of integration are neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism, both
of which are derived from the theories of international relations. While neofunc-
tionalism follows a liberal tradition, intergovernmentalism can be seen as aligning
more closely with the realist paradigm in many respects, although the main the-
orist of the latter, Andrew Moravcsik (1993, 1997), insists on the liberal (albeit
non-institutionalist) background of the theory. In this respect, the two main the-
ories of integration share common premises to a limited extent, and one of the
central issues of contention remains as the degree to which an autonomous lever-
age can be attributed to European institutions.
Neofunctionalism is an interpretation of functionalism, according to which
international agencies, such as European communities, are more likely to offer the
benefits that people seek, and to shift the popular allegiance away from the nation
state (Mitrany, 1948, 1965). The neofunctionalist interpretation, as examplified by
the works of Ernst Haas (1964; 1968) and Lindberg (1963), puts forward a quasi-
automatic process of deepening integration triggered by the first steps; namely,
initial integration in a sectoral economic area, in this case coal and steel, would
‘spill over’ onto other economic and political areas leading towards higher levels
of political integration.
Intergovernmentalism builds on the self-criticism by neofunctionalist theorists
(e.g. Haas, 1975; cf. Moravcsik, 1993), as well as the external critiques of the ne-
ofunctionalist theory. Among the latter, one of the most important arguments is
Stanley Hoffmann’s (1966; 1982) assertion that the coexistence of European com-
munities and member states is more appropriately interpreted as the preservation
of national sovereignty than the demise of the nation state3. Even in an advanced
level of integration, it is equally plausible to argue, in retrospect, that European
3From the perspective of international relations theories, while Hoffmann’s argument can be
seen as a realist critique of the existing theories of integration, his overall approach is also critical
of a crude form of realism (Hoffmann, 1981; Keohane, 2009).
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integration in fact rescued the nation state (Milward, 1984, 1994). Thus, liberal
intergovernmentalism puts the emphasis on treaty-making which drives the inte-
gration, thus the expression of national interests (Moravcsik, 1993, 1998). The
partial concessions of sovereignty to European organizations are explained by the
argument that it is in the rational interest of national governments to ensure the
oversight of commitments, because they are better off when they benefit from the
interdependence (Moravcsik, 1997).
In this context, the two main theories of integration differ on the degree to
which European organizations can have autonomous leverage vis-à-vis nation
states. Yet, looking beyond the disagreements, they share the view that integra-
tion is a process of institution building 4. Given the disagreement, one of the few
uncontroversial claims that can be made about the European Union is that it is
neither simply another international organization in the traditional sense, nor a
federal super-state which reduced member states into constituent units. Given the
undeniable importance of the resulting institutions, the European Union is a sui
generis form of polity with implications for all levels (Schmitter, 1996).
Once the institutions get entrenched and their centrality is recognized, the ap-
proach to European integration must undergo a shift of focus. In this sense, it
became a legitimate subject of study, first, for comparative politics (Hix, 1994;
Risse-Kappen, 1996), and second, for the governance approach (Hix, 1998; Kohler-
Koch and Rittberger, 2006; Jachtenfuchs, 2001). Governance signifies the increas-
ing role of a variety of state and non-state actors, engaging into decision making
processes without necessarily relying on the traditional hierarchical state struc-
ture. The outcome is a penetrated web of relations influential at both European
and domestic levels, as domestic structures gradually adapt to the European logic
of governance (Cowles, Risse-Kappen and Caporaso, 2001; Kohler-Koch, 1999).
Although European governance emerges as the final and encompassing out-
come of integration, the analytical turns in European studies reflect the follow-
ing interlinkages: the historical process of integration creates new institutions,
then comparative politics examines the system shaped by these institutions, and
governance approach deals with the policy-making implications of this system.
4The ideas that liberal intergovernmentalism can be interpreted as envisaging at least a minimal
degree of institutional autonomy, and the criticism that the low degree of envisaged autonomy is a
shortcoming of the theory are discussed more extensively in Section 2.1.2.
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In other words, the continuity among the political developments that led to dis-
ciplinary shifts is as important as the ruptures among them. Therefore, a solid
understanding of the institutional background is needed for an appropriate study
of governance, and this background should provide a degree of coherence if the
governance networks constitute a self-contained system despite all their fuzziness.
1.1.2 Multilevel governance
One of the most prominent forms of the governance approach focuses on multi-
level relations, and the studies focusing on the concept of multilevel governance
constitute the most relevant body of literature, to which the present thesis will
contribute. Furthermore, the coexistence of a relatively stable institutional back-
ground and a fuzzy web of governance practices is also intrinsic to multilevel
governance: whereas the existing academic works are usually interested in the lat-
ter aspect, this thesis is rather concerned with highlighting the importance of the
former, hence using the concept of multilevel politics to designate the political-
systemic and institutional dimension. The discussion below will review the lit-
erature on multilevel governance to explore the degree to which the institutional
dimension is underplayed.
To begin with the historical background, the concept of multilevel governance
emerged as a response to several political developments, notably the rising im-
portance of regional/structural policy of the EU, which became the first and the
most natural subject of study (Hooghe and Keating, 1994; Hooghe, 1996; Bache,
1998; Benz and Eberlein, 1999). Gary Marks (1993) coined the term in order to
explain the causes and consequences of the institutional innovations that underlie
structural policy, thus to provide a new theoretical account for an emerging sys-
tem. Yet the concept has been more widely applied to other policy areas, even
beyond the EU and Europe (Stephenson, 2013). Despite its relevance for politi-
cal developments and rising popularity, however, the criticisms have been centred
on its allegedly low degree of theoretical rigour, since it lacks clear propositions
about explanations, causality and predictions (Jordan, 2001). Similarly, it is de-
picted as a ‘(dis)ordering framework’ rather than a theory of European integration
(Rosamond, 2000, p. 111), which fails to provide an account capable of making
sense of European politics in a systematic way.
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The fundamental challenge for multilevel governance is, therefore, to come
up with a coherent account to explain practices that constantly defy coherence.
This tension is visible in various ways in which multilevel governance is depicted.
For example, a frequently cited and sufficiently comprehensive definition can be
quoted as follows (Schmitter, 2004, p. 49):
an arrangement for making binding decisions that engages a multi-
plicity of politically independent but otherwise interdependent actors—
private and public—at different levels of territorial aggregation in
more-or-less continuous negotiation/deliberation/implementation, and
that does not assign exclusive policy competence or assert a stable hi-
erarchy of political authority to any of these levels.
The need for coherence can be seen in the overall qualification of multilevel gov-
ernance as an arrangement for binding decision, but the rest is concerned with
complexities such as the multiplicity and diversity of actors, mixture of nego-
tiation, deliberation and implementation, and the non-requirement of exclusive
competence and hierarchy.
Going back to the original definition, multilevel governance is meant to des-
ignate a system, but one of ‘continuous negotiation among nested governments
at several territorial tiers’ (Marks, 1993, p. 392). Moreover, it can equally desig-
nate a change towards a relatively definite reconfiguration of competences, such
as ‘the dispersion of authoritative decision making across multiple territorial lev-
els’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2001, p. xi), or the web of connections including both
the horizontal relations between units in the same level and the vertical relations
across different levels (Bache, 2008, p. 21), thus increasing complexity. When
two ideal-typical models of multilevel governance are distinguished (Hooghe and
Marks, 2003), the difference corresponds to this tension between neatness and
fuzziness. The first type is characterized by general-purpose jurisdiction, non-
intersecting membership, a limited number of levels and stable architecture, while
the second type is characterized by task-specific jurisdiction, intersecting mem-
bership, an indefinite number of levels and flexible design. As the actual practices
of multilevel governance fall somewhere between these two ideal types, both a
stable architecture and a flexible design must be accounted for.
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One solution to this tension is defending multilevel governance, against the
criticism of being unsystematic, as a theory which takes as the dependent variable
a ‘transformed institutional architecture of the state’, and as one of the main in-
dependent variables the increasing complexity of policy making (Piattoni, 2015,
p. 337). This builds upon earlier attempts to theorize multilevel governance as
an actor-centred approach to explain the revision of institutional rules through the
interaction of actors and institutions (Marks, 1996). Accordingly, several struc-
tural pressures lead to institutional reform, because it is a rational response of the
actors, including national governments, to such pressures (Jachtenfuchs, 1995;
Scharpf, 1994). More specifically, when the institutions and executives of the
state are distinguished, the latter can be expected to voluntarily and rationally re-
allocate competences if this offers benefits exceeding the cost of lost sovereignty
(Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1996, p. 349).
In sum, the academic literature on multilevel governance primarily draws at-
tention to the complexity of policy-making, the multiplicity of actors, the flexibil-
ity of institutional design, etc., while the last remarks also show that it draws on
a theoretical account of institutional transformation. However, when the ‘disor-
dering’ aspects of multilevel governance are considered together with institutional
developments, new questions arise. For example, if the institutionalization of mul-
tilevel governance is understood as the mutual adjustment of existing institutional
arrangements through spontaneous collective responses of political actors to prac-
tical needs (Benz and Eberlein, 1999; Benz, 2000, 2011), two questions follow:
First, what is the significance of the adjusted institutional arrangements, or are
they simply meant to be readjusted in the face of new practical needs? Second,
while institutional arrangements can change with respect to the motives of the
actors, are these motives completely insensitive to institutional arrangements?
Therefore, this thesis is motivated by the understanding that a governance ap-
proach in general, and multilevel governance in particular, highlights the complex-
ity, multiplicity and flexibility of practices, but pays insufficient attention to the
systemic coherence and the institutional background which makes all these prac-
tices the manifestations of the same political phenomenon. It is in this sense that
the central concept of this thesis is formulated as multilevel politics, rather than
governance, to emphasize the analytical focus on exploring the common political-
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systemic features and institutional patterns, instead of referring to an indetermi-
nate set of spontaneous practices.
1.2 Institutional context
One of the main difficulties for specifying the institutional dimension of multilevel
governance is the blurring of several distinctions that demarcate the traditional
forms of political institutions, most notably that of domestic and international
spheres, which makes it fundamentally innovative (Piattoni, 2009, 2010b). In
stark contrast to a realist conception of an international/domestic dichotomy, the
absence of hierarchy is extended to domestic systems while functional differenti-
ation is extended to the European scale (Aalberts, 2004). Therefore, as multilevel
governance is a concept that is primarily expected to explain the interlocking of
political processes on multiple levels in domestic and international spheres (Piat-
toni, 2015, pp. 325-326), its political institutions must be those which bind these
two spheres together.
For such an interlocking to constitute a coherent system, two parallel processes
can be expected: the convergence of domestic structures towards the equalization
of the competences of subnational authorities, and the emergence of common in-
stitutions at the international sphere. In this sense, European integration and de-
centralization are put forward as resulting from similar conditions such as global-
ization and intensifying interdependence (Soldatos and Michelmann, 1992), being
mutually reinforcing (Sodupe, 1999), resulting in upward and downward shifts of
power (Loughlin, 2004, p. 7), and changing the nature of borders (Christiansen
and Jørgensen, 2000). Taken to the extreme, this depiction would correspond to a
literal reading of the idea ‘Europe of the regions’.
Nonetheless, the rise and the fall of this idea in political and academic dis-
courses over the last decades illustrate the prevalence of realpolitik and the lim-
its of regional mobilization (Borras-Alomar, Christiansen and Rodriguez-Pose,
1994; Elias, 2008; Hepburn, 2008). The main challenge in this respect is the di-
vergence in the types of regions, not to mention other subnational units, hence
in their objectives and agendas (Loughlin, 1996a; Moore, 2008). Therefore, at
best, the regional dimension of Europe can be depicted as ‘common threads of
change against a background of persisting variation’ (Hooghe and Marks, 1996).
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While domestic structures display considerable variation in the degrees of de-
centralization, transnational involvement is an essential part of real subnational
autonomy, for which domestic devolution is a necessary but not sufficient condi-
tion (Agranoff, 2004). Moreover, for the realization of such a degree of autonomy,
a favourable international environment is indispensable even for subnational au-
thorities with significant devolved competences including foreign action, but such
an environment is not always present (Philippart, 1998).
Taking account of these remarks, the following subsections will review insti-
tutional developments within the domestic and international spheres. First, de-
spite the evident trend of decentralization, it cannot be said that domestic struc-
tures converged to a common institutional arrangement. Second, the international
sphere displays diverse institutional channels, most of which reproduce the cross-
national variation. It is only the formal organizations representing subnational
authorities which provide a common institutional arrangement irrespectively of
domestic backgrounds, namely the Committee of the Regions under the EU and
the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities under the Council of Europe.
Since such organizations operate both within and outside the contours of the EU,
the institutionalized forms of multilevel politics coexist with the disordered gov-
ernance practices, but do not depend on them.
1.2.1 Decentralization, regionalization and regionalism
Defining multilevel politics as the dispersion of authority across levels, or upward
and downward shifts of power away from the national government, the expected
manifestation of the overall rescaling of the state in the domestic sphere is decen-
tralization. Indeed such a trend has been observed in Europe for a few decades
(Sharpe, 1979), and it has been shown more recently that since mid-XXth century
decentralist trends, especially in the form of creating or strengthening regional-
level units, has significantly outweighed centralist trends; ‘[n]ot every country has
become regionalized, but where we see reform over time, it is in the direction of
greater, not less, regional authority by a ratio of eight to one’ (Marks, Hooghe
and Schakel, 2008, p. 167). The overall trend can be seen as consisting of two
interlinked aspects, regionalization pertaining to more top-down processes, while
regionalism pertains to bottom-up processes driving demands from subnational
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actors (Loughlin, 2013). The following overview will discuss both aspects in
turn.
The timing or the intensification of decentralization is usually explained by
large historical developments. More specifically, following the economic, po-
litical and social crises of the 1970s, the establishment of neoliberal/neoclassical
economy as the dominant paradigm undermined the European welfare state which
arguably represented the apogee of the nation state (Loughlin, 2007). In fact, the
nation state, as a product and construct of modernity, had sought to integrate ter-
ritory with partial success5, but by doing so it also had to produce or reproduce
subnational units and levels (Keating, 2013, p. 42). The impossibility of realizing
perfect homogenization and territorial integration required federal or regionalized
structures as the only way to retain unity, and the same dynamics have led to
more recent decentralist trends in the face of new challenges to territorial unity
(Swenden, 2006, p. 46).
One way of understanding the implications of economic pressures is the need
for subnational actors to become competitive, since the transition from the Keyne-
sian to the neoclassical paradigm removed the national layer of protection which
stood between the subnational units and global markets (Keating, 1998). The
link between competitiveness and regional autonomy is best illustrated by differ-
ent conceptions of fiscal federalism or regionalism (Oates, 2005). According to
earlier approaches, which revolve around the ‘decentralization theorem’ (Oates,
1972), subnational fiscal autonomy is efficient with respect to being closer to cit-
izens, hence better mapping their needs and preferences. Thus, if the distribution
of preferences displays heterogeneity across localities, devolving power to lower
levels results in an optimal system of governance to the extent that meeting lo-
cally specific preferences compensates for the lost advantages of centralized fi-
nancial and political resources6 (Schakel, 2010). According to later approaches
to fiscal federalism which incorporate the public choice perspective (e.g. Bren-
5This idea is broadly based on the modernist theory of nations and nationalism, especially
that of Ernest Gellner (1983). According to this conception, ‘nationalism is primarily a political
principle that holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent’ (p. 1), and the
nation and the state are two sides of this stipulated congruence. Of course this is only one theory
from a large literature on nations and nationalism, but it is arguably the most consistent with the
approach developed in the present work and the literature reviewed here.
6Such advantages are primarily the internalization of externalities, and economies of scale.
The former refers in this case to accounting for the impact of a decision taken in one jurisdiction
1.2. Institutional context 23
nan and Buchanan, 1980), the devolution of fiscal competences creates sufficient
competition to break government monopoly and require adjustment to an optimal
government size, when it is assumed that governments are utility maximizers and
that the cost of moving households and firms between jurisdictions is low.
In addition to the changing conception of economic policy making, more po-
litical factors also played a role, such as the motivation to improve the quality
of governance through decentralization both in terms of output and accountabil-
ity (Faguet, 2014), the need to appease potential conflicts which may emanate
from socio-cultural composition by institutionalizing diversity through decentral-
ization (Brancati, 2006), or simply the transition to democracy which required a
decentralized arrangement after removing previous forces which were keeping the
territorial unity rather artificially (Swenden, 2006, p. 1). Furthermore, European
integration constitutes an important factor with the EU regional policy becoming
the main source of development. This is especially true in the case of Central
and Eastern European countries for which accession created strong incentives for
institutionalizing a decentralized system (Brusis, 2002).
At the same time, similar explanations can also be offered for the bottom-up
dynamics of regionalist demands. First of all, many of the above-cited works em-
phasize a sequential relationship between regionalization and regionalism; namely,
the institutionalization of decentralization creates new actors who will sustain the
demand for reform in an open-ended process (Keating, 2013, p. 177; Swenden,
2006, p. 47; Brancati, 2006). In this respect, it has been shown that decentral-
ized systems increase the strength of regionalist parties (Brancati, 2008). Simi-
larly, competition between regionally organized parties leads to higher demands
for autonomy as compared to the competition between regionally and nationally
organized parties (van Houten, 2007), suggesting that more regional framing of
politics strengthen the demands for further reform.
As for the European dimension, alongside the supranational pull factors as
discussed above and the sovereignty-challenging effects, European integration is
supposed to render autonomy more affordable for smaller political units (Keating,
2013, p. 12). This idea is usually based on Alesina and Spolaore’s (1997) argu-
ment on the optimal number of countries which increases in the context of eco-
on another jurisdiction. The latter refers to the reduced cost of dealing with certain tasks in the
central government which is by default larger than subnational governments.
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nomic integration while the average size decreases. On the one hand, if the differ-
ence between acquiring domestic competences and outright secession is assumed
to be only a matter of degree, demands for both autonomy and independence can
be conceptualized in this way. On the other hand, the dependence of subnational
units on the nation state is diminished as previously crucial functions of the latter
such as market access and financial resources have moved to the European level.
Empirical observations also support the view that transnational integration low-
ers the cost of regionalization, hence makes it more likely (Marks, Hooghe and
Schakel, 2008).
Another interesting effect of European integration is its interaction with re-
gionalist movements; also drawing upon Alesina and Spolaore’s framework, in-
creasing support for regionalist parties as a result of deeper integration can be ex-
plained by the argument that regions become more viable units of politics (Jolly,
2015). Meanwhile, Europeanization facilitated the formation of a more or less
coherent alliance between ethnoregionalist parties despite the lack of a clear ideo-
logical harmony, but thanks to common denominators which can be found in their
European political agenda (De Winter and Cachafeiro, 2002).
This overview shows that the institutionalization of rescaling in the form of
decentralization and in particular regionalization is the result of an interplay be-
tween political and economic factors. Although wider forces behind rescaling
are usually framed in economic terms, it should be acknowledged that regional-
ism also has important political roots, that a considerable part of the economic
sources of regionalism is mediated through political processes, and that eventu-
ally economic regionalism has substantial implications for political regionalism
(Agnew, 2013; van Houten, 2013). Overall, the political character of the general
trend of decentralization is crucial as it goes beyond a simple administrative del-
egation of tasks and a principal-agent model which assigns a peripheral role to
subnational authorities (Loughlin, 2007). Moreover, this rescaling of politics is
marked by high degrees of asymmetry, diversity, flexibility and hybridity, which
is blurring the previously significant distinctions between federal and unitary sys-
tems (Watts, 2013). While the focus of these observations has been the regional
level, similar conclusions can also be drawn for the local, albeit to a lesser extent.
Yet it is possible to see a movement from local government to governance, that is,
more flexible patterns and institutions, due to intensifying economic competition,
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the diffusion of new public management, and the growing role of the EU (John,
2001).
Nonetheless, it should be stressed that all these arguments focus on only one
side of the subnational dimension, namely common trends, which does not neces-
sarily mean a definite convergence. The main conclusion of two successive com-
prehensive studies on subnational democracy in Europe (Loughlin, 2004; Lough-
lin, Hendriks and Lidström, 2011) is the persistence of state traditions in subna-
tional governance, although these state traditions can be categorized into several
groups which display similarities in themselves. Common trends of transforma-
tion are therefore responses to common challenges against the background of this
persisting variation. First, while many subnational authorities are successful in
managing this transformation, the variation in their success is not necessarily a
reflection of state tradition, but rather a result of how they thrive in competitive
regionalism (Loughlin, 2004, p. 387). Second, as a result, the variation in institu-
tional change/stability within and across groups of state tradition leaves room for
further movements of reform (Hendriks, Loughlin and Lidström, 2011, pp. 732-
733). For this reason, the common trend of decentralization as discussed in this
subsection is not sufficient to assume away the challenge posed by the diversity
of domestic constitutions within which subnational authorities are situated. In-
stead, with possibilities of further decentralization, domestic competences should
be taken as a quintessential variable when analysing multilevel politics, parallel
to the common trends observed at the international sphere.
1.2.2 Transnational channels for subnational actors
The institutional channels through which subnational actors can reach the supra-
national level can be classified into three categories in terms of the major level
providing such channels: supranational organizations, national mediation and di-
rect subnational initiatives (Hooghe, 1995; Tatham, 2008). To begin with the most
traditional, national mediation is not completely a novelty of multilevel gover-
nance since it is framed in a system of neatly nested political units without inter-
secting membership, hence clearly demarcating borders especially between states,
whereby national governments easily retain their gatekeeper status. Nonetheless,
as far as influencing EU policies is concerned, national channels have been put
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forward by several studies as the most effective way. On the one hand, despite
huge variation in the patterns of relationship between subnational authorities and
central governments, a coalition between them is found to be essential for increas-
ing the influence of the former (Bomberg and Peterson, 1998). On the other hand,
the domestication of European governance, also known as the Europeanization of
domestic politics, can be seen as a much more significant development than the
internationalization of subnational authorities, and for this reason, influence can
be better exerted on the EU through within-state channels which are better adapted
to supranational decision making (Jeffery, 2000).
In both arguments, the domestic constitutional position and competences of
subnational authorities are the most significant determinants of the potential influ-
ence, which leads to a problem to be addressed through other institutional chan-
nels: the asymmetry between the scarcity of opportunities available to subnational
authorities with lesser legal, political and financial resources, and the flexibility of
domestically stronger subnational authorities to utilize both national and alterna-
tive channels. For the first group, bypassing the national government remains the
only option, hence counterintuitively, subnational authorities with weaker domes-
tic competences are more likely to be motivated for state bypassing, that is, direct
initiatives (Hooghe, 1995). It has also been shown that stronger subnational au-
thorities are more likely to cooperate with their national governments by making
use of their favourable domestic position (Tatham, 2011).
Such differences are reflected in the divergence between regionalized and fed-
eral entities; while the former focus mostly on autonomous foreign activities, the
latter both lead such activities and try to influence national foreign policy (Blatter
et al., 2008). In addition, mobilization within or without national channels is a
matter of choice depending on various factors not limited to the domestic system.
For instance, if the main motive for mobilisation is not in conflict with national
agendas, or if the Council of Ministers of the EU is the most important location
of decision, national channels are likely to be chosen, while an overlap between
subnational and supranational competences which provide the opportunity of an
exchange between the two, and political and cultural distinctiveness of subna-
tional authorities from the central authority lead to alternative channels (Marks
et al., 1996). It has also been shown more recently that party politics should
be added to the effect of the degree of devolution and above-mentioned factors
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(Tatham, 2010). However, it should be noted that, even if party incongruence and
the degree of devolution lead to state bypassing, these do not necessarily result in
conflict with the national governments (Tatham, 2013).
Furthermore, these findings are not necessarily in conflict with the argument
that national channels provide an effective way of multilevel political engagement.
They should be more profitable for subnational authorities in certain countries and
for certain policy areas, but this is not sufficient to eliminate the existence of alter-
native channels as viable options. Meanwhile, the mere existence of such options
undermines at least the gatekeeper position traditionally assumed by national gov-
ernments, as subnational authorities are not confined to the limits posed by domes-
tic structures (Blatter et al., 2008). Even so, resources derived from the domestic
position influence the chances of success of direct initiatives. For instance, trying
to influence European decision making through representation offices in Brussels
is the most prevalent type of such initiatives, but these offices are mostly opened
by subnational authorities which can afford the required funding (Marks, Haesly
and Mbaye, 2002). In this sense, a large budget is a necessary condition for direct
initiatives, and financial capability alone will accomplish promotional offices fo-
cusing on economic activities, whereas a well-staffed office which can accomplish
further tasks requires political autonomy (Blatter et al., 2010). All these findings
show that, even though the nation state is no longer the gatekeeper and subnational
actors can choose between alternative channels, this choice is still determined by
national factors to a considerable extent.
In addition to national mediation and direct initiatives, supranational institu-
tions representing subnational authorities constitute the third major institutional
channel of multilevel activities. The establishment of the Committee of the Re-
gions (CoR), the main organization of this representation, coincided with the re-
vived interest in deeper integration as embodied in the Maastricht Treaty, together
with the aforementioned reform of the EU regional policy, hence the develop-
ment of multilevel governance. The main logic behind its inception was that with
subnational authorities becoming an integral part of the EU policy implementa-
tion, their input to legislation and decision making processes should be essential7.
7This idea can be understood in a normative as well as pragmatic sense. It is both desirable
and efficient to include actors who will endure the implications of a decision and who have the
first-hand experience in implementing such decisions.
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Thereby, supranational-level representation has become an essential condition for
benefiting from the added value that subnational authorities could offer to the EU
governance, even for relatively strong actors who could utilize other means (Vos,
Boucké and Devos, 2002). Although this could be seen as the basis of profound
changes in the institutional architecture of the EU, CoR was framed as an advi-
sory body as the name ‘committee’ suggests8. Therefore, CoR has assumed a dual
role of translating subnational interests into policy recommendation and being the
representative institution of the subnational level. The academic appraisal of its
place and importance is roughly divided along this duality; if the assessment is
based on high expectations of a strong reassertion of the subnational level, or a
fundamentally representative institution akin to a third chamber, disappointments
are inevitable, but if the focus is put on whether subnational interests are effec-
tively channelled into European decision making processes, CoR can be seen in a
more positive light (Piattoni, 2010a).
To begin with earlier assessments, on the one hand, Thomas Christiansen
(1996) finds its consultative functions ineffective, representation obscured by in-
ternal divisions, and legitimacy merely symbolic, thus he does not consider CoR
as having any chance of exerting real influence on decision making in the EU. One
of the most compelling difficulties that CoR had to face was the divergent domes-
tic constitutional positions of subnational authorities, hence the definition of the
units that it was supposed to represent (Loughlin, 1996b). In this sense, variation
in the territorial administration systems was the first country-based dividing line
which was also exacerbated by the reliance on national delegations as the main
basis of alliance and the composition of delegates determined by national dele-
gations (Christiansen, 1997; Van Der Knaap, 1994). Overall, the general tone of
the early evaluations can be depicted as warranting a cautious approach against
overestimating the place of CoR (Jeffery, 1995).
On the other hand, several other accounts offer considerable alternative view-
points and findings. For instance, although it can be admitted that its impact
through formal powers remained relatively insignificant, the real added value of
CoR can be found in its informal role as a bridge between subnational and supra-
8Formally, CoR has the same status as European Economic and Social Committee (EESC)
whose consultative role is channelling the voice of interest groups. EESC was established in 1958,
but it has hardly become an essential part of the institutional architecture of the EU.
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national levels of government (McCarthy, 1997). At a different analytical level,
the relationship of CoR with other EU bodies is argued to save it from a periph-
eral institutional position, especially with the supportive approach of the Com-
mission providing the basis of real impact (Warleigh, 1997). Moreover, its mul-
tidimensional policy style transcends existing cleavages on several fronts with a
consensual tendency (Farrows and McCarthy, 1997). In this respect, cross-cutting
bases of alliance, such as organization along the lines of political groups as well
as national delegations, shape decision making patterns in ways that overcome
such cleavages, and in many cases lead to decisions taken by unanimity or near-
unanimity (Hönnige and Kaiser, 2003). Finally, despite being a simply advisory
body, CoR is distinctive in that it is composed of elected politicians who would
work hard to ensure that their contributions are not ignored (Loughlin, 1996b).
Similar disagreements in the literature on CoR have been sustained in more
recent works. While it has been argued that Christiansen’s original findings con-
tinue to be relevant despite visible increases in its formal powers (Christiansen
and Lintner, 2005), an analysis drawing on his very framework can also be used
to show that CoR displays a significant degree of institutional capacity along the
functional, representative and symbolic dimensions (Carroll, 2011). Additionally,
while it can exert a considerable impact only if it meets certain conditions, other-
wise remaining largely non-influential (Hönnige and Panke, 2013), one can also
find evidence to suggest that CoR managed well the duality of its role by balanc-
ing the tasks of subnational interest representation and performing as an advisory
body of the EU, hence establishing a stable place in the overall institutional archi-
tecture of the EU (Domorenok, 2009).
Amidst this continuing disagreement, CoR has now existed for more than two
decades. Meanwhile, it acquired additional formal competences such as the right
to appeal to the Court on issues related to subsidiarity9, and by the very virtue
of its history so far, its institutional status has become more difficult to question.
Thereby, the problems which were claimed to be damaging to the prospects of
CoR have arguably proven to be less salient than initially supposed. Among these
problems, therefore, inherent cleavages which were expected to reproduce na-
9It is difficult to expect frequent use of this right to challenge EU bodies or governments, but it
is indicative of the understanding that CoR is not merely an advisory body, and that it can formally
advance its position.
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tional differences should have been either overcome or made insignificant. In this
respect, CoR, as the chief form of any supranational channel of subnational partic-
ipation into European politics, is more likely than the previous channels to remove
factors contingent on national background, and thus to institutionalize multilevel
governance (Warleigh, 1999). For this reason, special attention should be paid to
CoR for the institutional study of multilevel politics.
1.2.3 Multilevel relations beyond the EU
Although the EU provides the strongest case for the importance of multilevel re-
lations, a brief overview of similar developments outside of its contours would
be useful to highlight the broader relevance of the phenomenon. To begin with
a different geographical focus, North America is another part of the world likely
to display increasing transnational political engagement among subnational au-
thorities, thanks to the federal structures of respective countries, as examplified
by the works of Dyment (2001), Fry (1998), Kuznetsov (2015, ch. 6) and Mingus
(2006). In fact, the roots of the study of paradiplomacy can be easily found among
North American scholars, mostly on North American subjects in 1970s, earlier
than the expansion of the field to Europe (Kuznetsov, 2015, p. 34). Nonetheless,
to reiterate what has been said about Europe, due to the absence of a favourable
international environment which might be provided by supranational integration,
and concomitantly the absence of intense institutionalization, today the progress
of such developments in North America lags behind Europe. For instance, the
case of the Pacific Salmon Commission is analysed as a catalysing institutional
environment (Mingus, 2006), which is by no means comparable to the strength
and influence of the EU. Yet the existence of such endeavours is indicative of the
possibility that, with similar institutional developments in other parts of the world,
multilevel politics would be more strongly asserted as a global phenomenon.
Focusing back onto Europe, a rich variety of similar transnational organiza-
tions with functionally or geographically delimited scopes can be found as well,
including for example, the Alps Adriatic Alliance, Association of European Bor-
der Regions, Baltic Sea States Sub-regional Cooperation, Conference of European
Regional Legislative Assemblies, Conference of European Regions with Leg-
islative Power, EUROCITIES, Union of Baltic Cities, Conference of Peripheral
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Maritime Regions of Europe, Four Motors for Europe, Council of Danube Cities
and Regions, Assembly of European Wine-producing Regions, etc. Although this
type of institutionalization is bound to face similar problems, which are discussed
above with regard to the direct initiatives of subnational authorities, these cases
also illustrate how multilevel relations get entrenched through a multitude of in-
stitutional strategies. Yet the coverage of functionally or geographically specific
institutions is not sufficient to provide a holistic image of the multilevel institu-
tional architecture of Europe at large.
In this respect, multilevel relations in Europe are also institutionalized through
organizations which aim to represent subnational authorities in a broader scope,
such as the Council of European Municipalities and Regions which is composed
of national associations of local and regional governments, and the Assembly of
European Regions which has a smaller membership coverage and which is lim-
ited to the regional tier, but which played an important lobbying role in the for-
mation of CoR (Loughlin, 1996b; Sodupe, 1999). Finally, the Congress of Local
and Regional Authorities (CLRAE) is a pan-European assembly for local and re-
gional authorities, which both provides the opportunity of direct representation
and benefits from the larger institutional architecture of the Council of Europe
(CoE). Thereby, as a channel of representation comparable to CoR, with standard
rules which do not vary with respect to the constitutional, political or economic
conditions of each country, and by virtue of integrating this representation with
a well-established European organization, the Congress is another organization
worthy of scholarly attention for the institutional study of multilevel relations.
Nonetheless, as the academic interest in the CoE has been overshadowed by
the obvious prominence of the EU, the Congress has remained understudied with
the exception of a few works which are largely descriptive (De Castro, 1999;
Schneider, 1994) or which mention it alongside many other international and
transnational organizations (Alger, 2010). Despite limited academic interest, the
history and the achievements of the Congress testify to its political significance.
With its origins going back to 1957, the predecessors of the Congress existed
during almost the entire history of the CoE, and it has proven to be an indis-
pensable part of the institutional architecture of the CoE, since it was eventually
given permanent status in 1994. Meanwhile, the European Charter for Local Self-
Government, adopted by the pre-Congress Standing Conference in 1985, is ar-
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guably the most important international document concerning local government
to date, proving the capacity of the Congress to exert international political im-
pact. In this respect, for a broader conception of multilevel politics in Europe,
not limited to multilevel governance of the EU which potentially obscures the in-
stitutional background, the study of CLRAE will also offer important analytical
insights.
1.3 Motives of subnational actors
In addition to the political and institutional contexts, the third dimension of the
rise of multilevel politics is changing motives of actors. The importance of their
agency is already recognized, explicitly or implicitly, by several studies cited in
the preceding two sections, especially with regard to their interaction with institu-
tions. For example, Marks’s actor-centred approach is intended as an explanation
of institutional change (Subsection 1.1.2, p. 19), and the variation in domestic
competences explains the existence of multiple transnational channels and deter-
mines specific choices among them (Subsection 1.2.2, p. 26).
Despite this prevalent recognition, however, the interactions between actors
and institutions have received relatively little attention from scholars. The studies
which discuss actor motives do not go much beyond their identification as rel-
evant factors for increasing multilevel political engagements, which are usually
categorized in terms of economic, cultural and political motives (Keating, 1999;
Blatter et al., 2010), with a possible addition of regular ‘housekeeping’ in border
areas (Kuznetsov, 2015, pp. 109-110). For this reason, the discussion below will
examine these motives with a view to highlighting the importance of the inter-
actions between actors and institutions through several examples which illustrate
these links.
To begin with economic motives which are linked to the need for catching up
with the liberalizing global economy, such as attracting foreign investment to sus-
tain and further the level of development, these are firstly a direct manifestation
of the changes in the underlying economic conditions, namely the rise of global
markets at the expense of nationally organized economies. However, adaptation to
these changes is mediated by political institutions. Fiscal federalism, for instance,
is a reflection of this changing economic logic which supposes subnational author-
1.3. Motives of subnational actors 33
ities as competing actors. Beyond the domestic sphere, the mediation by European
political institutions is particularly important. At a general level, European inte-
gration has provided a more or less self-contained market with a corresponding
polity. Moreover, EU institutions have also become the main source of funding
for more specific development aims. While competition to access these funds is
institutionalized through now popular practices of external offices of local and
regional authorities in Brussels, influencing EU policy is possible through for-
mal representation in CoR, if utilizing national channels is not deemed effective
enough.
Cultural motives are linked to ethnic, religious, linguistic or other dissimi-
larity with the parent country, and/or similarity with bordering areas in another
country. This basis of motives is primarily contingent on socio-cultural composi-
tions of one or more countries, but arguably it is also affected by institutional de-
velopments. For within country dissimilarity, decentralization usually takes into
account inner borders demarcated by cultural differences. For example, the re-
gionalization of France, which had been the epitome of the unitary state structure,
included a certain degree of asymmetry for Corsica with its designation as collec-
tivité territoriale10. For cross-country similarity, the Schengen Area has removed
barriers between people identifying themselves with a single community. This
has been further institutionalized through the formation of ‘Euroregions’, such as
the one which brings together the Austrian state of Tyrol with Italian provinces of
South Tyrol and Trentino.
Political motives usually follow cultural motives, and in this sense, they are
also contingent on social factors at a basic level. In the same vein, the relationship
between regionalization and regionalism highlights the potential of institutions to
generate and strengthen new actors11. Moreover, in a regionalized system, region-
alist agendas are more likely to be mainstreamed into normal politics through ex-
isting institutions. Taking two recent examples, first, the question of independence
10The special status of Corsica can be attributed to its geographical distinctiveness as an island,
but it is still an illustrative case of the congruence of regional and cultural borders. Furthermore,
France is not the only relevant case, and such congruence can be found in many other cases such
as Catalonia and Basque Country in Spain, or communities and regions of Belgium.
11This is not to say that regionalist actors emerge only after regional units are established; such
actors very probably played an indispensable role in the process of regionalization. However, the
argument holds, without delving into a chicken-egg problem, that once regionalization occurs,
regionalist actors irrevocably become an essential part of the new political system.
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for Scotland was decided through a legally approved referendum, and second, in
Spain where such a referendum has not been allowed, the Autonomous Commu-
nity of Catalonia still serves as the institutional locus of independence demands.
As for the European dimension, previous discussions testified to how European in-
tegration has made higher autonomy or independence a more viable option, hence
it potentially reinforces regionalist motives. Meanwhile, party-political aspects
of regionalism in both domestic and European spheres constitute another institu-
tional layer in terms of such motives.
A more normatively based political motive for engaging in multilevel politics
may be the contribution to the development of other subnational entities. With
regard to political development, promoting democratic values, in particular lo-
cal/regional democracy, and sharing and exchanging experiences of subnational
self-government should be added to other political motives that are rather prag-
matic. While CoR considers the improvement of subnational democracy to be
among its main objectives, organizations founded independently by subnational
authorities can also serve as platforms for policy learning and norm diffusion. In
particular, the Congress of the CoE emerges as the main institution championing
subnational democracy; within the framework of the CoE whose main mission is
concerned with democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Congress as-
sumes responsibility for the subnational aspects of these values.
Finally, subnational authorities may need to address several routine issues with
a local but cross-border scope, such as pollution affecting bordering regions but
not whole countries. The relevance of cross-border ‘housekeeping’ is naturally
much higher in the context of European integration. Under a strict system of
national sovereignty, border control would be managed exclusively by national
governments, but the absence of border controls in the Schengen Area creates
both opportunities and necessities for cooperation among subnational authorities.
While cooperation schemes such as the aforementioned Euroregions emerge also
as a response to this kind of issues, the EU does more than removing the borders
by actively encouraging cooperation through successive INTERREG programmes
as part of its regional policy. As a further step, European Grouping of Territorial
Cooperation (EGTC), a programme coordinated by CoR, ‘allows public entities of
different Member States to get together under a new entity with full legal person-
ality’, which is thereby significant in terms of its inclusion in the European legal
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framework12. The first established EGTC, Eurometropolis Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai,
seized this opportunity to create a territorial entity across the French-Belgian bor-
der, which is effectively almost a single metropolitan area, thus requiring close
coordination between public authorities that cannot merge otherwise.
Neither INTERREG nor EGTC is limited to cross-border cooperation. Al-
though such examples are used to highlight the above points, it should be noted
that Euroregion schemes display a higher degree of diversity, including sector-
based initiatives such as the Association of Ceramics Cities, or geography-based
initiatives such as the Mediterranean Archipelagus. In the latter case, for ex-
ample, in addition to broad economic factors discussed above, further bases of
subnational motives can be found in geography, which is contingent on exoge-
nous factors just like socio-cultural composition, and even more so. However,
these exogenous factors are not highly variable over time, hence they do not re-
ally constitute changing motives for subnational actors; rather what changes is the
possibilities of articulating and pursuing the interests which arise from them, that
is, the opportunities of institutionalization.
Overall, the types of motives of subnational actors for engaging in multilevel
politics which have been covered by existing studies are useful for a systematic
understanding of the role of agency. However, as the examples presented in this
subsection have tried to demonstrate, the agency of actors is more effective when
it is in interplay with institutional innovation; new institutions may create new mo-
tives, may mobilise pre-existing bases of motives, or may be created from scratch
based on predetermined motives. European institutions are of particular impor-
tance for multilevel politics, mostly thanks to the relaxation of the constraints
posed by national borders and the legal framework within which a variety of co-
operation schemes can operate. In light of this evidence, the present study will
proceed with an approach focusing on the interactions between institutions and
actors, which are most likely to manifest multilevel politics in an empirically ob-
servable way, as this indicates a high potential for a fruitful analysis.
12This description is taken from the official website: https://portal.cor.europa.eu/egtc (last ac-
cess: 18/04/2016). It is established by Regulation (EC) 1082/2006.
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1.4 Explaining institutional effects:
Research question and case selection
This chapter has reviewed several bodies of literature which are developed to
understand the rise of a new political system, conceptualized here as multilevel
politics. This concept is understood as depicting, in an encompassing way, all
political relations across multiple levels of government without serious impedi-
ment from the priority of the national level. In this sense, it is chosen to have
a broader focus than the familiar concept of multilevel governance, since it does
not narrowly focus on the practices emanating from the governance of the EU,
which are mostly framed with regard to spontaneity, diversification, complexity
and an overall fuzziness. Instead, the main motivation of this thesis is to advance
an understanding of the systemic and more systematic features of this novel phe-
nomenon.
For this purpose, three dimensions of the rise of multilevel politics are re-
viewed. First, at the European-political dimension, tracing the theories of Eu-
ropean integration shows that European institutions have moved from a position
of dependent variable to independent variable, and that contemporary studies are
more appropriately focused on the outcomes of the institutions built by integra-
tion. However, multilevel governance embodies a tension between the complexity
of emerging practices and a more stable institutional background; and when this
latter institutional dimension is scrutinized, it is still concerned with the construc-
tion or the revision of institutions necessary for multilevel governance. Second,
with a closer focus on the institutional context, the common institutional trends
operate against the background of persisting variation in domestic structures, and
the transnational channels reproduce this cross-national variation to a considerable
extent. There are only a few institutions, such as the Committee of the Regions
and the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, which embody the common
trends of multilevel politics by representing subnational actors irrespectively of
their domestic backgrounds. Finally, the dimension of actor motives shows that
the interactions between actors and institutions constitute an important aspect of
the rise of multilevel politics despite relative lack of attention to them.
In view of this last point, the institution-actor axis can be identified as the
main direction in which the study of multilevel politics can be improved, and
1.4. Explaining institutional effects 37
this thesis will endeavour to do so. In addition, as discussed in the European-
political dimension, the literature on multilevel governance is weaker with regard
to understanding the effects of the political institutions, apart from the disordered
governance practices. Combining these two observations about the relevant bodies
of literature, the main purpose of this thesis is explaining institutional effects on
actors. Among the studies cited in this chapter, the best example of such effects
is expressed in Subsection 1.2.1 (p. 23) by the idea that the institutional outcomes
of regionalization create regionalist actors who sustain the demand for reform. In
order to extend this logic to the European scale, the remainder of this thesis will
offer an answer, in the first place, to the following background question: does the
existence of the institutions of multilevel politics create actors who are particularly
disposed to further reform the European political system towards one of multilevel
politics?
Given the significance of institutions which is apparent in the works reviewed
here, one can reasonably expect an affirmative answer to this question. Along-
side confirming such an answer empirically, the analytical objectives of this thesis
will further include the explanations of the mechanisms which link the dependent
variable, the attitudes of subnational actors, and the primary independent variable,
institutional effects. In other words, the explanatory research question can be for-
mulated as follows: how do the institutional effects on subnational actors lead to
attitudes which are more favourably disposed to multilevel politics? As seen in
Section 1.3, the institutions may generate novel actor motives, as much as they
can help the better articulation and the pursuit of existing motives. In this sense,
when answering this research question, institutional effects will be explicated in
the form of both direct influence and the ability to meet expectations.
Finally, the logic of case selection is also derived from the literature reviewed
in this chapter. Namely, among the plethora of transnational institutional chan-
nels, the Committee of the Regions and the Congress of Local and Regional Au-
thorities stand out as organizations with the best capacity to embody the common
institutional patterns of multilevel politics, as they do not depend on domestic
competences of subnational authorities. In this sense, in the study of institutional
effects, a special weight will be given to formal organizations, and particularly to
these two. Following this logic, the Committee and the Congress will be examined
in detail, both to illustrate the appropriateness of the theoretical approach in the
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next chapter, and as case studies for empirical analysis. Moreover, the selection
of one case from outside the EU will ensure that the focus on the systemic as-
pect of multilevel relations will be sufficiently differentiated from the governance
practices of the EU.
Chapter 2
Institutionalist theory of
multilevel politics
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a theory of multilevel politics which
will unify its broader context with an empirical focus on the institution-actor axis.
New institutionalism is selected as the most appropriate theoretical framework,
not only because institutions have been shown to be central for understanding
multilevel politics, but also because this framework is capable of highlighting the
links between politics, institutions and actor motives. To begin with a sufficiently
comprehensive definition of political institutions, they can be depicted as pat-
terned higher order effects, including rules, standards and structurally determined
factors, which can constrain, shape or constitute the behaviour of actors with-
out necessarily repeated interventions, which endure over time, but which also
evolve and adapt to changing circumstances (Ostrom, 1986, pp. 3-4; Clemens and
Cook, 1999, pp. 444-445). In this sense, a new institutionalist conceptualization
will draw on three major features of institutions: translating structural factors into
patterned effects, relative stability in tandem with the ability of adaptation, and
influence over actors.
This approach, as well as the above definition, covers formal and informal
qualities of institutions. Organizations as physical entities can be seen as purpo-
sive and collective actors, hence distinct from institutions (North, 1990a, pp. 4-5;
Young, 1986, p.108). However, this does not have to exclude organizations from
an institutionalist study, as they are based on and generate institutional systems
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within which their formal and informal characteristics become important deter-
minants of political outcomes through interaction with individual actors (Zucker,
1987). Therefore, organizations or formal institutions constitute an important site
of institutionalist study insofar as the distinction and the relationship between their
actorness and institutional qualities are recognized. Informal institutions, on the
other hand, stand for the rules which are socially accepted and shared without
relying on codification (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). In this sense, this chapter
aims to develop a theory which is capable of taking into account both formal and
informal institutions, and both formal and informal qualities of organizations. Yet
the main focus will be on two formal institutions, the Committee of the Regions
and the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, as the most crystallized and
autonomous forms of institutionalized multilevel politics in Europe.
Taking stock of these conceptualizations and major claims of new institution-
alism, institutionalization will be understood as the totality of three interconnected
aspects: the emergence of specific institutions, their entrenchment in their larger
context by adapting to structural conditions and actor expectations, and their abil-
ity to exert influence on actors in line with their designated functions. Therefore, a
new-institutionalist framework will be developed to assess the origins, the evolu-
tion and the effects of institutions. It will be argued that multilevel politics are in-
stitutionalized by conforming to this framework, but empirical research is needed
to ascertain the effects with regard to the relations between institutions and actors.
In this respect, the first section below will lay down the general principles of new
institutionalism and its suitability for the study of multilevel politics. Next, three
successive sections will develop the argument by addressing the questions as to
why institutions arise, how they evolve, and what they are expected to do. Each
section will pay particular attention to the diversity of explanations offered within
new institutionalism, and the implications of these explanations for the interna-
tional and European environment of the institutions of multilevel politics. The
chapter will conclude with a set of hypotheses on the influence of institutions on
actors, to be tested through empirical research.
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2.1 New institutionalism
The designation of institutionalism as ‘new’ suggests, first of all, a departure from
an ‘old’ institutionalism1. What makes it new is the shift from an exclusive focus
on formal institutions and the use of discursive methods to explicate them, towards
a broader perspective on both formal and informal institutions and the use of the
relative merits of discursive and scientific methods (Ethington and McDonagh,
1995). The methodological aspect of this shift results primarily from the changes
in the scientific paradigm of politics. Namely, the transition from the old to the
new institutionalism has followed a dialectic process mediated by behavioural-
ism: the latter was in opposition to old institutionalism with a view to substituting
an exclusive focus on individual preferences for one on institutions, and a more
scientifically motivated methodology for the discursive approach. New institu-
tionalism is therefore a reaction to behaviouralism without a complete return to
old ways, refusing the exclusion of institutions from social scientific study but in-
corporating relative merits from both perspectives (Immergut, 1998). In a similar
vein, it is also a reaction to the virtually irreconcilable tension between social-
determinist and behaviouralist accounts (ibid.). In this sense, new institutionalism
is an approach which seeks flexibility between structural, institutional and indi-
vidual levels of analysis, and in the direction of causality across these levels. Its
core claim is that institutions matter; to supplement behaviouralism and social
determinism, institutions matter as much as individual and structural factors, and
to supplement old institutionalism, institutions matter alongside individual and
structural factors.
Nonetheless, the answers offered by new institutionalist scholars on why in-
stitutions matter diverge to a considerable degree. For this reason, it is commonly
accepted that new institutionalism is an umbrella term for three more specific
approaches: historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, and so-
ciological institutionalism (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Despite apparent differences
which cannot be easily bridged, in particular those at an epistemological level,
there is room for a partial synthesis among the three strands of the approach, and
where synthesis is not possible, for an eclectic approach. The next subsection will
1While new institutionalism is purposively called ‘new’ to distinguish itself from its predeces-
sors, the designation ‘old’ is only used retrospectively.
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briefly present these strands, and discuss the possibility of adopting a broad new-
institutionalist approach. From an eclectic perspective, the internal diversity of
new institutionalism will therefore be taken as the source of possible complemen-
tarities within a common framework; even if different strands offer alternative or
rival accounts, their integration into the explanatory model, rather than rejection
through theoretical discussion, will decrease the risk of omitting relevant factors.
The second subsection will discuss the suitability of new institutionalism for the
study of international and European politics, and conclude that the capacity of
this approach to tackle domestic and international problems alike makes it partic-
ularly well-suited to multilevel politics which erodes the separation of these two
spheres. Finally, the three aspects of institutionalization (origins, evolution and ef-
fects), the three areas of discussion (theoretical underpinnings, European context
and multilevel politic), and the three new-institutionalist approaches (historical,
rational choice and sociological institutionalisms) will be organized into a unified
framework.
2.1.1 New-institutionalist study of politics
The fact that new institutionalism, with its three variants, is a prevalent theoreti-
cal framework for political science is subject to criticism on the basis of merely
borrowing methods from economics and sociology instead of developing its own
methods (Moe, 1991). More specifically, the premises of rational choice institu-
tionalism are borrowed from economics as it is mainly concerned about collective
action problems with rational actors, and explains institutions as the processes
to solve these problems by reducing transaction costs of making collective deci-
sions or deals (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Sociological institutionalism, on the other
hand, understands institutions merely as reflections of cultural practices (ibid.).
However, the spheres of politics, economy and society or culture cannot be sep-
arated in a straightforward and mutually exclusive way, thus a certain degree of
permeability across respective academic disciplines is only natural. Moreover,
politics is arguably the sphere whereby economic and socio-cultural factors are
more likely to be co-determinate, hence a plurality of methods is necessary. In
this respect, historical institutionalism comes forth as the most suitable variant
to provide a mid-ground between rational choice and sociological approaches as
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it incorporates both strategic calculations and cultural bases of action (Hall and
Taylor, 1996; Hall, 2010).
In addition to economic and social factors which interact with politics, histor-
ical institutionalism also focuses on factors that are intrinsically political, namely
power, and it attributes great importance to the distribution of power and resources
by institutions among actors, offering this focus as one of its distinctive contribu-
tions to the institutionalist theory in general (Hall, 2010). In addition, histori-
cal institutionalism takes the form of an intermediate level theory, in view of ac-
counting for the mediation of macro-structural effects on individuals’ behaviour
and individuals’ feedback to systemic conditions (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). In
this sense, it is capable of linking the institution-actor axis with broader political
questions. Therefore, from the aforementioned strands, historical institutionalism
constitutes the best starting point for political analysis with respect to the incorpo-
ration of diverse perspectives, emphasis on power distribution, and intermediate-
level theoretical explanations.
In this context, the theoretical framework which will be developed here will
take historical institutionalism as the starting point, but advance its eclectic na-
ture by paying closer attention to rationalist and cultural components, thus by
also integrating the distinctive contributions of rational choice and sociological
institutionalisms. While aligning the methodology and the ontology of political
analysis is an essential task of a theoretical approach (Hall, 2003), the main dif-
ficulty lies in aligning two sets of internally consistent accounts with each other
against the background of their diverging ontologies, which is most notably man-
ifested in their respective conceptions of individual preferences. Namely, rational
choice assumes objectively defined preferences which rational actors pursue and
explains institutions in terms of enabling more efficient pursuit of diverse inter-
ests, whereas sociological institutionalism assumes that preferences are socially
constructed and that the role of institutions pertains to this construction. In other
words, the questions as to whether or not preferences are exogenous or endoge-
nous, and whether or not institutions are instrumental or constitutive demarcate
the line between rationalist and sociological perspectives.
An eclectic integration of two perspectives is possible, first, through a division
of functions between them for different issues, different aspects of the same issues,
different stages of a causal sequence, differences of generality and specificity, etc.
44 Chapter 2. Institutionalist theory of multilevel politics
(March and Olsen, 1998). For instance, strategic and cultural factors can be oper-
ationalized into variables that can be tested together, the formation of preferences
can be explained sociologically, while the pursuit of interests rationalistically, or
rationalist and cultural explanations can be found usefully relative to each other
in different cases. Second, as for the possibility of closing the gap between their
ontologies to the extent possible, it can be remarked that rational choice does not
have to be limited to instrumental rationality assumptions and can indeed incorpo-
rate elements such as culture, symbols, norms, etc. (Thelen, 1999). A prominent
example of this kind of rapprochement is the understanding of mental models
and ideologies as cognitive templates which process complex information from
the social environment and render it useful for social action, akin to the under-
standing of institutions from a rational choice perspective which emphasizes the
facilitation of collective action in a complex environment of preferences through
the provision of necessary information (Denzau and North, 1994).
The possibilities and limits of a synthesis between sociological and rationalist
perspectives are beyond the scope of the present discussion, yet the plausibility
of their complementarity and possible grounds of intersection suggest that devel-
oping a new institutionalist theory does not necessarily require an ontologically
motivated choice among mutually exclusive alternative accounts. Instead, start-
ing with historical institutionalism as the best possible common ground and the
most adept strand for the study of politics, the relative merits of rational choice
and sociological perspectives will provide the bases of the plurality of insights
which will be applied to all stages of the explanatory framework in this thesis.
More specifically, all strands of new institutionalism will inform the construction
of a narrative of the institutionalization of multilevel politics with respect to the
origins and the evolution of institutions, and the hypotheses which will lay the
groundwork for ensuing empirical research.
2.1.2 New-institutionalist study of European politics
New institutionalism is recognized as an approach suitable for studying both do-
mestic and international institutions. For the latter, the main focus of the early
research has been on the functioning of organizations, mostly with models and
methods borrowed from the analysis of domestic deliberative and bureaucratic or-
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ganizations (Martin and Simmons, 1998). More contemporary research by liberal
institutionalists2 and regime theorists has shifted the focus from organizations to
more informal aspects, and from institutional effects to the creation and persis-
tence of regimes/institutions. Consequently, international institutions are under-
stood as both independent and dependent variables, and both causes and effects,
simultaneously (ibid.; Keohane and Martin, 1995). Therefore, the institutionalist
study of international politics is in line with the breadth of the framework proposed
above, with regard to combining formal and informal, rationalist and sociological,
and endogenous and exogenous aspects.
This understanding is actually highlighted by theories of international regimes.
The basic definition of international regimes is formulated as ‘sets of implicit or
explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which
actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations’ (Krasner,
1982b, p.186), and refined as ‘social institutions consisting of agreed upon princi-
ples, norms, rules, procedures and programs, that govern the interactions of actors
in specific issue areas’ (Levy, Young and Zürn, 1995, p.274). Thereby, regimes
have a rather informal character, mediate actors’ behaviour, and are issue-specific.
This conceptualization distinguishes regimes not only from international organi-
zations as physical entities and actors, but also from the international political
structure which is valid across all issue areas, and world order in general which is
the sum of all institutional arrangements (ibid.).
While regime theory has made a significant contribution to the study of in-
ternational institutions by drawing attention to informal aspects, institutionalist
approaches to international politics do not have to be limited to these, but can
be developed to re-include formal aspects as well. For this purpose, with a less
restrictive definition, international institutions stand for general patterns of be-
haviour as well as specific arrangements which are persistent over time and which
prescribe, shape and constrain behaviour (Keohane, 1988). According to this def-
inition, international institutions can include formal international organizations
with specific rules, procedures and hierarchies. While these institutions consti-
tute a suitable subject for a rationalistic approach as mechanisms reducing the
2Liberal institutionalism has also been discussed as a general theory of international politics in
Chapter 1, and as the major representative of the liberal camp of contemporary theoretical debates.
Its discussion in this chapter refers mostly to the details of the institutionalist aspect of the theory,
rather than its position as a liberal theory of international politics.
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transaction cost of cooperation, the study of institutions could be improved by
considering them together with general patterns or regimes, incorporating rela-
tive merits of sociological approaches, and taking history seriously (ibid.), hence
by developing an eclectic new-institutionalist approach that addresses origins and
evolution as well.
As for European integration, it can be seen as a special case of international
institutional architecture which displays radical departures from traditional forms
of international politics. New institutionalism is also proposed as a necessary and
useful perspective to study European politics. This is especially true with regard
to the transition from theories borrowed from international relations to those bor-
rowed from comparative politics, as discussed in the previous chapter. While the
emergence of European institutions with autonomous leverage calls for a study of
these very institutions, new institutionalism can also help to bridge the apparent
divide between international relations and comparative politics, as no fundamen-
tal differentiation between domestic and international spheres is necessary when
analysing the category of institution (Jupille and Caporaso, 1999).
Furthermore, integration theories were criticized for proposing explanations
in stark rivalry with one another, while they were interested in different aspects
of the same phenomenon which could be understood as complementary (Puchala,
1971). In a similar way, the multi-faceted nature of institutionalism approaches
different aspects of political reality, and an eclectic institutionalist account would
be able to provide an overarching picture of European integration and its political
consequences (Jupille and Caporaso, 1999). However, institutionalism can be
considered as more closely coupled with neo-functionalist theory and based on
assumptions which contradict those of intergovernmentalism (Puchala, 1999), as
well as based on a critique or a re-interpretation of intergovernmentalist claims
(Jupille and Caporaso, 1999).
For instance, the historical institutionalist critique of intergovernmentalism
puts forward the following themes that the latter fails to address accurately: the
autonomy of supra-national institutions, short time horizons and changing pref-
erences of national political actors, unintended consequences of seemingly in-
significant political decisions, supra-national political actors becoming increas-
ingly powerful over time, and the difficulty of radical reform in political institu-
tions mainly due to the high costs of reversing institutional processes (Pierson,
2.1. New institutionalism 47
1996). Therefore, a historical institutionalist account of European integration de-
parts from intergovernmentalism in terms of relaxing the assumptions of national
sovereignty as immune to any change, institutions as merely instrumental, and in-
stitution making moments—grand bargains—as determinative of the integration
in its entirety (ibid.). Especially with respect to the last implication, the processes
between critical junctures, namely treaty making, are as important as these mo-
ments, and should be explained from a perspective of evolutionary or incremental
change (Bulmer, 1998).
On the other hand, an institutionalist re-interpretation of intergovernmentalism
can be developed insofar as the primacy of national governments is not challenged
at the outset. Despite this primacy, however, European institutions can be shown
to exert autonomous influence for several reasons (Pollack, 1996, 1997). First, the
actors representing European institutions can shape the stability and change of the
institutional structure, for instance by participating in the treaty making processes
albeit without formal powers. Second, they can exploit the divergence of pref-
erences between member states as well as their imperfect sanction and control
mechanisms on supra-national agents leading to a situation of lock-in whereby
the status quo cannot be easily changed. Third, they can create opportunities to
override individual government preferences through qualified majority voting3.
Overall, not only international and European institutions constitute units of
analysis amenable to a new institutionalist study with an eclectic character as pro-
posed above, but also the institutionalist analysis of international and European
politics helps to transcend several analytical divides which are unable to capture
the specificities of multilevel politics, since the latter operates through the per-
meability of domestic and international spheres and the institutions of multilevel
politics do not have to be exclusively domestic or international. Moreover, multi-
level politics originates from and acts upon its international and European context;
in this sense, the explanation of the origins, evolution and effects of the institutions
of multilevel politics requires a solid understanding of international and European
institutions at large, which will be discussed as the contextual background in each
section to follow.
3The significance of institutional mechanisms which explain these features will be examined
in more detail in the Subsection 2.3.2 below.
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2.1.3 New-institutionalist study of multilevel politics
To sum up the logic leading to the theoretical framework so far, first, the analyt-
ical focus of this thesis is set as the institutional dimension of multilevel politics
on the basis of the literature reviewed in the previous chapter. In this sense, not
only does new institutionalism emerge as the obvious choice in contemporary so-
cial science for studying institutions, but it also has great potential for explaining
important aspects of multilevel politics: On the one hand, new institutionalism
in general, and historical institutionalism in particular as a common ground for
all theoretical strands, are shown to be strong and rich perspectives to approach
political institutions; on the other hand, they are capable of addressing the in-
tertwining of domestic and international spheres through multilevel politics. Yet
several specifications and qualifications of the theoretical framework are in order.
First, historical institutionalism is fundamentally concerned with the temporal
aspects of institutionalization, whereas the empirical focus of this thesis is placed
on institutional effects on actors at a given point in time. In order to develop a
complete account of institutionalization and achieve the empirical objectives at
the same time, this chapter will discuss the historical aspects, namely institutional
origins and evolution, and conclude with hypotheses on institutional effects that
will guide the empirical research project. In other words, the remainder of the the-
sis will exclusively advance an empirical account of the effects of the institutions
of multilevel politics as both the outcome and a crucial mechanism of institution-
alization, provided that their historical background conforms to the theoretical
framework of institutionalization in terms of origins and evolution, as discussed
in the subsequent sections of this chapter. Thereby, the overall framework has
the shape of historical institutionalism, proceeding through institutional origins,
evolution and effects, although the empirical part of the thesis will be concerned
with the effects only at a given time.
Second, another important feature of historical institutionalism, which also ap-
plies broadly to new institutionalism, is being a mid-level theory, by understanding
institutions as intermediaries between structural factors and actor behaviour. This
will require the theoretical framework to account for the wider environment of the
institutions of multilevel politics, which will be done by discussing European in-
stitutions prior to multilevel politics. In this way, the discussion of the institutions
2.1. New institutionalism 49
of multilevel politics will help us to understand where they come from and the sys-
tem which they reshape. Furthermore, this strategy will have a practical advantage
in that useful guidelines for exploring the institutions of multilevel politics can be
derived from both abstract theoretical arguments of new institutionalism and the
arguments of existing studies on European institutions. For these reasons, the
three sections that follow in this chapter will examine theoretical underpinnings,
European institutions and the application of these to multilevel politics respec-
tively.
Third, historical institutionalism does not preclude either rational choice or
sociological institutionalism, and for this reason, it is taken here as the com-
mon ground of an eclectic new institutionalism. However, in order to enhance
its eclectic quality, the following discussions will pay special attention to argu-
ments which are distinctively rationalist and cultural; subsections on theoretical
underpinnings, European institutions and multilevel politics with regard to insti-
tutional origins, evolution and effects will all contain explanations from rational-
ist and cultural accounts. In this sense, such an eclecticism will be achieved by
feeding rational choice and sociological institutionalism into the content of the
broader historical institutionalist framework. However, historical institutionalism
is larger than the sum of the other two; in order not to lose sight of the distinctively
historical-institutionalist propositions, these will be integrated into the introduc-
tory statements of each section. For example, the sections on origins will begin
with the role of historical context, the evolution with stability-change dialectic
and path-dependency, and effects with the distribution of power and resources.
The historical-institutionalist explanation will not then be exhausted at the stage
of empirical research design, as it will still be relevant for generic institutional
influence and the dispersion of authority.
Finally, drawing an account of the institutions of multilevel politics requires
the specification of what these institutions are. However, as discussed in the previ-
ous chapter, the institutional architecture of multilevel politics is characterized by
persisting variations in domestic structures, and the multiplicity of transnational
channels which reproduce this cross-national variation to a certain extent. Instead
of attempting to account for all possible types of relevant institutions, the empha-
sis of the following sections of this chapter will be on the selected cases, namely
the Committee of the Regions and the Congress of Local and Regional Authori-
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ties, which display a crystallized embodiment of multilevel politics thanks to their
higher capacity to minimize the effects of national differences.
Therefore, the framework for the institutionalist theory of multilevel politics
will be unpacked in the following sections which will show that multilevel pol-
itics displays conformity with new-institutionalist approaches regarding origins,
evolution and effects; features which have parallels with and complement the in-
stitutional architecture of European politics; and characteristics which pertain to
rationalist and cultural accounts. In this sense, multilevel politics in Europe will
be said to be institutionalized. However, the empirical part of the thesis will focus
on institutional effects and particularly the influence of institutions over actors at
a given time. In empirical terms, as discussed in the last chapter, this is the most
understudied aspect of multilevel politics, which is probably because it requires a
large amount of data. In theoretical terms, this is also the weakest aspect of histor-
ical institutionalism (Hall and Taylor, 1996). For these reasons, the chapter will
conclude by employing all strands of new institutionalism to derive hypotheses
that will guide the empirical research which will complement the narrative of in-
stitutionalization by substantiating the theoretical presupposition that institutions
of multilevel politics indeed influence actor behaviour.
2.2 Institutional origins of multilevel politics
For understanding where institutions come from, the obvious explanation lies in
their historical contexts. However, the historical context of an institution is pre-
sumed to be characterized by already existing institutions. Thereby, the study of
one institution is not complete without taking into account the relevant institutions
which determine the structural conditions of a society or polity at the time of its in-
ception. In order to ensure that historical institutionalist analysis does not regress
almost infinitely deeper into history, the institutional setting at one point in time
should be taken as given or exogenous to the analysis. With a view to deciding an
appropriate starting point, one can look at ‘punctuated equilibria’ which explain
the cycles of institutional reproduction and evolution that are only disrupted by
contingent moments of crisis or critical junctures (Krasner, 1984). The most sig-
nificant critical juncture in recent political history of Europe, leading to a radical
institutional restructuring, is arguably the Second World War, the end of which set
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into motion several dynamics which paved the way for multilevel politics. The
aim of this section is deciphering such dynamics, following a discussion of the
theoretical underpinnings of the literature on institutional origins.
2.2.1 Rationalist and cultural accounts of institutional origins
The rationalist explanations of institutional origins focus on collective action prob-
lems; as certain equilibria of collective decisions which occur in reality seem the-
oretically impossible to predict, institutions are introduced as higher order factors
which make such equilibria possible (Riker, 1980). Therefore, the genesis of
an institution is in itself a collective decision which facilitates the processes of
reaching further decisions; and an institution is created insofar as actors have a
strong stake in the value that it will generate, that is, being able to reach collective
decisions which are otherwise impossible or very difficult. In economic terms,
an institution is a particular form of equilibrium in a game—the pre-institutional
context—and given its endurance, it is a recurrent equilibrium in a repeated game
(Calvert, 1995; Schotter, 1981).
In this sense, institutions are selected on the basis of their presumed effects, but
it is not always possible to explain institutional origins through pure functionalism
directly in relation to the effects (Moe, 1990). Instead, an analytical separation is
needed between theories of institutions which explain the institutions themselves
by taking them as endogenous, and institutional theories which explain effects by
taking stable rules as parametric or exogenous (Diermeier and Krehbiel, 2003;
Shepsle, 1989). In other words, the examination of institutional origins should
focus on the adoption of institutions in view of higher order rules, while the ex-
amination of more ordinary collective decisions in view of lower level institutional
rules should be left to the analysis of institutional effects (Ostrom, 1986).
The rationalist assumptions about the pre-institutional environment consist of
costly and imperfect information and feedback, insufficient enforcement of agree-
ments, and erroneous subjective models or cognitive templates (North, 1990a,
p. 16). Therefore, institutions emerge in order to reduce the transaction cost
of improving information flow and communication, ensure the enforcement of
agreements, and correct subjective models; in short, to reduce the uncertainty
of political markets (North, 1990b). This pre-institutional environment does not
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have to be one of institutional vacuum; the creation of new institutions will very
probably utilize existing institutional channels. Yet the need to create a new insti-
tution indicates the inadequacy or insufficiency of such channels, which render the
transaction costs of addressing the issues which are put into the political agenda
considerably high, so much so that the willingness to reduce this cost will out-
weigh the reluctance to bear the cost of creating a new institution. In this case,
although new institutional arrangements will not necessarily be perfect, they will
be highly preferable to the pre-institutional situation.
While rational choice institutionalism thus portrays the inception of an insti-
tution as a deliberate improvement to the existing imperfections, sociological in-
stitutionalism draws attention to an alternative explanation by deconstructing the
distinction between an institution and its context of inception, that is, the socio-
cultural structure. The main sociological explanation is thereby institutional iso-
morphism which predicts the replication of existing social and cultural norms and
symbols through new institutions (Scott, 1995; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The
main difficulty in this approach is related to explaining why isomorphic institu-
tions arise if they do not add anything to the existing environment. One com-
pelling claim is that they can serve the purpose of increasing legitimacy (Hall and
Taylor, 1996). In contrast to the rational choice approach which puts forward
increased efficiency as the major contribution of a new institution, the focus of
sociological institutionalism is on legitimacy which does not necessarily follow
efficiency. In fact, the social construction of an institution is a factor which can
explain the inefficiencies of institutions, as it ensures the perception of institutions
and socio-cultural norms as legitimate, even if they do not constitute an efficient
form of social organization.
In this respect, the following subsections will explain the foundation of the
institutions of multilevel politics in view of what made their inception necessary
and possible within their historical context. The rationalist account will point out
the pre-existing institutional setting, in particular its imperfections and high trans-
action costs with regard to imminent political issues, as the parameters of institu-
tional genesis which are distinct from institutional characteristics. The sociologi-
cal account will suggest explanation based on how central features of this setting
are ingrained in newly generated institutions. Therefore, the institutions of mul-
tilevel politics are founded to reform and refine their international and European
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environment, while this environment is shaped in a similar way by international
and European institutions which reformed and refined earlier contexts.
2.2.2 Origins of European institutions
The regime theory of international politics makes an important modification to the
rationalistic account of institutional origins: while a new institution is an equilib-
rium in a high-order game with respect to the given distribution of preferences
and capabilities, which is preferable to its prior arrangement or the lack thereof,
it is not necessarily the only possible equilibrium but one among many (Kras-
ner, 1991). In other words, irrespective of the degree of optimality of its prior
context, the formation of an institution primarily represents stabilization along a
line of Pareto-optimal points (ibid.). Although this conception seems to suggest
a fragile equilibrium since there exist other equally preferable possibilities, his-
tory is evidently not marked by institutional instability which alters continuously
between optimal equilibria. Above all, this is because the formation of an institu-
tion is more compelling than the maintenance of an existing institution; thus, once
established, radically reforming or destroying an institution entails much higher
costs (Levy, Young and Zürn, 1995; Keohane and Nye, 1977; Keohane, 2012).
In this sense, the moment of genesis determines an important part of institutional
characteristics.
One remaining question, however, is concerned with the factors behind the
location of the stabilization along a line of optimal equilibria, unless this is com-
pletely contingent. In the light of theoretical discussions presented above, the
rationalist account would draw attention to the parameters shaped by pre-existing
institutions, and the cultural account would put forward isomorphism. Thereby,
the explanation that can be confirmed by different variants of institutionalist the-
ory would suggest that the formation of an institution will represent a chain of
inter-institutional continuity as well as the beginning of an intra-institutional sta-
bility. On the other side, this tendency also suggests that any departure from
continuity is a strong sign that the underlying conditions of institutions make the
pre-existing system unsustainable.
The institutionalization of multilevel politics is a difficult process primarily
because the international and European environment is shaped by the remnants
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of preceding institutional arrangements, but its very existence indicates a need in
this environment. Most notably, multilevel politics is a challenge for sovereignty
at both sub-national and supra-national levels, as the latter implies that any au-
thority below the nation state cannot have an independent foreign policy, and any
authority outside or above the national state cannot have an independent influence
within its borders. However, this is a difficult challenge when sovereignty shapes
general behavioural patterns of international politics and manifests itself in many
or all of formal institutions pertaining to both national and international orders,
for instance, the constitutions of the nation states, or the basic principles of the
United Nations (Keohane, 1988). In other words, a critical juncture such as the
Second World War was not sufficient to do away with national sovereignty in the
postwar settlement and in the new international organizations.
Nonetheless, if the persistence of the traditional conception of sovereignty is
primarily a result of institutional inertia, then the institutional arrangements based
on this conception are likely to become suboptimal responses to changing struc-
tural conditions (Krasner, 1988). In this respect, while international institutions
embody the structural conditions of their time of foundation, this embodiment
easily lags behind changing conditions such as those which have been discussed
in the previous chapter in view of territorial rescaling. On the other hand, the
developments which reproduce national sovereignty in new institutions are also
responsible for institutions which transform or undermine it. For instance, Euro-
pean states, which had historically diffused the original idea of sovereignty, now
operate in a system of ‘pooled sovereignty’ as opposed to the United States which
has become the primary defender of the traditional version (Keohane, 2002). The
European Union, whose establishment as well as deepening and enlargement fol-
lowed traditional procedures of international treaty making, is the location of this
pooling. Irrespective of whether this was a rescue or the beginning of the end of
the nation state, it clearly represents an ‘innovative institutional thinking’ capa-
ble of shaping its structural conditions (ibid.). To a lesser extent, the Council of
Europe, which conforms to a more traditional understanding of intergovernmental
organization, is the result of earlier postwar attempts of enhancing European coop-
eration through institution building and an institutional embodiment of European
society of states (Heinrich, 2010; Stivachtis and Habegger, 2011). In addition, it
has adopted a value-driven role, focusing on the rule of law, democracy and hu-
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man rights, which is an unorthodox way of international politics as it conflates
domestic and international spheres with respect to the basic principles of political
organization (Kicker, 2010).
These developments testify to the fact that the need for cooperation and in-
tegration transcending national borders was evident in the mid-century restruc-
turing of international and European politics. Yet the preceding structural condi-
tions made the reproduction of national sovereignty more preferable to otherwise
equally plausible alternative arrangements. The widening gap between increas-
ing transnational interdependence and older forms of international and European
institutions lays the ground for emerging institutions of multilevel politics, as the
transaction cost of reforming old institutions become more bearable in the face
of their inefficiency, and as the legitimacy of old institutions become more ques-
tionable in the face of changing perceptions of politics and the role of values in
international politics.
2.2.3 Origins of the institutions of multilevel politics
The origins of the institutions of multilevel politics can thus be found, first, in
the cooperative characteristics of postwar international organizations, and second,
the increasing feasibility of institutional reform due to changing structural condi-
tions. Focusing on the Committee of the Regions and the Congress of Local and
Regional Authorities, the discussion of institutional origins should take into ac-
count their parent organizations, the European Union and the Council of Europe,
which play an important role in the constitutive characteristics of such institutions.
To begin with the Council of Europe (CoE), its internal organization and value-
driven activities will also be found in the Congress. The decision making body of
CoE, the Committee of Ministers is composed of the ministers of foreign affairs
or diplomatic representatives of member states. In this respect, it does not signify
a fundamental departure from traditional intergovernmental relations. Nonethe-
less, other bodies of CoE have a more integrative nature. For instance, the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights supervises national judiciaries, hence integrates
domestic and international legal systems within a common human rights law. The
Parliamentary Assembly comprises members of national parliaments, proportion-
ally taking into account both internal political divisions of members states and
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the population of each country. Therefore, it constitutes a pan-European assembly
bridging domestic and international politics. The Congress follows the same logic
in creating a European assembly out of local and regional authorities.
The establishment of the Conference of Local Authorities of Europe, the pre-
decessor of the Congress, in 1957, only eight years after the CoE, stands witness
to the fact that the roots of multilevel politics can be found in the early years of
postwar restructuring. Its current statute as a permanent body of the CoE after
1994 shows that local and regional tiers have become an integral part of Euro-
pean politics beyond national constitutions. These developments are a corollary
of a transformation which made democracy a key issue of European politics, as
opposed to being an exclusively domestic issue immune to international scrutiny.
In this sense, the Congress promotes local and regional self-government as an
indispensable aspect of democracy and European values, and the idea that a pan-
European assembly of subnational political actors should champion these values4.
In the case of the Committee of the Regions, its origins cannot be observed so
directly in mid-century political developments. Yet it originates from European
integration triggered by the postwar restructuring. European Union, the Nobel
Peace Prize laureate in 2012, achieved a long period of peaceful relations in Eu-
rope by entrenching interdependency through economic and political integration.
Economic integration necessitated territorial cohesion, and given that disparities
in the degree of development existed within each member state, equitable develop-
ment had to be targeted at the subnational level. This idea of regional development
policies had long been in place since the Treaty of Rome, but its formal creation
and systematic implementation have been possible only from 1970s onwards. Es-
pecially in the late 1980s, the culmination of a greater need for cohesion follow-
ing successive enlargements and special importance attached to regions during
the strong Commission presidency of Jacques Delors brought sub-national actors
to the core of the European political arena5. As structural funds have received
a significant part of the EU budget, direct relations between sub-national actors
4Such a self-depiction is apparent in the official website of the Congress, where it is defined
by the expressions ‘a pan-European political assembly’ and ‘the guarantor of local and regional
democracy in Europe’, and its role is defined as ‘to promote local and regional democracy, improve
local and regional governance and strengthen authorities’ self-government’ (CLRAE, 2016a).
5These factors are also counted among the reasons for a need to theorize multilevel political
relations since early discussions of multilevel governance (Marks, 1993)
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and European bodies have become common practice and the institutionalization
of these relations within the EU have naturally ensued.
Just like economic integration entails political integration, the inclusion of
subnational actors extends beyond the cohesion policy to political decision mak-
ing in general. Subnational authorities implement decisions taken in national and
European levels, and their inclusion in these processes increases both the legiti-
macy and efficiency of decisions. In other words, as sovereignty is pooled at the
European level, subnational authorities increasingly deal with this new locus of
sovereignty. The institutional origins of CoR can thus be found in the changing
political system of Europe through integration in general, and in the rise of co-
hesion policy in importance in particular. For this reason, CoR was established
at a time when integration reached a significant level of maturity, as embodied
in Maastricht Treaty which established the European Union as such, and when
territorial cohesion became one of the most important policy areas. It was given
an advisory status, and its role has been providing input to the EU legislative
processes, especially in areas which directly concern the subnational level of gov-
ernment. Therefore, instituting CoR can be interpreted as a direct response to the
need to enhance the efficiency and legitimacy of European decision making by
including representatives of subnational authorities thereto6.
To conclude, the origins of the institutions of multilevel politics, as exem-
plified by CLRAE and CoR, can be traced to the postwar restructuring of Euro-
pean politics. The formal institutionalization of European political cooperation
through CoE, and the internationalization of political values such as the rule of
law, democracy and human rights, provide a normative basis for multilevel poli-
tics in the Congress. Equitable development against the background of economic
integration requires action at subnational level across Europe, while the pooling of
sovereignty in an emerging Euro-polity requires action at the supranational level
on the part of subnational authorities. The result is the institutionalized inclusion
of subnational actors in European decision making processes through CoR. Over-
all, a configuration of several factors are relevant to the origins of the institutions:
CoR and CLRAE can be expected to display institutional characteristics which
6Another way to understand this interpretation is to look at what CoR is meant to do. For
example, several recent assessments of CoR, as discussed in the previous chapter, draw attention
to effective channelling of subnational interests into the institutional architecture of the EU as an
area of strength for CoR (Piattoni, 2010a) or as part of its identity (Domorenok, 2009).
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embody the changing nature of political norms and values, and the need for new
mechanisms to enhance the efficiency and the legitimacy of political processes in
the face of a shifting distribution of power across levels of government.
2.3 Institutional evolution of multilevel politics
The primary reason as to why institutional origins determine a considerable part
of institutional features is that institutions display a significant degree of stability
by reproducing their existing features. However, it should be remarked that in-
stitutions can also display a certain degree of adaptability to changing structural
conditions or actor behaviour. In this sense, institutional evolution can be anal-
ysed through two different historical institutionalist approaches: one that separates
change and continuity by understanding an institution as the period of continuity
between critical junctures which constitute the main source of change7, and an-
other one that conflates change and continuity, by focusing on incremental change
driven by actors, which ensures relative stability in the longer term. The key de-
terminant of change and stability in both approaches is the strength of compliance
with institutions by the actors.
To understand institutional stability, the fundamental rationalist explanation is
that compliance with institutions is more beneficial to actors than defection, and
the fundamental cultural explanation is that institutions constitute the basis of ac-
tions, and for this reason, challenging them is not usually envisaged as a plausible
option (Hall and Taylor, 1996). To understand institutional change, compliance
should be taken as variable, especially through the openness of interpretation and
implementation of institutional rules (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). In this re-
spect, institutional change is possible not only through sudden and large scale
events such as ‘displacement’ with new institutions and rules or ‘drift’ with exter-
nal shocks, but also through more gradual processes such as ‘layering’ with the
addition of new institutions and rules or ‘conversion’ with changing interpretation
and enactment (ibid.).
While critical junctures and institutional origins set in motion the reproduc-
tion of certain characteristics, fundamental transformations do not have to await
7One of the best expressions of this approach can be found in regime theories which have been
discussed in preceding sections.
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new junctures, but can occur as a result of accumulated incremental change, even
if this has been a function of the institutional continuity so far. Layering is a
particularly crucial form of enhancing long term stability by changing an institu-
tion or a system of institutions: an overall transformation occurs as each added
layer decreases the importance of existing ones, but the total rising number of lay-
ers also increases the complexity which make further institutional change more
difficult than before (Boas, 2007). Therefore, endogenous forms of institutional
change are more likely to result in more entrenched and stronger systems. From a
broader perspective, the institutionalization of multilevel politics is a form of lay-
ering to the European institutional architecture, and the self-reinforcing qualities
of the institutions of multilevel politics not only imply their entrenchment in the
European political system, but also contribute to the very stability of the latter.
2.3.1 Rationalist and cultural accounts of
institutional evolution
The historical institutionalist debate on the evolution of institutions suggests a di-
alectic pattern of self-preservation and adaptation. The main source of stability
is conceptualized as ‘path dependence’ which designates a reactive sequence of
causally connected events, started by a breakpoint in history and following logical
connections (Mahoney, 2000). The historical trajectory of an institution is char-
acterized by a contingent starting point and a deterministic pattern (ibid.). Path
dependence often results from increasing returns, that is, the increasing cost of
reversing institutional paths chosen at previous stages, which makes institutional
change more difficult over time, and which probably leads to suboptimal outcomes
(Arthur, 1994, pp. 112-113). This primarily economic conception of institutional
stability is even stricter in the political sphere: political institutions are more prone
to path dependence as politics is more concerned with public goods hence collec-
tive decisions, as political authority is centralized in a way that precludes the use
of alternative institutional channels, and as power asymmetries are central to po-
litical processes and reproduced by the institutions which privilege the powerful
(Pierson, 2000a,b).
One problem with this type of stability is that enduring institutions can eas-
ily become socially inefficient, because rational actors choose compliance when
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it is more profitable, hence institutional reinforcement through increasing returns
(North, 1990b). Although institutions represent equilibria for collective decision
making, they are usually unstable arrangements whereby inherent disequilibria
reveal themselves only in the long run (Riker, 1980). In this context, change is
possible when the inefficiency of an institution becomes more apparent and when
incentives to depart from such an equilibrium are strong. If actors think that they
would be better off with alternative institutions and that the costs of altering in-
stitutions are bearable, new incentive structures will result in institutional change
(North, 1990a, p. 86). On the other hand, the social inefficiency of an institution
may be due to the fact that it is benefiting actors with higher bargaining power
(ibid., p. 16). In this case, an evolution towards efficiency can be achieved if the
interests of the powerful are overlapping with more efficient arrangements, pro-
vided that the transaction cost of change is decreasing together with this overlap
(ibid., p. 69).
If and when these conditions of change are met, institutional evolution can
occur through mechanisms inherent to the institutions themselves. One way of
conceptualizing these mechanisms is to focus on the rules of institutional change
which are relatively more stable over time and which determine the transforma-
tion of more specific and variable rules (Shepsle, 1989). Therefore, even if the
parameters of an institution are the subject of a higher level bargaining, such pa-
rameters may include rules that allow institutional change without resorting to
a redefinition of institutions. In this sense, when institutional characteristics are
‘quasi-parameters’, which are not subject to continuous scrutiny yet which can be
revised through mechanisms inherent to the institutions, endogenous institutional
change is likely to occur (Greif and Laitin, 2004). Thus, quasi-parameters are the
source of both long-term adaptability and short term stability, which is capable of
ensuring self-reinforcement through evolution.
In contrast to this dynamic understanding of the rationalist account, for so-
ciological institutionalism, institutional change is analogous to social change, or
contingent on wider change in the environment of an institution, and only parallel
to a broader historical trajectory, while ‘history follows a less determinate, more
endogenous course’ (March and Olsen, 1996, p.255). In the course of history,
the fate of political institutions depends on several factors including the identities
of actors and collectivities, the distribution of capabilities, the interpretation of
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events and history, and the adaptability to the environment (ibid.). By the same to-
ken, institutions evolve to the extent that identities, power distributions, templates
for interpretation, and structural conditions change. Sociological institutionalism
focuses on the analysis of supra-individual units as distinct from the aggregation
of individuals (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991, p.8). This structuralist approach is
the main source of the criticism for losing sight of individual agency, especially
in terms of explaining change (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Taking stock of this crit-
icism, institutional transformation and stability can be explicated by broadening
the perspective to include actor feedback to supra-individual units or structural
conditions, as well as by taking sociological factors such as political identification
and cognitive templates as variable.
Overall, endurance is one of the main qualities of institutions, as compliance
becomes more and more beneficial once an institution is established. Even in this
case, changing incentive structures of all actors or the more powerful main bene-
ficiaries necessitate some institutional alterations, and the inherent adaptability of
institutions facilitates the process. The sociological account of institutional evo-
lution is more conservative, as institutions reflect their social conditions of exis-
tence, and social change is slow and infrequent. Nonetheless, the latter still offers
useful insights in view of cultural factors, since identities and cognitive templates
can complement rationalistic explanations.
2.3.2 Evolution of European institutions
International politics displays a low degree of transformation as compared to do-
mestic politics. As the above discussions on sovereignty show, for several cen-
turies, international relations have been functioning through more or less the same
basic norms, whereas domestic political structures have been fundamentally trans-
formed. However, the slow pace of change does not necessarily mean full re-
silience. To the extent that international institutions conform to the theoretical
accounts of institutional evolution, understanding the patterns of incremental re-
form and the complex relations between reproduction and innovation offers useful
insights for the study of international politics (Fioretos, 2011). The intensification
of international institutionalization following postwar reconstruction indicates a
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considerable degree of accumulated change in the international political system
since then.
The stability of institutions from mid-century onwards despite changing con-
ditions of world politics shows that institutions matter beyond the mere repre-
sentation of the underlying system8. The most notable example of this is NATO
which is fundamentally an organization emanating from the Cold War environ-
ment. However, not only does the relevance of NATO continue even today, but
it has also expanded its membership base; NATO has not ceased to exist simply
because the reason for its foundation ceased to exist, but it adapted to the circum-
stances of the world politics after the Cold War (Keohane and Martin 1995, cf.
Mearsheimer 1994). The same logic can also be applied to the EEC-EU and the
CoE since economic and political cooperation in Western Europe was seen as part
of the Cold War alliance, although their links to the Cold War environment are not
as direct as the security concerns embodied by NATO. Similarly, not only did they
survive the end of the Cold War, but also they extended their membership to Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe while the EU proceeded to further stages of integration
before and after the end of the Cold War.
As the most innovative of international organizations, the major characteristics
of the EU matter a great deal in terms of explaining the patterns of stability and
change. Considering that the EU has been established and reformed on several
occasions through international treaties, its dynamics of change and stability rely
heavily on extra-institutional processes or higher-order bargains. However, the
ordinary functioning of the EU is equally a source of its evolution in the form of
autonomous entrenchment and self-strengthening, hence an endogenous change.
To illustrate autonomous stability, the concept of ‘joint decision traps’ (Scharpf,
1988) explains the double difficulty of going forwards and backwards. In partic-
ular, it shows the inherent tendency of European institutions towards suboptimal
outcomes in the form of sticking to the baseline of the status quo as the low-
est common denominator instead of devising more effective arrangements (ibid.).
While European institutions are difficult to reform in this sense, the existence of
joint decision traps at the core of the EU decision making also means that they
8This can be seen as institutional inertia which proves the relative autonomy of international
institutions, but this autonomy can be a vehicle of conservation as much as reform. The relevant
implication for the present discussion is survival through adaptation, as institutional adjustments
will be telling about larger scale changes to which institutions should adapt.
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are difficult to reverse as well; since the current stage of integration constitutes
the status quo, a return to traditional forms of international relations in Europe is
quite unlikely. Moreover, this path dependent stability of European institutions
can be complemented by the idea of accumulated potential for evolution, as re-
peated traps are posited to bring about institutional refinement, through large scale
if not gradual adjustment (ibid., p. 271). For instance, transition to qualified ma-
jority voting in the Council of the EU in an increased number of areas can be seen
as a major example of institutional adjustment, since joint decision traps occur
more frequently due to the requirement of unanimity while bargaining takes place
on the basis of individual rather than common interests (ibid.).
Furthermore, the mere existence of the EU institutions as the status quo has an
effect of self-asserting change. Taking the example of the Council again, which
represents the member state interests and which constitutes the main intergovern-
mental part of the EU institutional architecture, its centrality in the decision mak-
ing procedure and its veto power are legitimate sources of the scepticism about
the autonomous leverage of the EU (Tsebelis and Garrett, 2001). Nonetheless,
the agenda setting power of the Commission and the Parliament, which represent
the Community as a whole and the European people respectively, is shown to
be more influential than commonly assumed; the rejection of the proposals initi-
ated by the Commission and the Parliament requires unanimity while the adoption
thereof requires qualified majority, which makes the use of veto power more un-
likely (Garrett and Tsebelis, 1996; Tsebelis, 1994). It should be remarked that
these decision procedures are codified in treaty making processes which are sup-
posed to be the main determinant of the pace of integration. Nonetheless, this
is not simply a matter of large scale changes that happen infrequently; instead,
the institutional design codified in treaties shape the possible gradual transforma-
tion towards more integration, insofar as agenda setting power is used with a real
chance of impact in this direction (Tsebelis and Garrett, 2001). Therefore, the EU
institutions assert their autonomous leverage thanks to the advantages of using the
virtually lesser powers vested in them by national actors who tried to keep these
under their supervision by reserving the veto power for the Council (Tsebelis and
Kreppel, 1998).
These observations confirm, overall, that international and European institu-
tions conform largely to the rationalist theoretical models of institutional evolu-
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tion. Implications for multilevel politics are twofold: first, the institutions of mul-
tilevel politics, as part of the same institutional architectures, can also be expected
to display similar qualities of a difficult-to-reverse entrenchment, a considerable
degree of adaptability and refinement, and a natural tendency of self-assertion
by making the best use of available powers; and second, the institutions of multi-
level politics in Europe function against the background of deeply institutionalized
supranational integration, hence a context in which the primacy of the traditional
conception of national sovereignty is losing its salience to make way for alterna-
tive forms of political organization. In return, the layering of multilevel politics
can be expected to make the European institutional architecture even more en-
trenched.
2.3.3 Evolution of the institutions of multilevel politics
One of the two selected cases, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities is
not part of the EU. Yet it constitutes a significant case of institutional entrench-
ment and self assertion as well, since it has moved from an ad hoc and peripheral
position to a permanent and central place within the institutional architecture of
the CoE. It was established as the Conference of Local Authorities of Europe
as early as 1957 and extended its membership to regional authorities in 1975, it
attained a more permanent status in 1979 as the Standing Conference, and be-
came one of the main bodies of the CoE in 1994 with a statutory resolution of
the Committee of Ministers. This last step shows that the Congress had to rely on
intra-institutional relations of the CoE to acquire its permanent and central status,
and that it successfully utilized these relations to achieve this end.
An important milestone in the history of the Congress was the adoption of
European Charter of Local Self-Government, which shows an example of the ef-
fective use of powers at the disposal of the Congress. Given that the CoE is an
intergovernmental organization, the Congress would most likely be able to make a
real impact through international law, and it accomplished this through the signa-
ture and ratification of the Charter which made it an international legal document.
It should be remarked that this is an international treaty concerning domestic polit-
ical structures and the Charter can be seen as an extension of the focus of the CoE
on democracy, human rights and rule of law as international norms. Moreover,
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the Congress has emerged as the body responsible for overseeing the implemen-
tation of the Charter, further anchoring its status in international law and politics
by using a tool that it had created in the first place.
On the other hand, the Committee of the Regions was initially endowed with
advisory powers and it utilized them to improve its status within the EU. In fact,
the advisory powers of the CoR are not comparable to the agenda setting power of
the Commission and the Parliament, and in this sense, it cannot be reasonably ex-
pected to rise to a prominent status in the institutional architecture of the EU, such
as a third legislative chamber, or to assume a leading role to deepen the integra-
tion. Yet, over two decades of its existence, it has neither proven superfluous nor
remained impotent, but it increased its formal and informal influence. Informally,
simply by virtue of having provided input to the European legislation for so long,
the opinions of CoR should have become a virtually quintessential part of the leg-
islative process. Similarly, simply by virtue of its existence as a body of the EU
at the time of new treaty making, it has had the opportunity to influence the final
text and acquire formal powers through the Treaty of Lisbon, namely the right to
appeal to the European Court of Justice for matters concerning subsidiarity.
Although this formal competence is not likely to be used to a considerable ex-
tent, assuming the position of the defender of the principle of subsidiarity comes
with a greater symbolic value. Moreover, this is also a case of appropriating insti-
tutional features which have national origins: the principle of subsidiarity was de-
vised by national governments as a protection for their powers vis-à-vis the Euro-
pean level, but a broader interpretation of ‘lowest level possible’ that the principle
prioritizes has led to its endorsement by CoR to protect subnational competences.
In this sense, even if CoR has not transformed its advisory status into one com-
parable to an agenda setter or veto player, it has succeeded in reframing a core
principle of the EU into one of multilevel governance/politics, and making itself
the institutional champion of subsidiarity.
To conclude, it can be shown that the institutional evolution of CLRAE and
CoR displays the qualities of stability, adaptation and self-asserting entrenchment,
which embody the institutionalization of multilevel politics. These follow not only
the theoretical model posited by new-institutionalist accounts, but also parallel
trajectories to international and European institutions, primarily their parent orga-
nizations. Together with the qualities inherited through institutional foundation as
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discussed in the previous section, the institutional evolution of CoR and CLRAE
should shape their general characteristics which will be manifested in their effects
on the actors.
2.4 Institutional effects of multilevel politics
The discussion of the origins and the evolution of institutions helps to explain the
characteristics that they acquire and develop throughout their lifespan. Yet insti-
tutionalization can be said to be complete whence these institutions perform the
functions in accordance with these characteristics. In addition, while the effects
of an institution at a given time can be seen as the outcome of institutionaliza-
tion, the recurring effects also constitute a significant mechanism which makes
institutional origin and evolution possible. In other words, the effects of institu-
tions at one point are the cause of institutionalization at another (Pierson, 1993).
This preliminary idea is also implicit in the preceding sections; for instance, if the
choice of an originating institution among plausible alternatives results from the
existing institutional context, or if institutional change and stability are shaped by
the compliance generated by institutions on the part of actors, then effects are as
much part of institutionalization as its outcome.
In this respect, studying institutional effects in their own right has a great
potential to advance a better understanding of institutionalization. Meanwhile,
institutionalization through influence over actors is the most understudied aspect
of multilevel politics, thus the conclusions reached through general observations
will be limited in this regards. Nonetheless, for the same reason, the hypotheses
derived from this aspect will constitute a large part of the empirical research in
this dissertation. Similar to the previous sections, the following discussion will
first briefly review the theoretical underpinnings of institutional influence, then
apply these to European institutions, and conclude with some remarks on possible
areas in which the institutions of multilevel politics are influential.
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2.4.1 Rationalist and cultural accounts of
institutional effects
The historical institutionalist account of institutional effects does not rule out ei-
ther strategic or cultural factors; the interests and preferences of actors as well as
their strategies to pursue given interests and preferences can still be shaped by in-
stitutions. The main effect of an institution which influences both the preferences
themselves and the ways to pursue those, in the historical-institutionalist account,
is the (re)distribution of power and resources. In this sense, distributive effects can
be taken as the distinctive explanation offered by historical institutionalism, while
more detailed explanations for strategic and cultural factors are given by rational
choice and sociological institutionalism.
The conception of the strategic effects of institutions results from the ratio-
nalistic account of the main function of institutions: generation of equilibria in
collective decisions, which are extra-institutionally either difficult or impossible.
Provided that an institution functions as devised, it ensures the existence of an
equilibrium irrespective of the actual distribution of preferences, while this distri-
bution determines the location of the equilibrium (Shepsle, 1979). In other words,
the very existence of a well functioning institution is sufficient for expecting that
a collective decision will be reached, while the analysis of specific preferences of
actors is necessary to explain the nature of these decisions. In this context, a solid
understanding of both institutions and preferences is necessary to explain political
reality (Riker, 1980).
However, rational choice institutionalism is not as interested in the explanation
of what shapes these preferences. In contrast, for sociological institutionalism,
preferences and meanings are also shaped by institutions, and the mechanisms
of such effects may include education, indoctrination and experience (March and
Olsen, 1984, p. 739). These mechanisms can be conceptualized in two ways.
First, according to the older approaches of sociological institutionalism, these can
be conceptualized as socialization (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). Second, ac-
cording to an approach more preferred by new institutionalism, these mechanisms
ensure the fulfilment of social roles that are deemed appropriate and define what
is deemed appropriate if necessary (ibid.; March and Olsen, 1984). More specif-
ically, individuals process the complex information from the social environment
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through a limited number of possible cognitive models, schemas and categories,
and act on the basis of a limited set of legitimate choices from which motiva-
tions are derived (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991); the major effect of institutions is
narrowing down this set of choices.
The question as to whether preferences can or should be taken as endogenous
or exogenous demarcates one of the deepest ontological differences between ra-
tionalist and cultural accounts. The rationalist perspective assumes that actors
rationally choose which preferences to pursue, and the way to pursue them is
shaped by institutions. The cultural perspective objects that the choice of pref-
erences cannot be seen as rational, since they are determined by institutions or
socio-cultural factors. Despite such deep-rooted incompatibilities, complemen-
tarity between two approaches will be sought out here, as stated at the beginning
of this chapter (Section 2.1.1). At a basic level, the generation of expectations for
efficient decision making can be seen as the major strategic influence of institu-
tions, while cognitive aspects should be taken as preference shaping factors.
2.4.2 Effects of European institutions
When the implications of historical institutionalist claims are considered for a
traditional understanding of international relations, the distributive effects of in-
stitutions over the power structure of international politics would be unacceptable
from a realist perspective. In contrast, according to the regime theory, regimes
are intervening variables which interact with both basic causes such as power and
interests, and the outcomes, modifying and influencing both (Krasner, 1982b).
They are not epiphenomenal but autonomous factors, as proven by their persis-
tence despite changes in the power structure (Krasner, 1982a). In this context,
they can modify the power structure by changing incentives, opportunities or di-
rectly interests and preferences, by empowering weaker actors, or by undermining
and reinforcing existing capabilities (ibid.).
As for the rationalist claim, the conception of institutions as process variables
from a realist perspective (Snyder, 1996) would suggest that they only represent
the way of conducting international relations, without fundamental influence over
the outcomes. Yet if institutions matter, their existence and effectiveness would
be a determinant of reaching a higher number of agreements, leading to more co-
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operation, as would be argued by the liberal institutionalist theory of international
politics. The reflection of the third strand of new institutionalism can be seen in
the constructivist objections to realism, since the way international politics works
relies on how legitimate this is perceived to be by the actors and how plausible
alternatives can be envisaged (Wendt, 1987, 1992). In this sense, any influence of
international institutions on power distribution, the scope of cooperation or cog-
nitive templates will have fundamental effects on the world political system.
The idea of complementarity between rationalist and cultural accounts can be
repeated for international institutions as well (March and Olsen, 1998). But the
added value of the cultural accounts, in the case of international institutions, is
more likely when the focus is on micro processes within institutions rather than
macro-structural factors (Johnston, 2001). In this respect, constructivist research
is well equipped to analyse international socialization within institutions, in the
sense of both adopting new roles and rules of appropriateness, and internaliz-
ing new norms and values, through social learning or argumentative persuasion
(Checkel, 2001, 2005). Yet it should also be recognized that strategic calculation
may be an effective trigger that stimulates the process of international socializa-
tion (Schimmelfennig, 2005). Taking stock of these arguments, both cultural and
strategic influence, as well as the interactions between these two types of influ-
ence, can be expected from international institutions.
The points on distributive, strategic and cultural effects can be more confi-
dently asserted for European institutions. First, European integration is a process
of creating a new form of polity at the supranational level and transferring com-
petences thereto. In this sense, the main power-distributive influence of European
institutions is the dispersion of authority across levels of government, which leads
to what fundamentally characterizes multilevel governance with the inclusion of
subnational levels. Even outside the EU, the transfer of authority to institutions
like the European Court of Human Rights suggests a redistribution of power away
from the national level. In this respect, even the role of the CoE can be counted
among cases of power redistribution through institutionalization from a broader
perspective.
Second, the neofunctionalist perspective can be cited to explain the effective-
ness of European institutions: integration in one area spills over to another, and
integration in economic sphere eventually leads to political integration. More
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specifically, as more policy areas acquire a trans-border character, the need to
act at the European level to manage and regulate them increases. Even a more
sceptical approach to European integration, namely liberal intergovernmentalism,
explains the transfer of competences to the supranational level in terms of effec-
tive bargaining among national actors, and the benefit of instituting mechanisms
to oversee commitment to agreements. Therefore, it can be safely argued that Eu-
ropean institutions perform the function of facilitating collective decisions among
member states, hence providing them with the means to pursue their interests more
efficiently.
Even though the CoE has a distinct status from the EU, it can loosely be seen
as part of European integration; in this sense, similar functionalist and intergov-
ernmentalist logics can be applied to the CoE as well in order to highlight its
policy achievements (Macmullen, 2004). At the time of writing, the CoE lists
219 treaties9, which can be seen as an illustration of how an international insti-
tution increases the possibility of reaching collective decisions. And once the
CoE becomes the locus of a large number of agreements, from an intergovern-
mental perspective, endowing it with the authority to oversee these agreements
is in the interest of the participant actors, and from a functionalist perspective,
such transfers of authority are likely to result in powerful institutions in their own
right which can ensure effective commitments to collective decisions. Again, the
endowment of European Court of Human Rights with legal authority above na-
tion states to oversee the effective implementation of the European Convention
on Human Rights is an example of power transfer across levels resulting from
effectiveness considerations.
One of the most significant examples of the influence of these two European
institutions is the parallel process of the post-Cold War transition of the Central
and Eastern European countries, and the eastern enlargement of the EU. Acces-
sion to the EU was a strong incentive for rapid transformation towards a market
economy and a democratic system, and the conditionalities relied not only on the
acquis communautaire, but also on the norms generated by the CoE in many as-
pects related to the rule of law, democracy and human rights, and in more specific
9The list of treaties is accessed on 30 May 2016 via the CoE official website; URL:
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list. The number is inclusive of the constitutive
treaties.
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areas such as minority protection (Sasse, 2008). In this context, the rationalist
explanation would point out the material incentives for taking part in institution-
alized forms of European politics, and the availability of organizational templates
which facilitates the adaptation to the system which is necessary to receive the
targeted benefits.
Finally, for the cultural influence of institutions, the normative leverage of the
CoE regarding the rule of law, democracy and human rights, as noted on several
occasions above, can be counted among broad institutional effects. More specif-
ically, the reliance of the EU on the CoE for setting certain standards highlights
the importance of the norm-generating effects of the latter. When the influence
of institutions on individuals is considered, Europe is supposed to be the most
likely case of international socialization (Checkel, 2005). Among the reasons as
to why Europe is distinctive, one can include strong organizational rules, roles,
interests and goals, the favourable composition of actors and physical space, and
the high level of institutionalization, autonomy and integrity, which are arguably
more prevalent in the EU (Egeberg, 1999, 2004). However, previous studies find
little evidence to support the claim that a European elite has acquired a distinctive
supra-national identity, even in the Commission (e.g. Egeberg, 1999; Hooghe,
2005), and the low levels of socialization can be attributed to pre-socialization
factors in the national sphere (Beyers, 2005). Therefore, even if a European polit-
ical identity is a reasonable possibility, such cultural effects of European institu-
tions remain limited as a result of the continuing precedence of national political
spheres.
In sum, an overview of international and European institutions shows that dis-
tributive, strategic and cultural aspects are relevant to the study of institutional
influence at this level as well. The distributive effects do not have to be limited
to the redistribution of power and material resources among actors, but can also
be understood as redistribution across levels of government. Strategic influence
manifests itself in the form of material incentives for accessing and conforming
to institutions. Finally, cultural influence can occur as socialization into new roles
and values in institutional environments, although this remains limited even in the
European context. Similar patterns can be expected from the institutions of mul-
tilevel politics, thus the following subsection will draw on these observations to
discuss possible institutional effects of multilevel politics.
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2.4.3 Effects of the institutions of multilevel politics
The institutions of multilevel politics can be expected to take part in the above
mentioned effects of European institutions, especially considering the fact that
the CoR and the CLRAE operate under the EU and the CoE, and display parallel
trajectories otherwise. In this respect, first, CoR and CLRAE are the bodies that
represent the subnational tier of government in these larger organizations which
redistribute competences across levels of government, thus their primary status
is embedded in such a redistribution. The example of enlargement given above
illustrates redistributive effects in the cases of CoR and CLRAE as well: where
domestic territorial reorganization results from the prospect of being part of Euro-
pean institutions, either for creating territorial units eligible for structural funds or
for transition to a completely democratic system, both CoR and CLRAE establish
relationship with subnational authorities in reforming countries to assist them in
the process.
Second, CoR and CLRAE respond to a need to involve subnational authorities
at the European level in a context where decisions taken at supranational or inter-
national level have direct consequences for local and regional levels. In this sense,
they offer convenient channels of relationship between these interlinked spheres
of politics, hence render the overall decision making processes more efficient. In
the case of the EU, this can be explained by the European legislation being bind-
ing for all member states and all European citizens, and the subnational authorities
working at the closest level to the citizens and being responsible for a considerable
part of this legislation. In the case of the Congress, the oversight of commitments
to an international document constitutes the main function of the organization.
The observation of the state of local and regional democracy in member states
and local and regional elections in view of their conformity to common standards,
as well as global and European issues which concern the subnational tier of gov-
ernment, is arguably realized in a more effective way by an international assembly
of subnational actors who directly experience the consequences of these issues.
Third, the same ideas can be used to depict these institutions as legitimacy
enhancing as much as efficiency enhancing arrangements. Ensuring input from
the subnational authorities to authoritative decisions which will influence them
and which they will implement is expected to bring the EU closer to the citizens.
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Similarly, subnational actors are subjects of local and regional democracy who
are directly affected by its quality; insofar as subnational self-government is a
European value, their presence in European political spheres increases the legit-
imacy of international and supranational processes. Therefore, the emergence of
new socio-political environments would help the dissemination of new norms and
values, in particular through political actors who socialize into them. The appro-
priation of the principle of subsidiarity from the legal discourse, and the concept
of multilevel governance from the academic discourse into political debates illus-
trates the generation, transformation and diffusion of new norms and values.
Nonetheless, these broad observations only suggest institutional effects at a
macro level. In order to ascertain that such institutional effects also materialize
as influences on actor behaviour, substantive empirical data are required. For this
reason, this study will proceed with an empirical research project that investigates
the relationship between institutions and subnational actors, and the design of this
research will also be guided by new institutionalist approaches. The concluding
section will present the hypotheses derived from this theoretical background, the
confirmation of which will complement the argument that multilevel politics is
institutionalized in view of institutional origins, evolution and effects.
2.5 Testing institutional effects
This chapter has proposed an eclectic new-institutionalist theoretical framework,
according to which institutionalization is understood comprehensively as the sum
of the emergence, the evolution and the effects of institutions, as well as the de-
velopment of institutional features which can be explained through rationalist and
cultural accounts. In this framework, the narrative of the institutionalization of
multilevel politics can be reconstructed in a simplified form as follows:
1. In the postwar context, national actors create European institutions to meet
certain goals.
2. Once European institutions exist, they create consequences for both inter-
national and national politics.
3. As the effects of European institutions are felt in the national sphere, na-
tional actors have further stakes to take part in them.
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4. The more European institutions are used for policy-making, the more en-
trenched they become.
5. The stronger European institutions are, the more effects they generate.
6. As the effects of European institutions are felt at the subnational level, local
and regional actors have motives to take part in them.
7. The more subnational actors try to access European policy-making, the
more imminent is the need for institutional revision towards multilevel pol-
itics.
8. Once the institutions of multilevel politics are layered into the European
system, they create new consequences for actors from all levels of govern-
ment.
9. As the effects of the institutions of multilevel politics are felt at the sub-
national level, local and regional actors have further stakes to take part in
them.
Several remarks should be made on these observations. First, as mentioned in
the previous section, institutional effects serve as the mechanism that explains
institutional origins and evolution; the origin of multilevel politics can be at-
tributed to the effects of European institutions, and the effects of the institutions
of multilevel politics can be expected to generate self-sustaining feedback. Sec-
ond, this is an open-ended process of path-dependency characterized by both self-
reinforcement and gradual change; European institutions survived by evolving to-
wards a multilevel system, and the latest additions with the layering of multilevel
politics can also be expected to display a tendency that combines the dynamics
of stability and change at the same time, with no definite prediction of an ulti-
mate end result. The narrative is limited to point 9, primarily because substantive
empirical evidence on institutional effects is needed to suggest that this process
would continue from this point onwards. Thus, considering these two remarks
together, testing institutional effects today will show that multilevel politics has
already been institutionalized to a significant degree with further potential, which
motivates the empirical part of this thesis.
Third, this narrative is not entirely new. On the one hand, points 1-5 follow
the standard theories of European integration, particularly with a logic akin to that
of spill-over in neofunctionalism. On the other hand, points 6-7 offer an expla-
nation as to why the institutions of multilevel politics emerged, as produced by
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the actor-centred approach to multilevel governance. In this sense, the intended
contributions of this thesis lie in points 8-9, by showing that the institutions of
multilevel governance, beyond their mere existence, also constitute a consistent
and enduring architecture of multilevel politics similar to other major political
institutions, as they exert effects on actors and thus generate positive feedback.
Fourth, however, the apparent compatibility of the narrative with approaches per-
taining to the EU might also mean an incompatibility with the institutions outside
the EU. Although new institutionalism proves useful in this respect since it applies
equally to institutions within and outside the EU, one should not lose sight of the
specificities that stem from different functions and trajectories of the EU and the
CoE. This thesis will address this issue by exploring the institutional characteris-
tics which are relevant to multilevel politics through a comparative case study.
Two major empirical objectives of this thesis, thereby, are showing the signif-
icance of institutional effects and exploring relevant institutional characteristics.
To conclude the theoretical discussion, the following subsections will specify the
new-institutionalist guidelines for the research design: first, falsifiable hypotheses
about institutional effects will be derived; second, possible dimensions of institu-
tional characteristics will be revisited.
2.5.1 Institutional influence, expectations and
attitudes towards multilevel politics
According to the framework summarized above, for the institutions of multilevel
politics to have significant effects, they must reproduce themselves, hence a sys-
tem of multilevel politics. The corollary of this logic in the institution-actor axis,
as noted in the point 9 of the new-institutionalist narrative, is subnational actors
being more favourably disposed to multilevel politics as a result of its institu-
tionalization. In this sense, the ultimate dependent variable, on which the effects
of institutions will be tested, is the degree of favourableness of the attitudes of
subnational actors. The independent variables, to specify possible forms of insti-
tutional effects, are then derived from the three strands of new institutionalism:
distribution of power (historical), material benefits and rational incentives (ratio-
nal choice), and roles of appropriateness (sociological).
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Inasmuch as these variables provide logical explanations as to why actors com-
ply with institutional arrangements, they rely on the assumption that institutions
offer something to comply with. In other words, by explaining how and why
institutions matter, different new-institutionalist theories assume that institutions
matter in the first place. Even though this may be seen as a reasonable assumption,
or even a self-evident point, it is in fact a fundamental challenge for the theory to
prove that institutions matter. As discussed by Adam Przeworski (2004), if insti-
tutional effects can only be argued for in contrast to hypothetically counterfactual
situations where institutions do not exist, it is impossible to rule out the possibility
that both institutions and their presupposed effects result from the same exoge-
nous factors. In that case, the institutions would not matter, they would rather be
epiphenomena.
In this sense, in order to argue that institutionalization is a central aspect of
the rise of multilevel politics, and not simply a side effect of broader structural
factors, the conjecture that institutions matter should be rendered another variable
to be empirically tested, in addition to the proposed reasons for why they matter.
In the light of Przeworski’s critique, this is not to restate the obvious; instead,
positive findings in this aspect would not only validate the theoretical approach
for this particular research, but also provide empirical evidence to support the
validity of new institutionalism as a grand theory. For these reasons, the first
independent variable will be a generic concept of institutional influence, which
can vary from one individual to another so that the conclusions would not rely
on presumed counterfactuals. To test this understanding of institutional influence,
the first and the core hypothesis of the empirical research is thus formulated as the
following:
H1: Subnational actors who have a stronger relationship with insti-
tutions of multilevel politics will also have stronger preferences for a
transformation towards multilevel politics.
The same logic also applies to the remaining independent variables, which are
based on specific insights derived from the three strands of new institutionalism.
Since institutional effects have macro consequences, from which it is difficult to
discern individual-level variation, they are better studied in terms of the expec-
tations of actors from institutions regarding their presumed effects. This strategy
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will also ensure the theoretical coherence with the dependent variable and method-
ological compatibility with the first independent variable. More specifically, the
dependent variable is defined in attitudinal terms, and defining these independent
variables as expectations for the posited effects of institutions will ensure that the
analysis is consistently at the attitudinal plane. In this sense, in order to over-
come the difficulties pointed out by Przeworski, the attitudinal counterpart of the
association between institutional effects and a systematic transformation will be
analysed.
Furthermore, the influence of institutions on individual actors is already cap-
tured by the first independent variable, and in order for the following variables
not to be confounded with this generic institutional influence, they should also be
conceptualized as independent from the first independent variable. Although these
variables provide explanations for how institutions matter, they will not be re-
garded as mediating the relationship between institutional influence and views on
multilevel politics. Rather, their institutional relevance comes from representing
the bases of actor compliance with the institutions of multilevel politics, namely,
favouring the preservation or the revision of a certain power distribution, seeking
institutional channels for certain goals or material benefits, and acting from a cer-
tain socio-cultural background. These factors, as propelled by different strands
of new institutionalism, will be adapted to multilevel politics in the hypotheses
below.
To begin with the historical institutionalist account, one specific form of power
distribution that is distinctively relevant to multilevel politics is the allocation of
competences across levels of governance. If political actors are categorized into
groups that correspond to different levels of governance, the allocation of com-
petences across these levels is analogous to the distribution of power among cor-
responding groups of actors. Furthermore, given that a transformation towards
multilevel politics means the dispersion of power upwards and downwards from
the national level, the expected power-distributive effect of the institutions of mul-
tilevel politics should be the strengthening of supranational and subnational levels,
leading to two parallel hypotheses:
H2: Subnational actors who favour more power to be concentrated at
the European level will have stronger preference for a transformation
towards multilevel politics.
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H3: Subnational actors who favour more decentralized domestic struc-
tures will have stronger preferences for a transformation towards mul-
tilevel politics.
Another type of distributive effects can be thought in financial terms. As pre-
viously remarked on several occasions, on the EU side of the institutionalization
of multilevel politics, cohesion policy has been playing an important role. Yet
the motives to access European funds constitute a response to material incentives
offered by institutions, hence this is closer to the rationalistic side of redistributive
policies. In this sense, European funds can be examined as a material incentive
that rational actors may be willing to follow. Thus, being incentivized by such
funds can be a factor explaining favourable attitudes towards multilevel politics:
H4: Subnational actors who consider European funds as important
for subnational politics will have stronger preferences for a transfor-
mation towards multilevel politics.
The main type of strategic effect that is emphasized by the rationalist account is
the ability of institutions to ensure collective decisions; institutions provide more
efficient ways of conducting political activities, which rational actors will choose
over less efficient ways. Thereby, the expectation from institutions to generate
effective channels of transnational political activity should be aligned with the
motives for a more prevalent multilevel system:
H5: Subnational actors who prefer institutionalized transnational ac-
tivity for reasons of efficiency will have stronger preferences for a
transformation towards multilevel politics.
Finally, institutions are also theorized to exert sociological effects. Social-
ization can be considered as a relevant factor, but as a form of direct relations
between individuals and institutions, it may have been partially or fully captured
by the first hypothesis. For this reason, more subtle concepts suggested by socio-
logical institutionalism will be used here, namely identification with political roles
which can be rendered socially appropriate and legitimate by the institutions. In
this respect, political identification can be taken as representing the sociological
understanding of institutional effects, since identities serve as the cognitive tem-
2.5. Testing institutional effects 79
plates of socially appropriate and legitimate political roles10. Subnational actors
subscribing to certain types of political identification should therefore expect in-
stitutions of multilevel politics to show affinity with the attributes of these forms
of political identification.
The types of identification compatible with multilevel politics are arguably
those which challenge the primacy of national identity, notably European and
subnational identities. Regarding the latter, a further specification can be made
for identifications which emphasize subnational distinctiveness as opposed to lo-
cal or regional identifications which accept the primacy of the national level. From
these, two hypotheses can be derived:
H6: Subnational actors who politically identify themselves as Eu-
ropean will have stronger preferences for a transformation towards
multilevel politics.
H7: Subnational actors who politically identify themselves as cultur-
ally distinctive from their national political establishment will have
stronger preferences for a transformation towards multilevel politics.
Furthermore, the types of political identification which are not confined to the
domestic sphere of politics, such as ideological or party-political identification,
can also be posited as associated with multilevel politics:
H8: Subnational actors who identify themselves as committed to
their ideological and party-political positions will have stronger pref-
erences for a transformation towards multilevel politics.
2.5.2 The eclectic framework and standard practices
in new institutionalism
Taken together, all these hypotheses constitute an eclectic new-institutionalist
argument which can be empirically tested without relying on counterfactuals.
10Where possible, the term ‘identification’ is preferred over ‘identity’ in this work, as the lat-
ter can be interpreted as assuming actors as passive recipients of imposed attributes (Brubaker and
Cooper, 2000), whereas the general approach of the present study values the agency of individuals.
In some instances like the above sentence, ‘identity’ can also be used to terminologically distin-
guish processes from cognitive templates, but this is not intended to assume static and passive
sociological bases for political action.
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Nonetheless, it also marks a departure from the conventional approaches of new
institutionalism, which can be seen as the price to be paid for bringing together
epistemologically divergent strands of the theory on a common ground that allows
empirical testing of basic conjectures. In this sense, while the framework devel-
oped here is capable of making theoretical contributions to new institutionalism
in its own right as it approaches institutionalization from a novel perspective, it
should also be noted that such contributions may not be entirely compatible with
the existing practices of each strand of new institutionalism taken separately.
The points of departure can be highlighted in comparison with standard ap-
proaches in different strands. First, historical institutionalism is often associated
with process tracing, a method which derives its strength from deciphering chains
of causality over time. The narrative constructed in this chapter, linking insti-
tutional origins, evolution and effects, is already a rather informal and compact
version of process tracing. However, the hypotheses formulated here are con-
cerned with a cross-section of historical processes, hence they are not longitudi-
nal in themselves even though they are part of recurring institutional effects. The
hypotheses 2 & 3, which are specifically attributed to historical institutionalism,
are thus informed by this strand primarily regarding the political focus on power
distribution, but not regarding the longitudinal focus.
Second, as it is clear in the theoretical remarks made throughout this chapter,
rational choice institutionalism approaches institutions in game-theoretical terms,
and understands them as analogous to sets of parameters in particular games which
shape the distributions of actor preferences towards certain equilibria. The empir-
ical interest here can be seen as a higher-order game with undefined parameters,
within which actor preferences for the institutions of multilevel politics are the
primary focus of analysis. For this reason, hypotheses 4 & 5 will not test the con-
sequences of particular institutional parameters; instead, they will test the associ-
ation between the promise of institutions in terms of material benefits and effec-
tiveness, which rational actors are supposed to want, and a systemic equilibrium
on multilevel politics, by taking these as not only variable but also independent of
participation in an institution.
Third, for sociological institutionalism, the main effect of institutions is gen-
erating legitimacy for the socio-cultural structure, by defining the appropriate and
acceptable roles that actors can assume. In this sense, as discussed before, this
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strand is particularly strong in explaining structural reproduction and the for-
mation of preferences, but concomitantly weak in explaining change and actor
agency, both of which are central features of the research problem tackled here
and the theoretical framework that has been developed in response. For this rea-
son, sociological institutionalism could be integrated into the eclectic approach
by departing rather radically from its conventional premises. Namely, structural
transformation instead of reproduction can be understood in terms of a multitude
of institutions, some of which lead such a transformation. The supposition of
multiple institutional arrangements also means a multitude of legitimate roles for
actors that these institutions generate. Thus, actor agency and its links to sys-
temic change can be framed in terms of identification with certain roles, as done
in hypotheses 6-8. The basic logic of sociological institutionalism is retained to a
certain extent, since identification still occurs with respect to a limited set of op-
tions, and likely reflects underlying socio-cultural factors for each actor. Thereby
this framing allows sufficient variation for integrating sociological explanations
into the overall framework.
2.5.3 Institutional characteristics to complement
individual-level attitudinal focus
In addition to these individual-level attitudinal hypotheses which constitute the
crux of the empirical research, an exploration of institutional characteristics is
still necessary for a complete institutionalist account. To reiterate several points
made above, first, other theories relevant for the institutions of multilevel politics,
such as those of European integration, would highlight important differences be-
tween selected cases, while new institutionalism is used to emphasize their com-
monality. Second, the posited hypotheses represent the attitudinal counterpart of
institutional effects, while their institutional relevance can be shown by examining
the corresponding institutional characteristics. Third, the attitude-focused strategy
departs from new institutionalism to a considerable degree, and its links to the the-
oretical premises can be re-established with an institutional-level analysis. These
objectives will be attained by analysing the variation in institutional characteris-
tics across selected cases, along the dimensions derived from new institutionalism
and its strands.
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To begin with the generic conception of institutional influence, this should be
the most basic attribute shared by both cases which can be reasonably classified
as institutions. In other words, what brings the Committee and the Congress un-
der the same analytical category, according to new institutionalism, should also
mean similar characteristics regarding the basic attributes of this category. There-
fore, both the CoR and CLRAE can be expected to display a similar capacity to
influence actors, and to the extent that they belong to the narrower category of in-
stitutions of multilevel politics, they should display this capacity in similar ways.
As for further dimensions, while these will all be useful for institutional anal-
ysis, variations can be expected since the CoR and CLRAE are not exact repli-
cations of each other. Here the theories of international relations and European
integration will provide background information for the CoE and the EU respec-
tively. For the distribution of competences across levels of government, the dif-
ference is apparent. The EU is the outcome of a polity-forming process at the
supranational level, and CoR, as part of this process, will have a natural orienta-
tion to the redistribution of competences in favour of the European level. The CoE
is an intergovernmental organization with stricter prevalence of national politics,
and CLRAE, as part of this organization, will have a natural orientation to the
redistribution of competence within the domestic sphere.
Similar implications can also be derived for practical characteristics. As a
supranational polity, the EU is more concerned with policy making; in terms of
rational choice institutionalism, this means effective mechanisms to coalesce a
multitude of preferences into equilibria. As an intergovernmental organization,
the main role of the CoE is facilitating international agreements and the oversight
of existing agreements. Yet remaining within the limits of conventional interna-
tional law, equilibrium-formation is much more infrequent and difficult, since the
preferences of national actors are more resistant to the institutional mechanisms
which are supposed to channel these into agreements.
Certain cultural differences can be expected, especially when the historical
and functional specificities of these institutions are considered. An important part
of academic studies on the EU deal with the questions of democratic deficit and
legitimacy, but it is not founded on normative bases. To follow the neofunctional-
ist logic, even if a supranational polity were the long-term vision at the beginning,
the foundation has been economic integration. On the other hand, the CoE is
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based on more normative grounds, namely the expression of democracy, human
rights and the rule of law as common European values. Therefore, the CoE has
a strong potential to provide an institutional architecture with significant socio-
cultural characteristics.
In view of these preliminary remarks, the institutional characteristics of CoR
and CLRAE constitute a highly relevant aspect of institutionalization which can-
not be captured by the attitude-based hypotheses but which display important par-
allels to them. In this sense, institutional-level analysis will be part of the empiri-
cal objectives, by following similar new-institutionalist guidelines and unpacking
the dimensions outlined here. Combining this with the hypotheses discussed in
previous subsections, a complex research design will be necessary with multiple
stages and a mixture of methods, as discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter 3
Mixed-method approach to
multilevel politics
One of the concluding remarks of the previous chapter, which is crucial for the
empirical strategy, is on the differences between the eclectic framework developed
here and the standard practices of the specific strands of new institutionalism (Sec-
tion 2.5.2). For this reason, the purpose of this chapter is to clarify the research
design and the methods appropriate for achieving the analytical objectives as re-
quired by the theoretical framework. These objectives are embodied by a list of
hypotheses focusing on the attitudes of actors (Section 2.5.1) and several charac-
teristics posited for the institutions to possess (Section 2.5.3). In this respect, the
research design should be capable of using both individual- and institutional-level
empirical evidence to test the theoretical propositions.
Moreover, Przeworski’s critique of new institutionalism, and the ensuing ne-
cessity to observe variation in institutional effects, are pinpointed as the main
challenge for rendering new-institutionalist propositions empirically falsifiable.
The study of multilevel politics is a fertile ground for overcoming this challenge
in both levels. On one hand, a multilevel political system, especially one that is
still in its infancy, is categorically different from central state structures in that the
relevance of its institutions for actors is variable. This provides the opportunity
to observe variation of institutional influence at the individual level. On the other
hand, there are multiple institutions of multilevel politics, such as the Commit-
tee of the Regions and the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, which
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operate independently from each other but also simultaneously in relation with a
similar group of actors. This provides the opportunity to observe the variation in
institutional characteristics.
To develop a research design which can seize both of these opportunities, dif-
ferent methods will be needed for each level of analysis. The variation in institu-
tional effects cannot be observed with an exclusive focus on institutions of inter-
est; the analytical focus should also cover a wide array of observations including
those where institutional effects are close to non-existent. This methodological
requirement increases the number of political actors to be covered, which can be
appropriately addressed through a cross-national survey. While a survey means
relatively simplified information from a large number of units, the existence of
a small number of institutions is to be addressed through in-depth case studies
which bring detailed information regarding each.
In this respect, the empirical strategy can be understood as based on a mixed-
method approach combining quantitative and qualitative components, although
these components are not chosen to test-and-retest the same specific hypotheses
with different types of data (Lieberman, 2005). Instead, the underlying logic is
that quantitative and qualitative methods are not necessarily mere substitutes or
alternatives, but they are capable of generating distinctive contributions to infer-
ence (Collier, Seawright and Munck, 2004; cf. King, Keohane and Verba, 1994),
hence they can complement and inform each other. In the present research, their
complementary is derived from the relative merits of a large number of data points
and a small number of rich data containers (Collier, Brady and Seawright, 2004;
Hall, 2003), corresponding to survey and case study respectively.
Therefore, the most suitable empirical strategy for observing variation at indi-
vidual and institutional levels is a mixed-method approach drawing on the comple-
mentarity between quantitative and qualitative methods, specified here as survey
and case study. Since the questions pertaining to the two levels of analysis are
different, the survey will focus on measuring individual attitudes and institutional
influence on actors, while the case studies will focus on the exploration of in-
stitutional characteristics. In this respect, the following sections will discuss the
survey and the comparative case study separately. Yet they do not perform com-
pletely separate functions in the research design; alongside the fact that quantita-
tive and qualitative components complement each other in response to the same
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broad research problem, the connections between them will also be reflected in
the possible uses of survey data for the case studies, which will allow the interpre-
tation of the correspondence between institutional characteristics and influence.
3.1 Methods for individual-level variation:
Designing a survey
Surveys are a useful method for generating data for social scientific research, es-
pecially in understudied areas, such as that of multilevel politics, where it is diffi-
cult to find or rely on existing observations regarding the attitudes of subnational
political actors within and without European institutions. The major difficulty in
employing survey methodology is the requirement of large resources in terms of
funding, time and manpower, as it is usually realized by a group of researchers
who are responsible for interviewing, coding, data entry, data processing, analy-
sis, etc.
It is possible to overcome this difficulty thanks to technological advances,
namely the widespread use of the internet, since an online questionnaire can be
advertised in a short period of time to a large group of potential respondents who
can simultaneously answer the questions and whose responses are automatically
coded into a dataset. Despite such evident advantages, web surveys are usually
approached with a high degree of scepticism. However, when web surveys are
conducted with methodological rigour, the internet is only a tool to replace mail or
telephone; in this sense, one can notice that concerns about mail surveys decades
ago are similar to those about web surveys today (Sue and Ritter, 2007, p. 3). In
this respect, methodologically strong guidelines for web surveys have started to be
systematically formulated (e.g. Couper, 2008; Tourangeau, Conrad and Couper,
2013). Thus the crucial determinant of methodological rigour is compatibility
with the general principles of survey design, irrespective of the mode of data col-
lection.
The main rationale of a survey is inferences at two levels; first, from the sam-
ple of respondents to the population that they represent, and second, from the
responses given by participants to the concepts of interest (Groves et al., 2004,
p. 40). This means that a survey design follows two parallel processes (pp. 41-
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47): the one, determining the population of interest, creating a sampling frame
which can be assumed to represent this population, drawing a sample which can
be assumed to represent this frame, collecting responses from willing partici-
pants, making necessary adjustments to enhance representativeness, and com-
puting statistics on the final dataset; and the second, determining the variables
of interest as measurable constructs, formulating questions which would mea-
sure these constructs, collecting responses to these questions, editing responses to
make them amenable for further analysis, and computing the statistics. Through-
out these processes, methodological rigour can be attained by minimizing com-
mon errors associated with the survey design (Groves et al., 2004, pp. 49-61):
for the first, coverage, sampling, non-response and adjustment errors, and for the
second, validity, reliability (measurement) and processing errors1.
In this context, this section will present the survey design in two stages per-
taining to the aforementioned parallel processes. Particular attention will be paid
to the steps to be followed, and the errors to be minimized. Thus, the discussions
below will show how the empirical research conducted for this thesis satisfies or
approximates the ideal standards of survey methodology, and present the data and
variables which are used in the subsequent analyses.
3.1.1 Population and sample
Population As the first type inference is from a sample to a population, it is
appropriate to begin with a clarification of the latter. Although for many survey-
based studies the boundaries of the population can be objectively determined from
exogenous facts and its definition does not constitute a methodological challenge,
in the case of multilevel politics whose boundaries are blurry and still in devel-
opment, clarifying the population becomes a particularly difficult task. Two ob-
jective criteria are seen to guide this task: the analytical interest in subnational
actors and in their engagement with multilevel political activities, especially in
institutionalized contexts. However, these two criteria pull the definition of the
population to two extreme definitions, one too broad and one too narrow for the
purposes of the present research. Hence a balance must be sought.
1Further details about these errors will be provided below when the procedures implemented
in the present research are discussed.
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On the one hand, defining the population as those who are actually engaged
in multilevel political activities, or even those who take part in the institutions of
multilevel politics, would be too narrow. This possibility is especially problematic
with regard to the overarching methodological principle of observing variation of
institutional effects, which would be difficult to detect in such a population. It
should be remarked, however, that when institutions are compared through case
studies, a survey sample of their members will provide valuable information and
necessary links between the two components of the mixed-method design. For
these reasons, the population will involve, but not be limited to, the actual partici-
pants of multilevel politics.
On the other hand, defining the population as all subnational actors in Europe
would be too broad. Although erring on the side of over-inclusion is preferable
to under-inclusion, such a broad definition would be not only impractical, if not
impossible, but also analytically uninteresting. To illustrate, the Council of Eu-
ropean Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) represents approximately 150,000
municipalities and regions2, varying from tiny communities, such as Villarroya in
La Rioja, Spain with 9 inhabitants3, to large metropoles with millions of inhabi-
tants. Even if it were possible to design the survey to cover these 150,000 units,
this would also be counterproductive with regard to the observation of the varia-
tion in institutional effects: although a large array could be covered from zero to
high levels of influence, the population would be overwhelmed by non-existent or
very low influence, making it again difficult to analyse meaningful variation.
This apparent dilemma can be overcome by defining the population in terms of
subnational actors who actually take part in multilevel politics together with those
who can potentially take part in it. Whereas this qualification through ‘potential’
is still vague to a certain extent, an objective boundary can be set by focusing
attention to other important qualities of the population. Namely, it is a desir-
able feature of the survey population to have maximum coverage in terms of the
territory and citizens of European countries. Meanwhile, the extremely high num-
ber of subnational units results from their nestedness at several territorial tiers.
Thereby, limiting the population to the highest tiers will ensure maximum cover-
2This figure is based on CEMR’s own presentation of its members, retrieved from CEMR’s
official website on 11/11/2015: http://www.ccre.org/en/article/about_members
3This figure is retrieved from the official website of the National Institute of Statistics, Spain
(Instituto Nacional de Estadística, INE, in Spanish) on 11/11/2015: http://www.ine.es/
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age without increasing the number of units excessively, addressing the problem of
impracticality. Furthermore, these politically and economically stronger units can
be assumed to be more likely to be engaged with multilevel politics, providing an
objective standard for the issue of potential.
However, the population is not identical to political actors from highest-tier
subnational units, and further qualifications are needed for two reasons. First, the
number and size of highest-tier units are variable across countries. For example,
in a large country such as Germany, full coverage can be attained through sixteen
Länder, whereas in relatively smaller Romania, there is no intermediary between
41 counties and the central government. In cases similar to the latter, fewer units
than the total number of the highest-tier had to be chosen; but territorial coverage
is enhanced by paying attention to geographical balance, and citizenry coverage
is enhanced by opting for larger units. Second, an exclusive focus on the highest-
tier would mean a population of regional units only, although local units also are
engaged in multilevel politics and represented in its institutions. For this reason,
the population is supplemented with cities and towns. Here as well, choosing a
number smaller than available units was necessary, and the same criteria of geo-
graphical balance and preference for larger units are applied to maximize cover-
age.
Appendix A.2.1 presents the figures related to each step leading to the eventual
sample. Its first two columns give not only the details regarding the practical
procedure of defining the population, but also a numerical illustration of what the
above discussions mean. First of all, each country is assigned a rough number
depending on how big they are, but irrespectively of their administrative divisions
(listed in the column ‘Cluster number guides’). Second, after considerations of
maximum coverage of territory and citizens, geographical balance, and regional-
local balance, a certain number of subnational units are selected for each country
(listed in the column ‘Targeted number of clusters’). The total number that results
from this procedure depicts the population defined here: namely, 558 entities from
the highest-tier territorial units and relatively large cities and towns from different
geographical parts of the CoE member states4.
4The geographical scope of Europe is defined in terms of CoE membership, as it covers the EU
and allows the connection with the case studies of CoR and CLRAE.
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Since the definition of the population involved a certain degree of selection
from within each country, this procedure can be understood as akin to a stratified
and clustered sampling, which is why the columns in Appendix A.2.1 used the
term ‘cluster’. Moreover, this similarity to clustered sampling calls for further
remarks on why a strategy of randomly selecting the clusters was not followed.
As discussed above, the actual or potential engagement with multilevel politics
is the guiding principle to define the population, and the size can be taken as an
objective standard for selectiveness preferable to the statistical representativeness
of randomness at this stage. As the targeted number of clusters for each country
is between 1 and 33, random selection cannot be trusted to ensure representative-
ness. Instead, qualitative judgement to balance different types of units and their
geographical distribution is the more reliable option.
Although all these choices are based on a rationale for how best to study mul-
tilevel politics, and although objective criteria are used as much as possible, it
should still be acknowledged that the proposed definition of the population is
more complex than what would be expected from a survey. However, this can
be attributed to the novelty of multilevel politics and the methodological sensitivi-
ties of the approach adopted in this thesis. In this sense, the complex definition of
the population results from an unprecedented attempt to measure actor attitudes
on multilevel politics and related factors, and an innovative attempt to observe the
variation of institutional effects.
Sampling frame As the overwhelming majority of the units included in the
population have official websites where the names of political actors (presidents,
ministers, assembly members, mayors, councillors, etc.) are listed, the sampling
frame can be expected to overlap with the population. The main problem, how-
ever, is partial unavailability of contact information, especially e-mail addresses.
Therefore, only 317 out of 558 units constitute the sampling frame, as seen in
Appendix A.2.1. This coverage error could be ignored insofar as partial unavail-
ability of contact information was random, but it can be assumed to be leading
to bias since it systematically varies across countries (Biemer and Lyberg, 2003,
pp. 46-48; Groves et al., 2004, p. 94).
In practical terms, the construction of the sampling frame began with identify-
ing the official websites of the selected units, finding the list of elected politicians
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and their contact information, and integrating them into the database which would
be used for call for participation. Where the needed information was missing,
the unit was substituted by another from the same country, respecting the criteria
of size and geographical location. Despite the substitutions, the number of units
from which contact information could be retrieved lagged behind the number of
originally selected units. Moreover, it was observed that the smaller the subna-
tional unit is, the less likely is it to publicize the contact information of elected
politicians. This observation meant that, even if unit size were not a defining cri-
terion of the population and the selection were more random, the practical limits
on the construction of the sampling frame would lead to a similar frame, resulting
in a certain degree of under-coverage.
Potential remedies for under-coverage include half-open intervals, multiplicity
sampling and multiple frame designs (Groves et al., 2004, pp. 84-89). Combining
half-open intervals and multiplicity sampling, local branches of political parties
are used as a communication channel in under-covered cases, and using a multi-
ple frame design, transnational organizations are used as supplementary sources
of contact information. While the number of contacts achieved through indirect
channels such as political parties cannot be known, transnational organizations
have increased this number by approximately 10%, adding the contact informa-
tion of 1,547 subnational actors to the 16,732 collected from subnational units
only. Furthermore, 13 countries would be excluded due to the lack of contact
information if the frame relied solely on subnational clusters, but transnational or-
ganizations as an additional source provided the chance to re-include them. How-
ever, these figures do not take into account the duplicates between local and re-
gional units, and between subnational units and transnational organizations, nor
the invalid e-mail addresses. The total number of delivered invitations amounts
to 16,940, which gives a more appropriate depiction of the size of the sampling
frame.
An additional layer of coverage error can be expected if it is not reasonable
to assume that all members of the population, or at least the sampling frame,
actively use the internet (Couper, 2000, 2005). On the one hand, this assumption
can be safely made today since the use of the internet is much more widespread as
compared to earlier assessments of web surveys. Political actors can especially be
supposed to have active internet access. On the other hand, given that the collected
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contact information consists exclusively of e-mail addresses, this type of under-
coverage should coincide with the unavailability of information, which would not
mean an additional aggravation of the coverage error.
Sample size Although a sampling frame is traditionally used to draw a sam-
ple, there is no need to target a smaller size in the case of a web survey, since
the marginal costs of inviting additional potential participants and receiving their
responses are negligible. Therefore, the procedure used in this research is ‘satura-
tion sampling’, in the sense that the group of invitation recipients is identical to the
sampling frame (Sue and Ritter, 2007, p. 27). In this respect, the main determi-
nant of the sample size will be the response rate. In the end, the obtained sample
has consisted of 802 respondents with a response rate of 4.73%5. These figures
are achieved as a result of implementing several response-enhancing measures
which are discussed below. In addition, by applying these measures, the ultimate
aim is to minimize the non-randomness of non-response, hence to improve the
representativeness of the sample.
Early assessments of web surveys found that low response rates were a cen-
tral concern for their accuracy (e.g. Couper, 2000, pp. 485-486; Couper, 2005,
pp. 496-497; De Vaus, 2002, p. 132). The underlying cause of this concern can
be associated with the absence of a direct relationship between an interviewer
and the respondent. Even though the relevance of such a problem is decreasing
with the internet becoming a more central and natural form of communication,
social exchange theory can still be used to take into account psychological aspects
that will increase the response rate (Dillman, Smyth and Christian, 2014, pp. 23-
24; Sue and Ritter, 2007, pp. 95-98). Accordingly, participation in a survey can
be made more appealing through material or non-material incentives, low costs,
cognitive resonance, and emphasizing the ideas of being helpful, making a con-
tribution suitable to the recipient’s social status, positive features of the survey,
etc. In this sense, the invitation for this survey, as well as the information page
of the questionnaire, has made it clear that participation will not take a long time,
that the impartiality of the survey is certainly granted, that the recipient could see
5This sample size does not include the responses with too many missing values. Although
this is also linked to item non-response, which is discussed in the next subsection, such cases are
treated as unit non-response leading to a lower response rate.
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that he/she is personally addressed and specifically selected by virtue of being a
subnational actor, that the survey is not something unimportant, and that this re-
search would make important contributions to subnational politics (these features
are illustrated in Appendices A.3.1 and A.3.2).
Another reason for low response rates in web surveys might be increasing
threats to online security and privacy. People are understandably trying to avoid
clicking unfamiliar links and they are reluctant to provide personal information.
This sort of reluctance can be even higher among political actors. The most ef-
fective way to address this problem should be establishing trust (Dillman, Smyth
and Christian, 2014, pp. 37–41). Accordingly, the purpose and the scope of the
research, the identity and the institutional affiliation of the researcher, and the
guarantees regarding confidentiality must be made explicit and easily accessi-
ble. Although these are already prescribed by academic ethics which apply to
the present research, their clear expression during the research process has also a
practical advantage. The first page of the questionnaire, as printed in Appendix
A.3.2, can be expected to establish this kind of trust.
Finally, the multilingual profile of the sampling frame may lead to low re-
sponse rates for potential respondents whose native language is not available. In
order to minimize this risk, the questionnaire is offered in six languages, selected
according to the six most widely spoken first and second languages in Europe:
English, French, German, Russian, Spanish and Italian6. Invitations are also sent
in the native language of the respondent if available, or otherwise in the most
likely second language alongside English. Different languages are integrated into
the same web design, as seen in Appendix A.3.3, whereby language choice is
provided at the very beginning.
Representativeness The mismatch between the population and the sampling
frame, and between the sampling frame and the sample will lead to biased infer-
ences unless under-coverage and non-response are unsystematic and random. As
seen in Appendix A.2.1, the last column of the table displays a high degree of
variation in the response rate among countries. Nonetheless, neither the level of
6In selecting languages, the report ‘Europeans and their Languages’ (European Commission,
2012) is taken as reference. Even though this report is only concerned with the EU, the continuing
relevance of Russian in Eastern Europe can be seen as indicative of its prevalence in other non-EU
countries as well.
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the unavailability of contact information, nor the overall language competence in
a country is found statistically related to varying response rates, as presented in
Appendix A.2.2. In this sense, responses from each country can be taken as repre-
sentative of their respective sub-populations, even if their relative size in the sam-
ple need adjustment to balance high and low responses from different countries.
In other words, assuming that a non-response does not result from any systematic
bias of sampling, apart from possible links to unobserved country characteristics,
adjustments made on the basis of country distribution will render the sample rep-
resentative of the population. Weighting will be used in this respect, by taking into
account the mismatch between sample characteristics and population parameters
to provide more accurate findings at the stage of statistical analysis (Kalton and
Flores-Cervantes, 2003).
Before recalibrating the sample, however, the outer limits of representative-
ness should be established by looking at several characteristics of the included
cases. First, there are 10 countries from which no response was received, among
which Turkey and Hungary are the biggest, while Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco
and San Marino are very small, and Armenia, Macedonia, Moldova and Montene-
gro are relatively small countries7. Second, some countries are represented with
very small numbers, usually displaying an inconsistency with their size. Con-
sidering the absolute numbers of respondents in the sample, and the degree of
under-representation, as summarized in Appendix A.2.3, it is difficult to claim
the representativeness of another 12 countries: Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Georgia, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Ser-
bia and Ukraine. Therefore, the sample represents 25 countries out of 47, corre-
sponding to 54% of the total population of ‘larger Europe’. It is also difficult to
claim that this sample represents the initially designated population; those coun-
tries whose representation in the sample is either weak or non-existent tend to be
from the Balkans, Eastern Europe and Caucuses. Therefore, any inferences from
this sample will be limited to a more western-focused understanding of Europe as
a geographic region.
7The combined population of these relatively small and very small countries is approximately
9 million, almost the same as the population of Hungary alone. While this means a small de-
cline in the population coverage of the sample, it also means a weaker representativeness of small
countries.
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Within these limits, weighting procedures will only take into account the 25
appropriately represented countries. Calculating weight on the basis of 37 coun-
tries would result in extreme figures, such as 47.28 for Ukraine and 39.73 for
Russia, as shown in Appendix A.2.3. By calculating the weights with 25 coun-
tries only, the largest figures are reduced to more acceptable levels of 3.78 for
Greece and 3.25 for Spain. In further analyses, 22 responses from the remaining
12 countries are still kept in the sample, and grouped into two categories of ‘Other
EU’ and ‘Other non-EU’, whereby their weights are assigned the neutral value of
1.00. On the other hand, there are also cases of over-representation, but this does
not pose a serious problem since small weights, which can get as low as 0.10 in
the case of Switzerland, are less likely to lead to biased estimates.
In addition to the country distribution, the institutional background and the
demographics of respondents can also be evaluated to describe the population
that the sample represents. First, for domestic institutional background, 47.5%
of respondents define their subnational entity as local, 33.5% as regional with
legislative powers, and 18.1% as regional with administrative powers. Thus, the
stratification of the sampling frame into the highest-tier entities and local entities
has been successful in generating a sample that is balanced between regional and
local dimensions of subnational politics. Second, for transnational institutional
background, 24.9% of respondents report past or present membership in an or-
ganization operating above the national level. Thus, the sample can be taken to
represent a population of subnational political actors, one quarter of whom have
had direct experience in a transnational organization. Given that the population
is defined in terms of the potential to engage in multilevel political activities, this
provides a more precise meaning to this definition: 25% is high enough to claim
that the sample contains relevant information regarding multilevel politics, and
low enough to reflect the fact that multilevel political engagement is still an ex-
ception for the majority. In other words, the ultimate methodological aim of ob-
serving variation of institutional effects has been achieved, and this has not been
at the expense of reducing the number of respondents with direct contact with
institutions to very small levels.
As for the demographics, the distribution of the age of respondents is fairly
balanced. More specifically, the age ranges from 21 to 83, showing that the sample
is not biased towards either early-career or late-career political actors. 33.3% of
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respondents report their gender as female, and 66.6% as male; the sample thereby
reflects the male-dominated political sphere in subnational authorities. Finally,
participants are asked to position themselves on a political left-right scale from 1
to 9. The results imply a bias towards the left; when responses are divided into
three equally divided categories of ‘left’ (1-3), ‘centre’ (4-6) and ‘right’ (7-9),
the frequencies result in 44.6%, 37.3% and 18.1% respectively. Comparing this
distribution to that of the European Values Study 2008 (EVS, 2016), where 59.3%
of the respondents position themselves on the left and 40.7% on the right of a
scale with 10 response categories, the sample obtained by this survey, in which
60% reported themselves to be in the first four categories and 40% in the last five,
can be considered as providing a realistic representation8, insofar as right-wing
politicians are assumed to have a stronger propensity to report ‘centre’ than left-
wing politicians. Nevertheless, in the interpretation of findings, this feature of the
distribution of ideological self-positioning must be taken into account.
3.1.2 Variables
Conceptualization Testing the hypotheses that have been identified in the pre-
vious chapter requires the analysis of corresponding variables. In turn, these vari-
ables have to be conceptualized, operationalized and measured (Babbie, 2013,
pp. 163-196). To begin with conceptualization, the main aim is to achieve a high
degree of theoretical precision by clarifying the content of what is meant by each
variable. Conceptual clarification is especially important in this research, given
that the majority of variables will draw on attitudes which are not directly or in-
directly observable, but which should be understood as constructs to be deduced
with reference to observables (Kaplan, 1998 [1964], pp. 54-56).
The dependent variable used in all hypotheses is ‘motives for a transformation
towards multilevel politics’. First, taking the elusive term ‘motive’ as an attitude
which can be derived from the views expressed by subnational actors, strong or
weak motives can be conceptualized as favourable or unfavourable views on mul-
tilevel politics. Second, multilevel politics is a concept developed in this thesis,
8There may be important differences between the self-positioning patterns of political actors
and the general public. However, since the parameters of the population of subnational actors are
not known, the general-scope surveys such as the European Values Study offer the best available
benchmark.
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and its precise meaning would not be empirically available for actors to express
their views thereupon. For this reason, it should be conceptualized in terms of
more tangible dimensions that concern subnational authorities: being among the
main actors of European politics, their ability to establish direct relations with for-
eign counterparts, their representation in transnational organizations, their recog-
nition as subjects in international law, and the absence of national-level constraints
on their external relations. Additionally, the terms multilevel governance and sub-
sidiarity have a more widespread use in the political discourse, and the direct ex-
pression of the views on these terms will also contribute to the conceptualization
of multilevel politics.
The first independent variable is institutional influence, which can be partially
conceptualized through indirect observables. Firstly, the membership of a subna-
tional actor in a transnational organization should be seen as a primary element
of such influence. For the members, whether their membership is in the past or
continuing, and the duration of their membership will be among other indirect
observables. For non-members, whether or not the subnational unit of a politi-
cal actor is represented in a transnational organization provides an indirectly ob-
servable dimension for indirect institutional influence. However, assuming that
institutional influence may vary even for actors with similar degrees of exposure
to institutionalized multilevel politics, attitudinal dimensions will consist of an
awareness about such organizations and the motivation to be a member of them
for the non-member actors, and the professional satisfaction with and personal
importance attached to the membership for those with transnational experience.
Moreover, two independent variables which are concerned with power distri-
bution, namely ‘favouring power to be concentrated at the European level’ and
‘favouring decentralized domestic structures’, will be conceptualized along com-
mon dimensions. First, actors can be expected to have preferences about how
much power supranational and subnational authorities should possess in general.
Yet their views may vary with respect to different policy areas. For this reason,
the conceptualization of power distribution should be further specified as consist-
ing of several dimensions, which are identified in this research as social policy,
economic policy, internal affairs and foreign affairs. Additionally, two relevant
concepts, namely federalism and decentralization, may also be good indicators of
the views on stronger subnational competences.
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With regard to material incentives, two variables are posited. First, European
funds are put forward as direct benefits. This variable can be conceptualized in
two dimensions: through an indirect observable as to whether the subnational unit
of the actor receives European funds, and through a construct regarding the im-
portance that the actor attaches to European funds. Second, preference for institu-
tionalized activity for reasons of efficiency can be deduced from what subnational
actors think about the effectiveness of specific forms of institutionalized activity,
namely transnational organizations, direct channels and national mediation. Fo-
cusing on formal organizations, the extent to which subnational actors find them
useful for external relations is a more specific aspect that would be analytically
interesting. Finally, the variables pertaining to the cultural aspect of the theory
are formulated in the hypotheses in terms of identifying oneself as European or
culturally distinctive from the national establishment. The conceptualization of
these variables does not have to draw on any additional indicators, since ‘iden-
tity’ is best understood in view of how people identify themselves (Brubaker and
Cooper, 2000), hence ‘identification’ with relevant political roles will be consti-
tute the basis of sociological variables.
Operationalization The validity of variables depends on the extent to which
eventual measurements indeed measure what is meant by the conceptualization.
In this respect, operationalization is a crucial stage which links the theoretical
background of variables to the collected data, by translating the specified dimen-
sions into questions, the answers to which will be coded into the values of the
variables. The resulting standardized questionnaire is printed in Appendix A.3.2.
The questionnaire begins with questions which are relatively easy to answer
and unintimidating. First, a few items on the country and the subnational unit in
the Section 1 of the questionnaire are used to assess the representativeness of the
sample above. Section 2 begins with the dependent variable and continues with
several independent variables. Sections 3 and 4, with their subsections depending
on the special circumstances of the respondent, target multiple dimensions of in-
stitutional influence. Finally, Section 5 includes questions on several demographic
factors and political identification variables. The overall design of the survey has
benefited from the general guidelines provided by survey methodologists (e.g.
Converse and Presser, 1986; Saris and Gallhofer, 2014) in choosing among alter-
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native approaches such as the number of categories, offering a middle category
and ‘no opinion’ option, presentation of questions, etc., as discussed below.
With regard to general characteristics, special attention is paid to the simplicity
of language and presentation, and to the specificity of questions and answer cat-
egories. As a principle of simplicity, the questions were kept as short as possible
without compromising precision: in most cases, a request for answer follows one
sentence of background information. In addition, the strategy of bringing together
the questions and the statements which correspond to the dimensions of a single
variable was followed to highlight the thematic linkages and to make responses
more convenient. With regard to specific choices, first, 5-point ordinal scales are
preferred in order to attach meaningful labels to each answer category. Second,
middle categories are used because, in general, there is no need to differentiate
answers between positive and negative camps with a few exceptions. Third, ‘no
opinion’ option is offered so that the lack of preference is not compounded with
the ordinal position of the middle category.
The conceptualization of variables is reflected into the questionnaire with re-
spect to these standards. For the dependent variable, five aforementioned dimen-
sions of the views on multilevel politics are formulated into statements, and the
respondents were asked to state their degree of agreement with each. For the
views on the power of European institutions and subnational authorities, the polit-
ical areas of social policy, economic policy, internal affairs and foreign affairs are
supplemented with examples to increase the level of specification, and presented
alongside an additional overall evaluation, with the answer categories varying be-
tween ‘very weak’ and ‘very powerful’. The concepts of multilevel governance,
subsidiarity, federalism and decentralization are similarly presented to be evalu-
ated between very negative and very positive opinions.
The majority of the variables pertaining to material and cultural aspects are
not conceptualized with multiple dimensions, thus they would not be measured
through a composition of questions. In view of making them amenable to quanti-
tative analysis, they should be operationalized with either a high number of answer
categories, or an even number of categories that can be reduced to a 2-point scale9.
9Treating ordinal variables as continuous is usually accepted as valid with at least 7 answer
categories. Meanwhile, dummy-coding ordinal variables with 5-point scales creates redundancy
in the statistical model by decreasing the degrees of freedom. A reduction to 2-point scales allows
including each variable in the model with only one dummy.
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In this respect, the questions on the effectiveness of institutional channels, and the
role of European funds are not asked in 5-point scales to be able to use them in the
analysis as binary variables. This type of dichotomous coding in these variables
is useful insofar as the main interest is simply in differentiating those who think
a certain type of institutional channel is effective, those who have received, are
receiving or will receive European funds, and those think that European funds are
important. Similarly, answers for political identity are sought in terms of whether
the respondent chooses to identify him/herself with each category, rather than in
terms of degrees of identification. One exception is the perceived usefulness of
transnational organizations, which is designed with a view to generating a multidi-
mensional continuous variable, hence operationalized in the questionnaire through
ordinal scale questions on political, economic and cultural benefits.
More complex procedures of operationalization are needed for the measure-
ment of institutional influence. First of all, a differentiation is necessary between
non-members, the members of multiple organizations, and the members of spe-
cific organizations. For this reason, the first question of the Section 3 of the ques-
tionnaire redirects respondents to respective subsections. Similarly, Section 3B
redirects members of multiple organizations to the relevant subsection of one type
of organization. For the non-members, the representation of the subnational unit
of the respondent in a transnational organization is asked as a Yes/No question,
and the awareness of such organizations and the motivation to work in them are
asked with 5-point scale ordinal answer categories. For the members, a 2-point
scale question asks whether membership is in the past or current, and the dimen-
sions of duration, professional satisfaction and personal importance are asked with
5-point scale ordinal answer categories. A similar procedure is also followed for
external offices as an additional layer of institutionalized multilevel politics in the
Section 4 of the questionnaire.
The degree to which these operationalizations are successful determines the
validity of the variables which will be used in the analysis. Although there is no
formal way to test their validity, it should be noted that tailoring a new survey
to the objectives of the present research is a factor that diminishes the risk of
any mismatch between the conceptual background and the actual measurement
of variables. Since each question is formulated to fulfil a specific purpose that
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is derived from the conceptualization of variables, the responses can be taken as
valid representations of the values attached to the variables of interest.
Measurement Following the conceptualization and the operationalization of
variables, they are measured on the basis of the responses given by subnational
actors to the questionnaire. The main concern in this measurement stage is relia-
bility, that is, the consistency in the ability of the questionnaire to collect meaning-
ful data. The main challenge in ensuring reliability is that systematic measurement
errors cannot be detected until after the data have been collected. In order to miti-
gate measurement-related risks, the questionnaire has been tested against the data
collected from a pilot study.
For this pre-test, an additional sampling frame was drawn from the UK and the
Republic of Ireland with subnational clusters which are not included in the main
frame. These countries were selected primarily for the convenience of testing the
questionnaire in its original language and the wide availability of contact informa-
tion. In the end, this sampling frame consisted of approximately 2,400 subnational
actors, and the sample contained 120 complete or almost complete responses, giv-
ing an initial idea of the expected response rate around 5% which has also been
the case in the main survey. The preliminary analyses conducted on the pilot data
show that the potential problems associated with systematic measurement errors
are not present in this survey, as discussed below.
First, in terms of general advantages of web surveys, interviewer bias can be
dismissed as there is no intermediary between the respondent and the question-
naire, with the exception of an electronic device. The possible use of different
types of device, such as computers, tablets and smart phones, could be seen as a
source of inconsistency, which has been minimized through design features which
adapt to the screen where the questionnaire is displayed. The absence of a human
factor also means that social desirability bias need not be a serious concern, given
the anonymity of answers and the lack of sensitive information requested from
the respondents. Similarly, primacy or recency biases, that is, the propensity to
choose the first or the last heard option respectively, are dismissed in a web sur-
vey where the answer categories are displayed on the same screen which does not
prioritize the visibility of any option.
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Second, in terms of general disadvantages, several other types of bias may be
exacerbated in web surveys. For instance, the questionnaire carries a considerable
risk of acquiescence bias, that is, a higher tendency to agree than disagree, due to
the formulation of ordinal scale questions in agree-disagree and positive-negative
terms (Converse and Presser, 1986, p. 38). Pilot study data has indeed displayed
answer distributions with a negative skew. However, when composite variables are
generated through additive indices, distributions are normalized through simple
data transformation procedures, showing that in spite of a general tendency to
agree, the selection of the most positive answer in all dimensions of a variable is
an exception. This finding also increases the confidence in the absence of primacy
and recency effects. A parallel bias could be expected in the form of giving similar
answers to different indicators of the same variable, but this is also ruled out by the
pilot data as the variability of the values of the composite variables is as nuanced
as the total number of indicators. Finally, greater convenience of dropping out
could be a disadvantage of using a web survey as the mode of data collection,
but this has also proved marginal in view of the very low item non-response rates
in the pilot study. Overall, the preliminary statistical models fitted to the pilot
data (presented in Appendix A.1) have shown that the questionnaire was capable
of collecting meaningful data from which associations among variables could be
inferred.
It should be noted that the main survey also generated data for which measure-
ment related issues did not pose a serious problem. However, one major concern
of reliability which could not be tested in the pilot study stems from the multi-
lingual population. In other words, the administration of the same questionnaire
in different languages raises serious questions regarding cross-linguistic consis-
tency. The main precautions taken against this risk involved the selection of trans-
lators with proven competence in social scientific texts, and the proofreading of
the translated texts by actual social scientists who are native speakers of the target
language, checking the accuracy of translations against the original in English.
Furthermore, several post-facto tests did not return statistically significant differ-
ences in major variables, when the sample is divided into subsets with respect
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to the questionnaire language10. On the other hand, another type of systematic
measurement error might be caused by the limited availability of languages and
varying competence in second languages. This possibility is also ruled out by
similar tests11.
Data processing The last stage for making the raw data amenable to statistical
analysis consists of several additional transformations. First of all, data processing
should re-aggregate the disaggregated components of composite variables. More
specifically, conceptualization has identified multiple dimensions for the views on
multilevel politics, the strength of European institutions and subnational author-
ities, the influence of transnational institutions, and the perceived usefulness of
transnational organizations; operationalization formulated questions for multiple
indicators; and measurement generated numerical values for them from ordinal
answer categories. Thereby, these constructs are turned into variables with con-
tinuous scales by adding together the numerical values assigned to the ordinal
answer categories. While four relatively simple variables are generated through
additive indices, the more complex operationalization of institutional influence
requires a more detailed approach. Notably, the categorical distinction between
the members and the non-members of transnational organizations should be pre-
served, leading to a multi-stage indexing with higher values for those with actual
experience in transnational institutions12.
Furthermore, parametric significance tests assume the normal distribution of
continuous variables, which cannot be satisfied by the raw data. As noted above,
there is a general tendency to give positive responses to ordinal answer categories,
resulting in negatively skewed distributions for the views on multilevel politics,
and the strength of European institutions and subnational authorities. These vari-
10For four variables with continuous scale, including the dependent variable on the view on mul-
tilevel politics, the mean differences between subsets of questionnaire language return insignificant
t-values at 5% cut-off, when country effects are controlled for.
11For the same continuous variables, among the respondents who answered the questionnaire
in English, the mean differences between those from Anglophone countries and others return
insignificant t-values at 5% cut-off.
12The details of the construction of the variable of institutional influence are given in the next
chapter under univariate analyses, since the multi-stage indexing depends largely on the actual
data.
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ables are normalized through squaring and cubing where necessary13. On the other
hand, the majority of the sample reporting no direct experience in transnational in-
stitutions means a positively skewed distribution for institutional influence, which
is normalized through natural logarithm. For the simplicity of the interpretation
in the stage of analysis, normal distributions are rescaled to ranges that do not
exceed 0 and 5 on both ends14.
Finally, data processing has also addressed the issue of item non-response.
Although the observations with large numbers of missing values, especially those
who do not provide answers for an entire section of the questionnaire, are dropped
from the sample, the existence of smaller amounts of missing values would lead
to a further reduction of the sample size in the analysis. While a larger sample size
is preferable for a variety of reasons, a more important concern is that excluding
observations with item non-response may result in a biased sample. Assuming
that item non-response occurs when a respondent does not want to answer a ques-
tion, excluding this respondent would be systematically linked to the unanswered
question. In order to avoid this form of bias and the loss of genuine data points
that such cases provide for other variables, imputation comes forth as a useful
method to simulate values for missing points15 (de Leeuw, 2001; Durrant, 2009).
In this research, the general-purpose statistical package Amelia II (Honaker,
King and Blackwell, 2011) is used to generate multiple imputed datasets.
The main advantage of proceeding with multiply imputed datasets is retaining
the sample size and avoiding a possible item non-response bias without changing
the estimates that could be otherwise observed. Since the simulations are based
on the existing interrelations among variables, imputation only carries these re-
lations upto a larger sample without interfering with them. Even in cases where
simulations are not able to impute accurate values, the uncertainty is reflected in
13The decisions regarding which transformation is necessary, if any, also depends on specific
distributions that can be observed from the actual data. For this reason, the details of variable
transformation are also left to the next chapter which presents survey results.
14Since the measurements are merely theoretical constructs that are developed in this study, such
data transformations do not affect the accuracy of interpretations. In other words, the values that
each variable take do not have a meaning independent of the values assigned in the questionnaire.
Thereby, the normalization and reduction to 0-5 scale can be seen as part of the indexing procedure.
15Comparison of nested models, which is crucial for model specification, requires the same
sample size for all tested statistical models. Without imputation, observations with at least one
missing value would have to be dropped from all models.
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the variation of imputed values across multiple datasets. The drawback would be
increased standard errors, but this would lead to a cautionary choice by opting for
a Type II error rather than Type I. Additionally, sustained sample size will provide
sufficient compensation. For these reasons, the analyses in this research will be
conducted on the basis of results combined from 5 imputed datasets.
3.1.3 Quantitative methods of analysis
Statistical analysis is the ultimate aim of the two parallel processes of survey de-
sign, generating a sample of respondents who have given answers to the desig-
nated questions. In this respect, the research will proceed in three steps. First,
univariate analyses will be conducted to examine the above-discussed variables.
These analyses will also provide a more concrete content to the relatively abstract
methodological discussions and the descriptions of the research process of this
section. Second, bivariate analyses will test individual hypotheses that form the
basis of the proposed research design. Third, the full set of hypotheses will be
treated as a single argument, and tested as a multiple regression model with ordi-
nary least squares (OLS). Having checked the basic assumptions during univariate
and bivariate analyses, this model will return statistics for each variable when oth-
ers are controlled for, hence accounting for the interrelationships among them.
The choice of multiple OLS regression is made against two alternatives. First,
considering that the measurement of variables is at ordinal scales including the
dependent variable, an ordered logit or probit regression seemed to be the natu-
ral choice. However, multilevel politics is a multidimensional concept, and this
is reflected in its measurement; reducing it back to a 5-point ordinal scale would
remove the information gathered from the nuances among multiple dimensions.
Furthermore, since the values attached to the variables do not have a meaning in-
dependent of the present research, any simulations that could follow the obtained
odds ratios would not be particularly informative. To test the usefulness of OLS
and ordered regression, respective models were compared during the stage of pi-
lot study, with no considerable difference between the significance levels of the
independent variables.
Second, the cross-national property of the sample calls for a special attention
to country clusters, and multilevel modelling with random country effects came
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forth as the most plausible alternative. However, for multilevel modelling, rigor-
ous sample size requirements apply to within-country and across-country num-
bers of units alike (Snijders and Bosker, 1999, p. 140). In this respect, a second-
level sample size of 25 countries is the absolute minimum for reliable estimates
from simple models, and more complex models require larger samples (Bryan and
Jenkins, 2016). In the sample that has resulted from the survey, there are only 11
countries with reasonably high numbers of respondents. As a remedy for the in-
ability to use multilevel models, country fixed effects are going to be inserted into
OLS models, and country-specific regressions will be separately examined.
On a practical note, the statistical analyses are conducted by using the pro-
gramming language R (R Core Team, 2016). More specifically, the multi-purpose
statistical package Zelig (Imai, King and Lau, 2008; Choirat et al., 2016) is used
to fit the models. The main reason for using Zelig is its convenience in com-
bining the results from multiply imputed datasets. In addition, the presentation
of findings makes extensive use of the graphical packages ggplot2 (Wickham,
2009) and likert (Bryer and Speerschneider, 2015). Other packages used for
miscellaneous reasons, such as data processing and regression diagnostics, in-
clude car (Fox and Weisberg, 2011), Hmisc (Harrell, 2016), plyr (Wickham,
2011), reshape2 (Wickham, 2007), lmtest (Zeileis and Hothorn, 2002) and
gridExtra (Auguie, 2016).
3.2 Methods for institutional-level variation:
Comparative case study
Having designed the individual-level research through a cross-national survey,
there will also be a comparative case study designed to address the institutional-
level variation. As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, the relative merit
of the second part of the mixed-method design is the opportunity to derive rich
information from a small number of units of analysis. However, there are several
methodological issues associated with small-number comparative methods, which
will be discussed in the first place. The subsequent subsections will address the
use of survey data and qualitative techniques in the case studies.
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3.2.1 Comparative logic and case selection
Two major types of small-N comparison exist, namely most similar and most dif-
ferent systems designs (Przeworski and Teune, 1970). As the main motive of
scientific social inquiry is the control of variables that the comparative method
tries to achieve (Sartori, 1970), the first type assumes that all factors are the same
across cases with the exception of diverging variables of interest, and the sec-
ond type assumes that all factors are different across cases with the exception of
similar variables of interest. If the scientific control of variables is best achieved
through experimental methods, statistical methods approximate this idea through
mathematical manipulation, and the comparative method through selecting cases
on the basis of similarity or dissimilarity which allows the assumptions of control
(Lijphart, 1971, 1975). In this sense, inferences made through methods of differ-
ence or agreement, that is, most similar and different systems designs, take the
shape of a macro-causal analysis (Skocpol and Somers, 1980).
However, small-N comparisons are methodologically and philosophically crit-
icized for their imperfections with regard to the basic premises of scientific inquiry
(MacIntyre, 1971). First, the comparative method relies on a set of unrealistic as-
sumptions, such as a deterministic approach relying on a single cause without
interaction with others and a confidence that all relevant factors can be measured
without error (Lieberson, 1991, pp. 315-316). Second, case selection on the basis
of dependent variables, which is the only way to ensure the control of variables,
inevitably leads to biased conclusions (Geddes, 1990). In this sense, comparative
method should not be seen as a source of law-like inferences, but instead gen-
eralizations should be limited to moderate levels (Bendix, 1963; Sartori, 1970).
In other words, the scope of the theory should be consistent with the empirical
evidence and the methods employed in exploring this evidence (Collier and Ma-
honey, 1996; Mahoney, 2007). It is also true that cases perfectly compatible with
the requirements of methods of difference or agreement are nowhere to be found;
the purpose of comparative method is hence ‘to assimilate and to differentiate to a
point’ (Sartori, 1991, p. 246), and a wise strategy is to select cases from the same
class or ’genus’ (Sartori, 1970), which does not necessitate a selection on the basis
of variables and avoids the accompanying bias.
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In this context, the primary reasons which have already been offered to justify
the case selection on the basis of an overview of alternative institutional channels
(Chapter 1), as well as the theoretical discussions focusing on the selected cases
(Chapter 2), can also be grounded in methodological standards of case selection.
In a study which offers new explanations and tries to determine their empirical
validity, such as this dissertation, the selection of typical cases is the most appro-
priate option, in contrast to the possibilities of, for instance, outlying or influential
cases which could have been used to challenge existing explanations, if they had
existed (Seawright and Gerring, 2008). In terms of the primary reasons offered
in Chapter 1, the robustness of the Committee of the Regions and the Congress
of Local and Regional Authorities to diverse backgrounds can be translated into
methodological justification as typicality, since they can be reasonably expected
to occupy the central stage and not display unusual characteristics regarding in-
stitutional effects. Moreover, their compatibility with the historical component of
the theoretical discussions of Chapter 2 can be expected to extend to the contem-
porary component as well. All in all, this typicality can be equated to Sartori’s
logic of selection with a view to representing a category of cases, in this context,
the institutions of multilevel politics in Europe. Since the attributes that narrowed
down the selection are those that pertain to typicality, the findings of the compar-
ison are likely to be relevant for other less typical institutions as well, insofar as
the latter can be fundamentally categorized as institutions of multilevel politics.
Therefore, it should be emphasized further that the reason for including a com-
parative case study in the research design is not simply an interest in within-case
relationships between variables, but also the analytical relevance of taking insti-
tutional characteristics themselves as variables, hence the variation at the insti-
tutional level. In other words, differentiating between intra-systemic and inter-
systemic levels of analysis, and showing the importance of the effects of higher-
order variables on within-case patterns, or the lack thereof (Przeworski and Teune,
1970), will help to unify the two constituent parts of the research design. In this re-
spect, a two-level theory will be tested, to see if institutional characteristics shape
the relationships among variables that are already observed at the individual level
(Goertz and Mahoney, 2006). In order to realize these objectives, the compara-
tive case study will begin with case-specific re-examinations of the survey data,
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and continue with qualitative research which follows the same dimensions along
which the hypotheses were formulated.
3.2.2 Use of survey data in comparative case study
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the case study is not intended to re-test
the findings of the survey, but to complement it with institutional-level observa-
tions, thus it should accomplish separate objectives. Yet these objectives are inher-
ently linked across quantitative and qualitative components, especially regarding
the potential relationship between institutional characteristics and influence on
individual actors. For this reason, in order to establish a parallel design for the
case study, its main dimensions of analysis will also be defined in distributional,
material and value-based terms, namely, the redistribution of competences across
levels of governance, material incentives offered by and effectiveness provided by
institutions, and political norms and values generated by them. In this respect, the
comparative case study will serve to explain the similarity or dissimilarity of CoR
and CLRAE with respect to a dependent variable that can be derived in the first
instance by re-examining the scores of their members on the variable of the views
on multilevel politics.
First of all, with a simple approach, the mean scores in the views on MLP
will be compared across cases. Second, a dummy-coded institutional affiliation
will be substituted for the continuous variable of institutional influence to see the
difference that these organizations make when other individual-level variables are
controlled for. These two types of analysis will highlight the direct effects of insti-
tutions on the dependent variable. Third, given that several independent variables
are associated with the dependent variable, any direct institutional effect on the
independent variables will mean indirect effect on the dependent variable. In this
sense, independent variables will also be compared across cases in order to detect
such indirect effects. Furthermore, several institution-specific variables are added
to the relevant parts of the Section 3 of the questionnaire (see Appendix A.3.2),
in order to explore how subnational actors see the organizations of which they are
members, with respect to the main missions and the future of these organizations,
and which bodies of the organizations are more likely to be influential on mem-
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bers. The findings from these questions will be examined as an additional layer of
the quantitative part of the case study.
Nonetheless, quantitative analyses cannot be sufficient for the case studies.
Given that CoR and CLRAE are both similar and different, quantitative findings
of either similarity or difference will leave behind analytically interesting ques-
tions. If both CoR and CLRAE display similar results in numerical terms, how
can we account for the differences in institutional characteristics? If CoR and
CLRAE display different results in numerical terms, how can we account for the
overarching similarities between the two? These questions set the limit of in-
ferences that can be achieved through the quantification of data. From this point
onwards, in-depth analyses of institutional characteristics, hence qualitative meth-
ods are needed.
3.2.3 Qualitative research
Three major qualitative research techniques applicable to the study of political
organizations are ethnography or participant observation, textual analysis, and in-
terviews (Silverman, 2006). Although ethnography would be a comprehensive
method which would yield relevant information, it is not very suitable for CoR
and CLRAE where members are not permanently based. This sort of observation
can instead be replaced by ‘naturalistic observations’ (McNabb, 2004, p. 365)
during plenary sessions, which was realized for CoR during a 11-week long field-
work in Brussels. Although this naturalistic observation has helped to develop a
more first-hand experience of what is under scrutiny, with probable indirect ef-
fects on interpretations drawn from other methods, it does not constitute a central
aspect of the analysis. Instead, textual analyses which were conducted prior to
this fieldwork, and semi-structured interviews which were conducted during the
fieldwork lay the basis of qualitative research. In line with the general theoreti-
cal framework, the exploration of institutional characteristics will proceed along
four dimensions: the free-standing influence of institutions over actors, the role of
institutions with regard to the redistribution of competences across levels of gov-
ernance, the strength and effectiveness of institutions, and the norms and values
prevalent in institutional environments.
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Textual analysis The documents which are produced by CoR and CLRAE and
which are amenable to analysis can be categorized into two groups: publications
and adopted texts. The first group consists of the official website as the primary
source of general information, as well as booklets, pamphlets, mission statements,
activity reports, rules and procedures, etc. It is crucial to note that the organiza-
tions are the authors of these documents as collective actors, and the main aim
of the analysis is to infer institutional characteristics from them. In this respect,
the publications will be scrutinized with a view to providing answers to questions
regarding the institutional characteristics of interest: how do they define their re-
lationship to subnational actors, how do they define their role in terms of supra-
national integration and domestic decentralization, how effective are their internal
structures, how likely are they to make political impact, and how capable are they
to change the norms and values that underlie the political discourse in Europe?
While publications reflect the position of CoR and CLRAE as unitary actors,
adopted texts result from debate and compromise, and hence reflect the politi-
cal complexity within each organization. Although the technical nature of these
texts make it difficult to derive interpretations on institution-actor relations and
normative aspects, they contain rich information on political positions taken by
the members regarding the appropriate levels of governance. Similarly, the insti-
tutional mechanisms through which the texts are drafted and adopted, as well as
the total output, will be used to evaluate the effectiveness of these mechanisms.
Given the total amount of text produced by each organization each year, a sys-
tematic approach is necessary to arrive at specific findings. For this purpose, this
part of research will draw on content analysis to identify ‘specified characteristics
of messages’ (Holsti, 1969, p. 14), by relying on the rules and procedures of sci-
entific method (Neuendorf, 2002, p. 10), and complementing qualitative research
with quantification where necessary (Weber, 1990, p. 10). The content analysis
will be conducted on a sample of texts, selected to reflect the period between 2008
and 2013. While all documents produced by CLRAE in this period are taken into
account, two plenary sessions per year are selected from CoR to ensure equiva-
lence across cases16.
16The majority of CLRAE documents are approved in the plenary sessions twice a year, while
the same practice happens six times a year in the case of CoR.
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In this respect, relevant themes will be coded into common categories, and the
large amount of information will thus be summarized into the frequencies of these
categories. More specifically, the itemized structure of adopted texts makes items
the natural units of analysis. These items will then be ascribed values on the basis
of the level(s) of government that they refer to. Thereby, the frequency of all levels
or subnational and European levels will be taken as indicative of an emphasis
on multilevel politics, the frequency of European level or European and national
levels will be taken as indicative of an emphasis on European integration, and
the frequency of subnational level or subnational and national levels will be taken
as indicative of an emphasis on decentralization. On one hand, the magnitude
of these emphases will show the role that organizations assume with regard to
the distribution of competences across levels of governance. On the other hand,
the association between emphases and institutional mechanisms will show how
internal structures affect the output.
Interviews The survey and its standardized questionnaire served the purpose of
collecting data on individual attitudes. Since qualitative interviews are primarily
concerned with the case study, the participants at this stage will be seen as infor-
mants rather than the subjects of research. In this sense, staff members as well as
political members will be among the interviewees. Given that both groups are in a
position authority, in the form of either specialized knowledge or decision making
power, they qualify as elite participants. Following general guidelines on elite
interviewing, semi-structured interviews emerged as the most suitable method
(Burnham et al., 2008, pp. 242-243; Aberbach and Rockman, 2002). Even though
semi-structured interviews are often associated with non-positivist epistemology
(Brenner, Brown and Canter, 1985; Rubin and Rubin, 1995; Warren, 2002), which
would mean that the interview itself cannot be a source of information, any re-
search interview has the implicit or explicit aim of making observations, and rela-
tively unstructured interviews can be as systematic as structured interviews insofar
as adequate standards are adopted (Gillham, 2000; Morris, 2009). Yet the asym-
metry of the interviews that stems from the presence of elite participants must be
controlled by cross-checking the accuracy of the information with other sources
of data (Harvey, 2010; Berry, 2002).
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These broad considerations have led to the design of qualitative interviews
in several steps. First, in order to provide assurance to participants, a detailed
information sheet and a consent form is offered (see Appendix C.1 for details).
Second, in order to ensure that the interview data are systematically collected
with consistency across conversations, common guidelines are set and followed
(see Appendix C.2 for details). For the political members, the questions focus
on the general characteristics of the CoR and CLRAE, their possible strengthen-
ing, the role of national delegations and political groups, and their relationship to
multilevel politics17. Since staff members work for either national delegations or
political groups, the questions directed to them focus on the functioning of these
bodies. The probes that are identified for each primary question are intended to
cover the main institutional characteristics of interest. Finally, participants are se-
lected with a view to ensuring the diversity of national and political backgrounds.
In the end, 13 positive responses to interview requests were received, and the ma-
jority of interviews were conducted in Brussels or nearby locations (see Appendix
C.3 for details). Overall, a reasonable balance has been achieved between three
major political groups, different parts of Europe, and staff members and political
members. CoR members have a greater weight due to the fact that the fieldwork
took place in Brussels, but CLRAE is still sufficiently represented with 6 out of
13 interviews.
3.3 Research process
To summarize, the mixed-method approach that has been adopted in this work ad-
dresses individual-level variation through a cross-national survey, and institutional-
level variation through a comparative case study of CoR and CLRAE. Conducting
quantitative analyses on a sample that represents the population of European sub-
national actors with reasonable chance to engage in multilevel political activities,
within the limits discussed above, the survey data will allow the testing of the
institutionalist hypotheses on the link of the views on multilevel politics to the
distribution of competences across levels of governance, the material incentives
and the effectiveness of institutionalized practices, and the cultural factors of po-
17During the interviews, the term multilevel governance is used as a proxy for multilevel poli-
tics, since the latter is not a widely used concept in political language.
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litical identification. The findings from the survey research will inform and be
complemented by the comparative case study which will explore the institutional
characteristics of CoR and CLRAE along the same institutionalist analytical di-
mensions, through textual analysis of official documents and semi-structured elite
interviews.
This design has been implemented throughout four years of research. The first
and preparatory stage was concerned with the review of relevant literature and
the formulation of the research question, which has resulted in Chapter 1 of the
present thesis, as well as the identification of possible theoretical and methodolog-
ical approaches, and the exploratory analyses of official documents. The second
stage consists of the development of the theoretical framework and the formu-
lation of empirical hypotheses, which has resulted in Chapter 2, as well as the
drafting of the questionnaire according to the hypotheses and the testing of its re-
liability through a pilot study. The most important research objectives that have
been set out in this chapter materialized in the third stage. On one hand, the con-
tact information was collected for the sampling frame, subnational actors were
invited to take part in the survey, and the responses of the participants were trans-
formed into the raw dataset. On the other hand, the semi-structured interviews
were conducted during the fieldwork, and the examination of official documents
was completed. In the fourth and final stage, the dataset was rendered suitable for
further operations, univariate, bivariate and multivariate analyses were conducted,
and the information that had been drawn from official documents and interviews
was examined with respect to the theoretical framework.
The following sections present the results of the final stage of the research.
Chapter 4 provides further details about the variables that have been described
here by taking into account the actual responses given by the participants of
the survey. The sections on the univariate and bivariate analyses not only dis-
cuss the general patterns observed thanks to the survey, but also check the ba-
sic assumptions for a multivariate analysis that is the ultimate aim of the sur-
vey research. Chapter 5 then specifies the best multivariate model in confor-
mity with methodological and theoretical requirements, running parametric sig-
nificance tests through OLS regression as discussed above. The results of hy-
pothesis tests, which check the significance of the variables conceptualized in
this chapter, are interpreted on the basis of the multivariate OLS model, and con-
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clusions are drawn for the broader institutionalist argument. Finally, Chapter 6
begins with a re-examination of the survey data concentrating on the cases under
scrutiny, in order to determine the degree of variation in the dependent variable
and individual-level independent variables. The institutional characteristics that
are explored in the rest of the chapter to account for similarities and differences
draw on document- and interview-based data for empirical support.
Chapter 4
Subnational attitudes towards
multilevel politics
In the previous chapter, the section on survey design discussed, on the one hand,
the general characteristics of the sample, and on the other hand, the conceptual-
ization, the operationalization and the measurement procedures of the variables.
Additionally, it has been stated that the ultimate purpose of the survey is to calcu-
late statistics about the variables of interest, and a further processing of the data is
necessary for this reason. However, this section has only laid out the methodolog-
ical principles behind these procedures in a rather abstract manner, and a more
concrete understanding of how the intended measurement has materialized in the
sample is necessary to substantiate the eventual analyses. The aim of this chap-
ter is, therefore, to answer several background questions regarding the collected
data: how are the responses of subnational actors processed into more practicable
variables, what are the basic statistics of these variables, and how do the variables
relate to each other? In order to understand the attitudes of subnational actors
towards multilevel politics and the factors posited as related to multilevel politics,
the first section will discuss the construction of each variable and the resulting
statistics. In order to explain the observed attitudes, the second section will ex-
plore the covariation among variables, and in particular the variation of the views
on multilevel politics (MLP) as a function of other variables.
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4.1 Understanding subnational attitudes:
Univariate analyses
The variables drawn from the survey data are classified into two groups. First,
continuous-scale variables are generated by indexing ordinal-scale measurements
of multiple dimensions as discussed in the section on their conceptualization
and operationalization. Second, dichotomous variables result from either ques-
tions asked through Yes-No options, or a reduction of ordinal and categorical
answer options. The following subsection will present the components of four
continuous-scale variables with equivalent dimensions and the processes of their
construction from these components. The second subsection will discuss exclu-
sively the variable of institutional influence, since its measurement follows a more
complex pattern. The last subsection will summarize the frequencies of the an-
swers given to dichotomous variables.
4.1.1 Continuous variables
Views on multilevel politics The dependent variable of the present study, the
views on multilevel politics, is conceptualized as consisting of multiple dimen-
sions which are measured in terms of the degree of agreement with five state-
ments, as well as a possible addition of opinions on two concepts. To begin with
the statements, the average scores of five dimensions with 5-point scales result in a
combined range of 25 levels. Figure 4.1 summarizes the distribution of responses
to each statement, ordered from greater to lesser agreement.
While major analyses will be conducted on the combined variable, a further
look at the individual aspects might reveal important information about what it
truly represents. The overall results suggest that respondents tend to agree with
the statements rather than disagree, which is also seen in the negatively skewed
distribution in the top-left chart of Figure 4.3. The order between statements in
Figure 4.1 implies that lower tendencies of agreement can be associated with more
radical aspects of multilevel politics. In this sense, the bottom statement calls for
reducing national competences vis-à-vis subnational authorities with regard to the
latter’s transnational endeavours, while the second statement from the bottom calls
for a status for subnational authorities in international law which is conventionally
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Figure 4.1: Components of the variable ‘views on multilevel politics’
dominated by the nation states. With an almost equal distribution to this one, the
middle statement also calls for an equalization of the statuses of subnational and
national levels, this time in the framework of European politics, with an emphasis
on subnational authorities becoming main actors. In the same vein, more agreed
statements have less radical implications, using the phrase ‘it is important for...’
rather than ‘should’ with regard to the transnational relations between subnational
authorities and their representation in international organizations. Therefore, the
small differences in the higher values of the variable will mostly result from more
radical statements, meaning that the highest values indeed represent extremely
favourable views on MLP.
In addition to these five statements, participants were asked directly about their
opinions on two central concepts of multilevel politics whose appeal has expanded
beyond academic and legal terminology, and which have become familiar to po-
litical actors: multilevel governance and subsidiarity. The distribution of these
responses, summarized in the second and third rows1 of Figure 4.2, also shows a
tendency towards more positive attitudes. Moreover, subsidiarity received more
positive responses than multilevel governance; this might allude to the fact that the
propensity to favour ideas which only refer to the power of subnational authorities
1The concepts in the first and fourth rows are discussed later as part of the variable ‘subnational
competences’.
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is higher than ideas which refer to a larger scale restructuring of the political sys-
tem. Considering these parallel features and the common theoretical background,
the variable of multilevel politics can also be calculated as the average score of
numbers assigned to response options of five statements and two concepts, allow-
ing for a combined scale of 35 levels.
Figure 4.2: Multilevel governance, subsidiarity, federalism and decentralization
Finally, having observed that subnational actors display predominantly posi-
tive views on multilevel politics, the main focus should be on the variation within
the positive side of the distribution. In order to magnify this part of the variation,
the eventual numeric values of the variable of multilevel politics will be calcu-
lated by taking a power of the initial average values. This transformation will also
increase the likelihood of the overall distribution to approximate a normal distri-
bution which is required to meet the assumptions of further statistical analyses.
In the case of the views on MLP, squaring and cubing are evaluated successively,
and it is found that the latter further enhances the normality of the distribution.
In this respect, raw and cubed versions are summarized in Figure 4.3, which are
calculated separately for the averages of 5-dimensional and 7-dimensional mea-
surements.The black lines represent an ideal normal distribution with respective
means and standard deviations.
Both the addition of opinions of two related concepts and the cubing trans-
formation increase the normality of the distribution, reducing the skewness co-
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Figure 4.3: Distributions of the variable ‘views on multilevel politics’
efficient from -0.94 to almost zero. Therefore, the distribution visualized in the
bottom-right chart will be taken as the final form of the variable. Not only does
this provide greater conformity with the requirements of further statistical analy-
ses using parametric significance tests, but analytically it is also more interesting.
Given that the prevalent opinion generally corresponds to agreement with mod-
erate statements on MLP, this opinion is represented in the mid-part of the dis-
tribution, while the right-hand side represents extremely positive views on MLP
and the left-hand side represents negative views broadly. In the end, the views on
MLP will be calculated through the following equation:
MLP =
(S1+S2+S3+S4+S5+C1+C2
7
)3
52
where Si means the score from agreement with statements, Ci means the score
from opinion on concepts, and the cubed average score is divided by 52 to bring
the scale back to the range of [0, 5] so that the values are easier to interpret2.
2Given that different types of transformation result in scales of varying length, the comparabil-
ity of continuous variables becomes more difficult. In order to avoid this difficulty, once a power
n of the values is taken, this will be divided by 5 to the power (n−1), 5-squared in this case. Even
though the scales will not exactly match, the maximum value will always be 5, and the minimum
value will be between 0 and 1.
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Views on the strength of European institutions The first continuous indepen-
dent variable to be constructed is the views on European institutions—the upward
aspect of the distribution of competences across levels of governance—measured
in terms of the opinions of the respondents on how strong European institutions
should be, with regard to four competency areas and an overall assessment. The
addition of these five dimensions, as listed in Figure 4.4, will generate a variable
which measures the attitudes towards European institutions and which has a scale
of 25 levels. The results generally indicate opinions in favour of stronger Euro-
pean institutions, leading to a negatively skewed distribution as seen in the top
chart of Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.4: Components of the variable ‘views on the strength of European institutions’
Among the components of the variable, the ‘in general’ category is in the mid-
dle rank in Figure 6, suggesting that it approximately represents an average of the
other categories. The categories which received relatively more positive responses
are ‘foreign affairs’ and ‘economic policy’. On one hand, foreign affairs represent
an area in which European institutions are currently quite weak whereas economic
policy is one of their strongest areas. Therefore, the former can definitely be seen
as a statement for further strengthening while the latter can be seen at least as a
statement of preserving the current competences. On the other hand, both foreign
affairs and economic policy, as pertaining to the European level, are beyond the
powers of subnational authorities. In this sense, more positive views in these areas
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can be linked to the fact that these would not infringe upon their current compe-
tences. In contrast, other categories, domestic affairs and social policy are areas
where subnational authorities conventionally have more power and responsibility,
and would potentially expect to have more.
Figure 4.5: Distributions of the variable ‘views on the strength European institutions’
Despite a left-skew similar to the variable of multilevel politics, the views on
European institutions display a higher variability on the positive side of the dis-
tribution. Thus, squaring the average values is sufficient to arrive at a reasonably
normal distribution, while taking higher powers skews the distribution in the op-
posite direction. Proceeding with the squared form of the variable, which reduces
the skewness coefficient from -0.86 to -0.16, the higher end of the distribution will
be taken as representing very favourable views on the strength of European insti-
tutions, the mid-part representing moderately favourable views, and the lower end
representing less favourable views broadly. Taking into account the components
as well, the higher values are distinguished from the rest with more favourable
attitudes towards upward transfer of competences that are usually associated with
national and subnational levels. This formulation of the variable will be given by
the following equation:
SEI =
(A1+A2+A3+A4+A5
5
)2
5
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where Ai means the score from the evaluation of policy area, and the squared
average score is divided by 5 to bring the scale back to the range of [0, 5] so that
the values are easier to interpret.
Views on subnational competences As the counterpart of European institu-
tions, the views on subnational competences are measured along the same dimen-
sions, as summarized in Figure 4.6. A single combined variable is once again
created to form a scale of 25 levels. Nonetheless, as seen in the top chart of Fig-
ure 4.7, the distribution of this variable displays a much greater tendency towards
the middle category as compared to the previous two variables. The surprising part
is that a sample consisting exclusively of subnational actors provides more mod-
est responses on subnational competences than on the strength of supra-national
institutions. It can be deduced from this finding that the participant subnational
actors make a fair assessment of the relationship between political issues and the
levels of governance irrespective of their current position.
Figure 4.6: Components of the variable ‘views on subnational competences’
On the other hand, the results on the components are less surprising, although
participants tended to mark higher options in the ‘in general’ category than the
average of other four categories. Additionally, foreign policy is the area in which
subnational actors expect themselves to be the least competent. Considering the
overwhelmingly positive views on statements concerning multilevel politics, the
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respondents apparently do not consider multilevel activities as part of foreign af-
fairs. On the opposite side, social policy, which was ranked the lowest in the
questions regarding European institutions, is ranked on the top as part of subna-
tional competences. These two would suggest an implicit understanding of the
division of powers between supranational and subnational levels of government.
In this respect, one possible interpretation of domestic affairs being ranked rela-
tively low is the acceptance of this category as an area of national competence.
Lastly, economic policy seems to be outside an understanding of the division of
powers; instead, multilevel politics can be taken to mean cooperation rather than
sharing between levels when economy is concerned.
In addition to these five categories of policy areas, respondents’ opinions on
two related concepts of decentralization and federalism were also asked, in the
same format as subsidiarity and multilevel governance, as shown in Figure 4.2.
These could be added to the combined scale in a similar way to the variable
on multilevel politics, as suggested in the stage of conceptualization. However,
based on the examination of the actual data, this has proved to be unnecessary.
Above all, adding two additional dimensions would make the design of this vari-
able more similar to the dependent variable, and more dissimilar to the views on
European institutions, while its parallelism with the latter is more logical. There-
fore, this operation would be meaningful only if it offers a significant practical ad-
vantage. However, given that the variable with 5 dimensions is already normally
distributed, and that the addition of two further dimensions does not improve but
deteriorates the distribution3, as compared in Figure 4.7, there is no need to depart
from the 5-dimensional construction of the variable of the views on subnational
competences.
Moreover, any further transformation is not necessary either, as the normal-
ity of the distribution would not be significantly improved in this way. Thus, the
highest values of the variable would be distinct from the rest due to those actors
who think that subnational authorities should share in the competences catego-
rized under ‘domestic affairs’ and ‘foreign affairs’, and the lowest values would
be distinctive due to those who think that subnational authorities should not be
3Adding the opinions on two related concepts increases the mean from 3.31 to 3.50, further
away from the middle category of ordinal measurements, and shifts the skewness coefficient from
-0.10 to -0.21.
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Figure 4.7: Distributions of the variable ‘views on subnational competences’
powerful overall or with regard to social policy and economic policy. This formu-
lation of the variable will be given by the following simple equation:
SNC =
A1 + A2 + A3 + A4 + A5
5
where Ai means the score from the evaluation of policy area, and the final values
are the simple average of five ordinal scale dimensions.
Usefulness of transnational organizations The last continuous variable to be
constructed from equivalent dimensions is the perceived usefulness of transna-
tional organizations. These dimensions are offered in the questionnaire in terms
of political, economic and cultural benefits, as well as an overall assessment, but
the responses display little variation among them, as seen in Figure 4.8. If this
similarity had resulted from a tendency of respondents to mark the same answer
categories for each type of benefit, these dimensions would not lead to an appro-
priate continuous scale, but they would reproduce the discrete ordinal categories.
However, this is not necessarily the case with this variable, since its distribution
displays a reasonably continuous variation which is presented in Figure 4.9.
Nonetheless, the similarity of dimensions still means that no nuanced informa-
tion is derived from this type of measurement. Instead, the indexing of different
ordinal scales only served the function of leading the respondents to make precise
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Figure 4.8: Components of the variable ‘usefulness of transnational organizations’
judgements on a larger range of options. Therefore, the variable is more appropri-
ately understood as a unidimensional evaluation of the usefulness of transnational
organizations on a scale from 4 to 20, rather than a multidimensional concept. On
more practical aspects, the combined measurement results in a left-skewed distri-
bution, which is normalized by squaring as seen in the bottom chart of Figure 4.9.
Figure 4.9: Distributions of the variable ‘usefulness of transnational organizations’
128 Chapter 4. Subnational attitudes towards multilevel politics
Finally, similar to the views on European institutions, which was also trans-
formed through squaring, the values of the variable will be given by:
UTO =
(B1+B2+B3+B4
4
)2
5
whereBi means the score from the evaluation of the type of benefit to be expected
from transnational organizations, and the squared average scores are divided by 5
to bring the scale back to the range of [0, 5] so that the values are easier to interpret.
4.1.2 Influence of transnational institutions
Another key variable, the influence of transnational institutions, is operationalized
to be measured by several dimensions which are not equivalent to each other and
which call for more complex procedures. First, the actors who have direct ex-
perience in transnational institutions should be categorically distinguished from
those without direct experience. Second, different types of transnational institu-
tions, namely formal organizations and informal channels such as external offices,
should be taken into consideration. For this reason, two sections of the question-
naire were devoted to questions for collecting relevant information regarding in-
stitutional influence. Third, within each group distinguished by direct experience,
dichotomously defined variables have a different standing than ordinally measured
factors, hence they are not suitable for regular additive indices.
The simplest way to overcome the difficulties of bringing together all these
factors in a meaningful way would be acquiescing to a dichotomous variable
which only takes into account the existence of direct experience. While it should
be accepted that the difference between experience and non-experience is the fun-
damental indicator of institutional influence, disregarding more minor aspects
would be problematic in other ways. Not only this would mean a loss of rele-
vant information, that is, the removal of within group variation from the analysis,
but also the analytical rigour of the analysis would be significantly damaged. No-
tably, there may be a problem of endogeneity between the dependent variable and
the institutional influence, since subnational actors are not passive recipients of
institutional effects.
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More specifically, membership in transnational organizations does not have to
occur irrespectively of the agency of actors. Instead, subnational actors must be
aware of the opportunities of membership, if they exist, and motivated to take up
ensuing responsibilities. In this sense, those who actively seek or accept posi-
tions of membership in transnational institutions would be the same actors who
already have favourable views on multilevel politics, suggesting a reverse causal-
ity for which the framing of independent and dependent variables are not appro-
priate4. Following a similar logic, the awareness of transnational institutions or
the motivation to work in them would increase the likelihood of membership and
favourable views on MLP independently, suggesting the existence of an unob-
served spurious variable. In order to mitigate this risk, the existence of the oppor-
tunities of transnational experience, the awareness of transnational institutions,
and the motivation to work in them will be included in the measurement of in-
stitutional influence on the side of non-experience, and will be assumed as fully
materialized on the side of experience.
Accordingly, the respondents who reported that they have not been a member
of transnational organizations are asked to indicate whether their subnational unit
is represented in such an organization, hence the existence of the opportunity of
membership, how much they know about these organizations, hence the awareness
of the opportunities, and how motivated they would be to represent their subna-
tional unit at the transnational level, hence the motivation to be a member. The
same questions were also repeated for external offices. In order to take into ac-
count the dichotomous property of the existence of an opportunity of membership
on equal footing with the other 5-point scale questions, it is treated as mediated
by the awareness of opportunities. Intuitively, if an actor has the opportunity of
membership through his/her subnational unit, this is a meaningful opportunity to
the extent that he/she is knowledgeable about its specificities. Similarly, even
if an actor knows a great deal about transnational organizations, the absence of
4The design of the present research is not sufficient to prove the direction of causality. Any
causal inferences that can be made depend on the strength of the theoretical background as com-
pared to alternative explanations, on the basis of which the dependent and independent variables
are identified. Since this possibility of reverse causality cannot be ruled out by the theoretical
framework alone, the methodologically correct strategy will be incorporating the sources of the
potential problem into the analysis.
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an opportunity of membership reduces the probability of an indirect institutional
influence.
In terms of measurement strategy, the representation of one’s subnational unit
in transnational organizations or through external offices is taken as a factor of
awareness, to which motivation is separately added5. The non-experience side is
thus calculated by the following equation:
TNInoXP = representation× awareness+motivation
In this formulation, the values of subnational unit representation are coded 2 for
‘Yes’ and 1 for ‘No’. For those who report ‘Yes’, this contributes one point for
each level of awareness, while for those who report ‘No’, the contribution is zero.
The maximum score that could be retrieved from this equation is 15. To en-
sure that for the experienced actors these aspects are taken as fully materialized,
16 will be their minimum score. More specifically, the subnational units of these
actors are naturally represented at the transnational level, they should know at
least as much as someone who have not had direct experience, and they should be
motivated enough to take up the position. On top of this baseline, the indicators
that are identified as dimensions of transnational influence are the timing of mem-
bership (current or in the past), the duration of experience, the satisfaction with
and the personal importance attached to it. Similarly to the measurement of non-
experience, past-current dichotomy is treated as mediated by duration, by virtue
of being two temporal aspects, and the other two dimensions are added separately.
The corresponding scores are then calculated by the following equation:
TNIXP = K + timing × duration+ satisfaction+ importance
5The same intuitive arguments could also be made for motivation. But multiplying the repre-
sentation of the unit with both would increase the overall scale and the effect of the latter too much.
Similarly, the central tendency of motivation displays higher values than awareness (a mean of 3.91
versus 2.45 when values are treated as numeric), hence multiplication with awareness inflates the
effect of the representation of unit to a lesser extent.
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where K is a constant ensuring the appropriate baseline. In the non-constant part
of the equation, the variable takes values in the range of [5, 20]6, thus the constant
should take the value of 11 to raise the baseline to 16.
Both groups of non-experience and experience have near-normal distributions
in themselves, as seen in the top row of Figure 4.10. Thereby, when two groups
are combined, a bimodal distribution could be expected. But with the group of
non-experience constituting the majority with 75%, the combined distribution is
more appropriately depicted as right-skewed. Therefore, a transformation which
compresses the differences across higher values will normalize the distribution.
Figure 4.10: Distributions of the variable ‘the influence of transnational organizations’
While these calculations only measure the influence of formal transnational
organizations, the same procedures are repeated for external offices as the infor-
mal aspect. The only difference is that the experienced part resulted in a range
beginning with 7, hence the constant of its equation was corrected as 9. Although
formal and informal institutions are considered together for an eventual measure-
ment of transnational institutional influence, a higher weight is given to formal
organizations for two main reasons. First, as a theoretical concern, the systematic
nature of formal institutions can be seen as having greater capacity of influence
in the political sphere. Second, as a practical concern, only 7.78% of the sample
6The variable could theoretically take values between 3 and 20, but the minimum value ob-
tained in the actual sample is 5.
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report experience in external offices, hence a much larger part of the variation in
the informal aspect comes from the side of non-experience. For these reasons, a
weighting of 3-to-2 is applied in favour of transnational organizations, resulting
in the right-skewed distribution shown in the top row of Figure 4.11.
Figure 4.11: Normalization of the variable ‘the influence of transnational organizations’
Finally, the normalization of the distribution is achieved through natural log-
arithm. Taking into account both the weighting of formal and informal aspects,
and the final transformation, the variable of ‘the influence of the transnational
institutions’ is given by the following equation:
TNI = ln (
3
2
· (TNIformalnonXP + TNIformalXP ) + (TNI informalnonXP + TNI informalXP ))
The use of this weighting and logarithmic transformation have enabled the mea-
surement to be compressed to the range of [1.61, 4.39], which is smaller than the
ranges of previously constructed continuous variables, but sufficiently close and
within the limits of [0, 5].
4.1.3 Dichotomous variables
In addition to the composite variables which have been discussed so far, sev-
eral other variables are designed to have dichotomous values. These include two
questions regarding European funds, three major ways of conducting political ac-
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tivities related to multilevel politics, and five types of political identification. The
main reasons for their operationalization as dichotomous involve the fact that these
variables had to be measured individually, ruling out the possibility of generating
numeric scores with large enough ranges from multiple questions. In addition, for
most of them, saying ‘yes’ or ‘no’ is more logical than an assessment on a scale.
Even where question types similar to Likert scale could be used, the reliability of
numeric treatment for statistical operations decreases with shorter scales whereas
the likelihood of measurement error increases with longer scales.
Dichotomous values are obtained indirectly in two variables with regard to
the European funds, one determining the receipt of these funds, and the other
determining the respondent’s attitude towards them. In the first question, three re-
sponse options which correspond to receiving European funds in the past, present
or near future have been considered as ‘yes’, while never receiving and no knowl-
edge have been considered as ‘no’. In the second question, the participants were
asked to assess the importance of European funds for subnational development
with four ordered response options. In order to strengthen the validity of reducing
these to a dichotomous measurement, first two options were formulated affirma-
tively whereas last two options were formulated negatively.
As a result, 79% of respondents have given a positive answer to the first ques-
tion, and 90% have given a positive answer to the second question. It should be
noted that weighting according to country representation has had a strong effect
on these percentages; the unweighted rates are 61% and 78% respectively. The
main reason behind this discrepancy is the distinction between EU and non-EU
countries, and the over-representation of the latter through Switzerland and Nor-
way which do not have access to European funds. The same logic also applies to
the difference between the two questions; even if one has not benefited from these
funds directly, he/she can still think that they are important, while the opposite
is less likely. This is again most visible in the non-EU countries; for instance in
Switzerland, positive responses rise from 4% to 44% from the first question to the
second.
As a separate issue, respondents were asked to state directly whether they
think three methods of conducting external relations are effective in their opinion:
through direct initiatives, through transnational institutions and through mediation
of national governments. An overwhelming majority of 92% find direct relations
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an effective method, while the confirmation of transnational institutions and na-
tional delegations remain at the same and more moderate level with 66% and
65% respectively. The equivalence between the latter two options suggests that
autonomy from national constraints is not necessarily seen as a precondition for
effective external actions.
Finally, five types of political identification were asked to observe how partic-
ipants depicted themselves as political actors: local/regional, national, European,
cultural/ethnic and ideological. It should be emphasized that dichotomous values
were not obtained through dummy coding from a single multiple-choice question,
but respondents had the chance to mark as many as applied, since options are not
necessarily mutually exclusive especially in the possibility of a multilevel context.
The results display great variation: local/regional 91%, national 41%, European
34%, ethnic/cultural 11% and ideological/political party-related 73%. While lo-
cal/regional political identification is naturally the highest ranking category, the
fact that it is not closer to 100% can be explained by a refusal of political identifi-
cation or a dissatisfaction with the formulation offered in the questionnaire.
4.2 Explaining subnational attitudes:
Bivariate analyses
The univariate analyses have discussed 15 variables, 5 of which have continuous
scales and 10 of which have dichotomous scales. All of these variables are drawn
from a common theoretical background and they can be expected to display co-
variations. An examination of these co-variations will help to hone the research
in several respects. First, some of the constructed variables are intended to mea-
sure similar aspects, hence a choice has to be made for further analyses. Second,
the main research question is interested in their association with the dependent
variable, hence relatively high degrees of correlation are expected between the
dependent variable and all other individual variables. Third, these variables are
posited as being relevant independently from each other, hence low degrees of
correlation are expected among them. Fourth, the eventual analysis will be con-
ducted through a multivariate statistical model, as presented in the next chapter,
and several methodological assumptions must be met for this purpose. In addition
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to low degrees of correlation among independent variables, that is, the absence
of multi-collinearity, the relationship of continuous covariates to the dependent
variable must be linear. The first subsection will present findings concerning all
possible associations among variables, and the second subsection will focus the
attention on their ability to predict the dependent variable.
4.2.1 Exploring co-variations
Given different scales of variables, the exploration of co-variations will proceed
in three steps: among continuous variables, among binary variables, and between
continuous and binary variables. For the first group, Pearson correlation coeffi-
cients will be reported; for the second group, Phi coefficients7; and for the third
group, mean differences across dichotomous categories. Confidence intervals will
also be provided to test the significance of findings, drawing on p distributions for
correlations, and t distributions for mean differences.
Continuous variables Figure 4.12 gives the Pearson correlation coefficients for
the association among continuous variables and 99% confidence intervals between
parentheses. As expected, each of the associations between these variables is
positive. Although all coefficients are statistically significant at the 99% level,
it should be remarked that the lower end of confidence intervals of coefficients
among variables on European institutions, subnational competences and institu-
tional influence is too close to 0. On the other hand, all variables appear to be
more strongly linked to MLP while the variable on the usefulness of transnational
organizations display more similarity to MLP than the other three.
Considering these results in the light of the designation of MLP as the depen-
dent variable, these correlations would have several implications. First, a rela-
tively weak relationship among the three independent variables and their stronger
relationship to the dependent variable suggest that these variables do, indeed, rep-
resent different aspects of multilevel politics, and independent variables are good
predictors of the dependent variable. Second, nevertheless, the unusual similarity
between the usefulness of transnational organizations and MLP, in terms of their
7Phi coefficient is calculated from a 2 × 2 contingency table of two binary variables. In fact,
when Pearson correlation coefficient is applied to two binary variables, it returns the same value
as Phi coefficient.
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Figure 4.12: Correlations among continuous variables
relationships to the remaining two variables, suggests that, in fact, the former may
not measure an attitude which is categorically different from the latter. Given the
components of the variables, the former is more likely to be a measure of attitudes
which focuses in more detail to the formal-organizational aspect of MLP. For this
reason, its use as a covariate in a multivariate model may be methodologically
problematic.
Dichotomous variables Figure 4.13 gives the Phi coefficients for the bivariate
associations among dichotomous variables. The majority of coefficients are too
close to 0, hence without any possibility of significant relationship. The most
notable exception is the correlation between national political identification and
European political identification, on a confidence interval between 0.33 and 0.49
at the 99% level, which would suggest an interesting result in that these do not
constitute rival forms of identification. Given that a similarly strong association
is not observed with the local level, this should be seen as a specific attribute
between national and European levels, rather than a general pattern between all
political levels.
Another relatively strong relationship can be observed between ideological
and local forms of political identification, on a confidence interval between 0.18
and 0.35 at the 99% level. Furthermore, the strength of relationship with ideologi-
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Figure 4.13: Correlations among dichotomous variables
cal identification decreases as the political level moves towards the supra-national.
Self-description of respondents on the Left-Right scale might shed light on this is-
sue; however, the distribution of Left-Right scale among those who chose ideolog-
ical identification (mean 3.99, SD 1.97) is very similar to the overall distribution
(mean 4.12, SD 1.94) with a small tendency towards further left. Thereby, the
relationship between local and ideological identifications cannot be explained by
an overlap between localism/regionalism and one side of the political spectrum.
On the opposite side of this, the strongest relationship of cultural identification
is with European identification, on a confidence interval between 0.09 and 0.26,
supporting the idea that political identifications which emphasize distinctiveness
from the national establishment are compatible with European political identifica-
tion. This can be seen as a counterpart of the fact that the regionalist parties tend
to favour European integration, as discussed in Chapter 1.
Apart from political identifications, methods of conducting multilevel political
activities also display relatively strong correlations, notably between direct rela-
tions and transnational institutions with a confidence interval between 0.15 and
0.33 at the 99% level. This result suggests that these two methods are more likely
to be seen as complementary rather than alternatives. Meanwhile, national medi-
ation can be seen as a weaker complement to transnational institutions, with a co-
efficient on a confidence interval between 0.06 and 0.24 at the 99% level, whereas
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its relationship with direct relations is statistically insignificant. For the subject of
European funds, it can be observed that the two aspects of receiving and consider-
ing them important are not very highly correlated. In comparison, the assessment
of European funds as important has a stronger association with other dichotomous
variables, especially the effectiveness of direct relations and transnational organi-
zations, while its relationship with ideological political identification displays the
most notable negative correlation in the table, with a confidence interval between
-0.20 and -0.02 at the 99% level. While it is necessary to take stock of these
correlations when explanatory models are interpreted, it is difficult to detect an
overwhelming similarity between any two variables which would undermine their
use in such models.
Mean differences across binary categories Figure 4.14 presents the mean dif-
ferences in the continuous variables according to the answers given to dichoto-
mous variables. Similarly to the results among continuous variables, multilevel
politics constitutes the variable which displays the strongest overall association
with other variables. The significance and specificities of these associations will
be examined in detail separately in the next section. Also similarly, the usefulness
of transnational organizations gives very parallel results to those of multilevel
politics, suggesting again that it does not offer a sufficiently independent variable
which would help to explain the latter. For this reason, it will be considered as an
unreliable measure and neglected henceforth. Its components could be considered
as additional dimensions of the views on multilevel politics and included in its in-
dex; however, this would bias the latter too much in favour of institutional aspects
leading to a possible endogeneity with all other institutionally relevant variables.
Thus, the perceived usefulness of transnational organizations, as designed in this
study, is neither a good dependent variable nor a good covariate, and should be
excluded from upcoming analyses. Given that there are other variables that can
replace it to measure the perceived effectiveness of transnational organizations,
this can indeed be dropped from the analysis.
Among the other three continuous variables, the one measuring opinions on
the strength of European institutions displays the strongest association with di-
chotomous variables. Most notably, considering European funds as important
shifts its mean score upwards with an effect between 0.84 and 1.52 at the 99%
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Figure 4.14: Co-variations of continuous and dichotomous variables
confidence level. Considering the direct link between European funds and Euro-
pean institutions, such a large association is to be expected. The same effect of
selecting direct relations as an effective method of multilevel politics is between
0.31 and 1.12, while European political identification increases its mean by an
amount between 0.42 and 0.87 at the 99% confidence level. The last statistically
significant dichotomous variable is the effectiveness of transnational organizations
with an effect within the 99% confidence interval between 0.14 and 0.59.
As for subnational competences, perceived importance of European funds has
a much smaller effect in comparison, though it is statistically significant at the
99% level. Other significant associations include, similarly, the effectiveness of
direct relations and transnational organizations, and European political identifi-
cation, while, differently, effectiveness of national mediation displays an effect
between 0.18 and 0.52 at the 99% confidence level. At the same time, ideolog-
ical political identification has a negative effect of between -0.43 and -0.06. On
the other hand, the variable measuring the influence of transnational institutions
on subnational actors appears to be significantly associated with all dichotomous
variables, including the receipt of European funds, whereas the effect is smaller
in each case in comparison to the other two. Given that the majority of other vari-
ables are conceptualized as pertaining to specific aspects of institutionalist theory
and this variable as pertaining to a more comprehensive understanding of insti-
140 Chapter 4. Subnational attitudes towards multilevel politics
tutional influence, these multiple associations are theoretically consistent. One
particularly notable result is the negative effect of local political identification on
the change in its mean between -0.51 and -0.17 at the 99% confidence level, which
suggests that the influence of transnational institutions leads to a lower tendency
to identify oneself as a local politician.
In sum, although there are several pairwise relatively strong co-variations
among independent variables, these do not follow a systematic pattern. For this
reason, they will not be considered as damaging the methodological rigour of a
multivariate model which includes the variables in question, with the exception of
the usefulness of transnational organizations. Yet the possibility of the mediation
of one variable by another will not be ruled out completely, and will be tested
through interaction terms between the influence of transnational institutions and
the most likely candidates which may mediate it.
4.2.2 Explaining the views on multilevel politics
Having established that attitudes towards multilevel politics display the strongest
association with the remainder of variables, a closer look at its individual relation-
ship with covariates is in order. While interpretations based on significance levels
will be informative for hypothesis testing, the visualization of the relationships
will allow the assumption checks on linearity. The relationships with continuous
variables will be visualized through scatter-plots while those with dichotomous
variables will be presented in the form of box-plots. Scatter-plots display the den-
sity of distribution with the help of partially transparent points, whereby darker
blue indicates higher density due to overlapping points. In addition, black lines
represent the linear fit between variables, accompanied by a grey area marking the
confidence interval. Red lines display the locally weighted scatter-plot smoothing
(LOWESS) curve representing the local variability of the relationship across the
plot (Cleveland, 1979). The proximity of linear and LOWESS lines suggests the
linearity of the relationship. In box-plots, the observations between the first and
the third quantiles are represented by the boxes, while the horizontal lines within
boxes mark the median, and the circles mark the location of the mean.
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Continuous covariates Figure 4.15 shows four relevant scatter-plots. In all
plots, top-left and bottom-right areas appear relatively empty, and mid-sections
display higher density, confirming a positive linear relationship with the dependent
variable. At the same time, the distribution of points with high vertical distances
to the linear line suggests that the observed relationships are not too obvious. It
is important to note this non-obvious relationship, because one of the overarching
principles in the design of this research has been testing whether the fundamental
claim of new institutionalism, that institutions matter, is a self-evident conjecture,
a negligible epiphenomenon, or a phenomenon worth analysing and discussing.
The positive relationships shown below support the new-institutionalist theory,
yet the prevailing dispersion supports the view that the significance of institutions
is not self-evident. Therefore, in view of the data, it can be more confidently re-
stated that the hypotheses tested in this research are neither a restatement of the
obvious, nor reliant on unverifiable counterfactuals.
To examine the continuous variables in detail, first, the linear model with the
strength of European institutions results in a line with an intercept 1.68 and slope
0.38 significant at the 99.9% confidence level. The slope is estimated to be in the
confidence interval between 0.29 and 0.48 at the 99% level. The curvilinear pre-
diction is steeper at lower values of the covariate and flatter at higher values, and it
follows the linear fit in the middle; the difference between the lowest-ranking and
moderate attitudes has a stronger effect on the dependent variable as compared
to the variation within moderate attitudes, and especially the difference between
moderate and the highest-ranking attitudes. Nonetheless, the LOWESS curve does
not remain sufficiently distinct from the linear fit to discredit the plausibility of the
linear fit.
The attitudes towards subnational competences results in a stronger relation-
ship with multilevel politics, with an intercept of 0.72 and a slope of 0.63 signif-
icant at the 99.9% confidence level. The slope is estimated to be a minimum of
0.51 and a maximum of 0.75 within the 99% confidence interval. The curvilinear
prediction remains very close to the linear fit, although slight divergences imply
that the relationship becomes strong as the covariate moves from lower towards
higher values. The association of the perceived usefulness of transnational orga-
nizations is weaker with a slope of 0.42 significant at the 99.9% confidence level,
and it has little variability across the values of the covariate.
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Figure 4.15: Linear fit of continuous variables with the views on multilevel politics
The influence of transnational institutions presents a more complex picture.
The linear curve takes an intercept of -0.16 and a slope of 0.89, significant at the
99.9% level. The confidence interval of the slope at the 99% level is demarcated
by 0.66 and 1.12. The S shape taken by the LOWESS curve suggests that the rela-
tionship is strongest in the middle section of the distribution, and more moderate at
lower and upper ends of the distribution. Although the lines are not too divergent
to necessitate a fundamental questioning of linearity, a closer look which takes ac-
count of the components of indexing will be useful. The steepest part of the curve
appears to be between scores of approximately 3.00 and 3.50, which correspond
to the minima of the ranges of the subgroups with external office experience and
transnational organization experience respectively. In other words, the association
between institutional influence and multilevel politics seems to be weaker within
the group which is dominated by those with transnational experience.
The separate inspection of the two groups reveals this difference more clearly.
In Figure 4.16, the box-plot displays the difference in MLP scores between those
with and without transnational experience in an organization or external office.
The difference in the mean is 0.76 and significant at the 99.9% confidence level,
confirming the variation between groups. However, for within groups variations,
the scatter-plots show that the slope of the linear line is much lower in the group
which scores higher than the 3.50 cut-off point. More specifically, the linear line in
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the first group has a slope of 1.23 significant at the 99.9% confidence level, while
that of the second group has a slope of 0.87 significant only at the 99% confidence
level. This difference in the slope is still small enough to allow the treatment of
this variable as displaying a linear relationship to the views on MLP. Given the
benefits of the continuous measurement of transnational influence as discussed
above, the analysis will proceed with it, but the substitution with the dichotomous
measurement will still be interpreted as a background to the comparative case
study.
Figure 4.16: Linear fit of the transnational institutional influence with the views on multilevel
politics
Binary covariates The relationships between the attitudes towards multilevel
politics and all dichotomous variables are summarized by box-plots in Figure 4.17
in three groups. In the first row, variables related to European funds display visibly
distinct distributions. Receiving European funds appears to have a minor effect on
attitudes towards multilevel politics, changing its mean by 0.31 at the 99% con-
fidence level. Corresponding confidence interval ranges between 0.01 and 0.62,
suggesting a marginally significant and ambiguous estimate. On the other hand,
the mean of multilevel politics varies by 1.33 between considering European funds
as unimportant and important, significant at the 99.9% level. Thus, opinions on
European funds are expected to be a strong predictor. Meanwhile, the difference
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between these two variables can be interpreted as bringing forward attitude-based
factors as more relevant to the overall research design as compared to fact-based
factors.
Figure 4.17: Change in the distribution of the views on multilevel politics by dichotomous cate-
gories
As for methods of conducting multilevel politics, the effectiveness of transna-
tional organizations and especially direct relations appear to have a strong relation
to the opinions on multilevel politics, while that of national mediation is less con-
siderable, even though all three are significant at the 99.9% confidence level. More
specifically, the mean score of multilevel politics increases by 1.37 between the
values of the variable on transnational organizations, and 1.16 between the values
of the variable on direct relations. The effect of the variable on national medi-
ation remains at 0.52, within a confidence interval between 0.26 and 0.78 at the
99% level. Therefore, the views on the effectiveness of transnational organiza-
tions and direct relations are potential candidates for strong predictors, whereas
the variation that could be explained by national mediation remains limited. Ad-
ditionally, having dropped the perceived usefulness of transnational organizations
from the analysis, the dichotomous assessment of their effectiveness proves to be
a suitable replacement. Since the former has been shown to fail at providing a
multidimensional measurement, this replacement does not cause a serious loss of
nuance either.
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Finally, among the types of political identification, European and cultural
types have a more apparent positive impact, and the ideological type has a negative
impact on the scores of multilevel politics, whereas the magnitude of association
with local and political identification seems small. Accordingly -0.13 change by
local identification and 0.08 change by national identification are statistically in-
significant. On the other hand, the 0.61 mean change by European political iden-
tification is significant at the 99.9% confidence level, and the 0.47 mean change
by cultural/ethnic political identification is significant at the 99% level with a cor-
responding confidence interval ranging between 0.07 and 0.86. One of the few
variables which shows a negative relationship, political identification with an ide-
ology or political party decreases the mean score of multilevel politics by 0.48,
which is significant at the 99.9% confidence level.
4.3 Implications of the preliminary findings
The bivariate analyses yield results that largely confirmed the hypothesized as-
sociation. Yet the meaning of these findings should take into account the basic
properties of the variables that have been discussed in the first section. Above
all, for each observed relationship with the dependent variable, it should be re-
marked that the estimated change in the views on MLP is largely within the range
of moderately negative and highly positive views, whereas highly negative views
constitute a small part of the sample.
First, the influence of transnational institutions displays the strongest relation-
ship as compared to other continuous variables, although this is partly due to its
smaller range. Overall, those with transnational experience are estimated to score
0.76 points higher than those without experience, while posited factors for each
group also prove positively related to the views on MLP given the slope. For the
first group, it is seen that the combined effects of the representation of subna-
tional unit, the awareness of transnational institutions and the motivation to work
in them, considerably increase the favourableness of the views on MLP. When the
assumption of linearity for the whole range is dropped, it is even found that these
are more relevant than the factors posited for those with transnational experience.
Second, the views on the strength of both European institutions and subna-
tional authorities are strongly linked to the dependent variable as well. When these
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two are compared, the attitudes towards subnational competences come forth as
a more important predictor of the attitudes towards MLP, as compared to the at-
titudes towards European institutions. In this sense, for subnational actors who
favour MLP, a higher degree of self-government for their local and regional en-
tities has priority over supranational integration. However, this difference might
be partially due to the way the variables are constructed. In the case of Euro-
pean institutions, the relationship is between two variables which mostly represent
moderate to highly positive views, hence it returns a modest slope. In the case of
subnational authorities, the independent variable covers more extreme views on
both ends, hence it is more likely to make more drastic increases across its values.
Furthermore, European funds seem to offer a strong incentive for MLP. In-
terestingly, the actual receipt of the fund is not quite important. But the great
majority who think that these funds are important for subnational development re-
port very high scores on the views on MLP as compared to the small minority who
think otherwise. Similarly, the small minority who think that even direct relations
cannot be an effective way of external relations score significantly lower than the
majority who think otherwise. Among other options, the link of the effectiveness
of transnational organizations to the views on MLP is much stronger than that of
national mediation. This is hardly surprising since the use of national channels
does not necessitate a fundamental change in the political system. Moreover, the
removal of national barriers is the least popular dimension of the views on MLP,
whereas the aspects corresponding to direct relations and organizations are the
most popular. Therefore, while transnational organizations and direct relations
are seen as more likely to make an impact, the national layer is not necessarily
ruled out from the multiple levels of MLP.
As for political identification, local and national identities seem to be unrelated
to the views on MLP, while European and cultural/ethnic identities display signif-
icant relations. Thereby, the supranational dimension of MLP is sociologically
represented in the form of European identification, and the subnational dimension
in the form of cultural or ethnic distinctiveness rather than local/regional identities
more broadly. In the opposite direction, ideological/party-political identification
is the only variable with a significant negative relationship to the dependent vari-
able. Accordingly, strong ideological positions, irrespective of the location in the
political spectrum, are not seen as compatible with multilevel politics. It is true
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that multilevel politics does not necessarily pertain to the distinctive priorities of
ideological camps, but this discrepancy materializes not merely as negligence, but
in the form of apparent contradiction.
Almost all hypothesized relationships are therefore confirmed by the survey
data when they are assessed individually, with the exception of political identifi-
cation. However, given the small albeit visible correlations among independent
variables, the evaluation of the isolated relevance of each requires hypothesis tests
through multivariate analysis. This will allow the testing of the broad institution-
alist argument as a self-contained explanatory model, and the relative weight of its
components which are discussed in this chapter separately. The following chapter
will advance the analysis to the next level in this respect.

Chapter 5
Institutional effects and multilevel
politics: a multivariate model
The aim of this chapter is to build a multivariate model to test the hypotheses for
which the previous chapter implied confirmatory results. In addition to the general
scientific principle that the association between independent and dependent vari-
ables should be tested by holding all other relevant factors constant, a multivariate
analysis is particularly necessary in view of the theoretical framework. Namely,
all hypotheses are derived from a common theoretical background, hence they are
inherently interlinked. In this sense, bivariate analyses do not take into account
the variance collectively explained by multiple independent variables. In the mul-
tivariate model, these variables will be integrated as covariates which predict the
values of the independent variable.
Moreover, the common theoretical background of the hypotheses means that
they collectively constitute a comprehensive and coherent argument. Thereby, the
explanatory power of a multivariate model which includes them will testify to the
validity of the eclectic new-institutionalist argument as a whole. For this purpose,
the first section will discuss the model specification, and in doing so, it will test
the statistical significance of models containing different numbers of variables in
comparison to each other. It will show that the model which provides the most
explanatory power contains all hypothesized relationships.
While multivariate models are a theoretically and methodologically more rig-
orous way to test the hypotheses, certain assumptions must be met. The previous
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chapter has already transformed the variables so that they are normally distributed.
The bivariate analyses have shown that the posited relationships can be expected
to display linear associations, and that the correlations among independent vari-
ables are not high enough to warrant multicollinearity. Yet these methodological
requirements will be double-checked through regression diagnostics which will
also address the issues of influential observations and heteroskedasticity.
When the cross-national nature of the dataset is considered, further precau-
tions against unobserved country-based factors will be necessary. Although mul-
tilevel modelling would be an ideal strategy, the limitations of the data make this
type of analysis inaccurate. Instead, the models to be specified will include coun-
try fixed effects, and will take the form given by the following linear equation:
MLPic = κc + β1IV1,ic + β2IV2,ic + · · ·+ βpIVp,ic + εic
where the subscript i denotes individual units of observation, c countries and p
variables, and MLP stands for the views on multilevel politics, IV for indepen-
dent variables, κ for the fixed country effects, and ε for the error term. In order
to further elaborate on potential country effects, the model will be re-examined in
more detail within national subsets of the data. This exercise will show that no
systematic pattern can be found in the variation at the country level.
After having specified the model which represents the best statistical fit and
confirmed its validity, the results yielded by the model will be interpreted in the
last section. In the light of these findings, it will be shown that the majority of
the hypotheses are confirmed, and for a minority no sufficient evidence or contra-
dictory evidence is found. Thus, not only the broad argument provides a strong
explanation for the institutionalization of multilevel politics, but also its specific
constituents are mostly relevant with a few exceptions.
5.1 Model specification
The empirical strategy of model specification will be comparing several possibil-
ities between the smallest and the largest alternatives with respect to the available
variables in the survey data. In order to simplify the procedure in a way com-
patible with the theoretical background, at first, the differences between nested
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models will consist of several variables, instead of adding or dropping one vari-
able in each stage. For this purpose, six groups are identified with regard to the
strands of the new institutionalist theory, posited and rival explanations, and some
potentially relevant additional factors.
The baseline will consist of only one variable, namely the influence of transna-
tional institutions, which represents the fundamental claim of the theory that in-
stitutions matter. The second group will consist of two types of power distribution
across levels of governance—European and subnational. The third will consist
of the rationalist explanations, namely those related to European funds and the
effectiveness of formal or informal institutions. The third will consist of socio-
logical explanations in the form of political identification. The fourth will consist
of factors that are not expected to have an effect as they traditionally relate to the
domestic sphere of politics. Finally, demographic factors will be considered in a
separate set of variables.
The model which makes the last significant improvement to the previous nested
model, with regard to the above mentioned sets of variables, will be taken as the
benchmark. In the next stage, the variables not included which return significant
coefficients in their respective models will be added to this benchmark, in order to
test if they improve the explanatory power of the latter. Once a model is specified
in this way, necessary adjustments will be made in the light of regression diag-
nostics, and the sufficiency of country fixed effects will be considered for possible
further modifications.
5.1.1 Hierarchical modelling
The model specification follows a forward hierarchical strategy, beginning with
the baseline model and adding the remaining five sets of variables in each step.
Finally, an additional model tests several interaction terms, which are selected
based on observed correlations and intuitive proximity. The results are presented
in Table 5.1, marking each added component by horizontal dashed lines. The bot-
tom section of the table gives model fit statistics to be interpreted for the model
selection1. In particular, the row of the reduction in residual sum of squares (RSS)
1The R2 values reported in the table are calculated from the same models designed with an
intercept, since the unusually high R2s that are returned by fixed-effect-only models without in-
tercept are difficult to interpret in model comparison.
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highlights if each column offers a significantly more powerful model in compar-
ison to the previous nested model. According to the last significant result in this
aspect, Model III is the best option and the benchmark upon which the eventual
model can be specified.
To describe the model building process, the addition of the component with
power distribution variables improves the model fit significantly, as seen both in
the doubling of the R2 and in the large reduction in RSS. The addition of the com-
ponent with variables on material incentives and effectiveness also has a similar
effect, while the contribution of the views on direct relations is relatively less sub-
stantive. The model improvement decelerates when political identification vari-
ables are added with one insignificant coefficient for European political identifi-
cation, but the reduction in RSS is still significant at p < 0.01. The models cannot
be improved further with new variables, R2 remaining at the same level and RSS
reduction becoming statistically insignificant.
Nonetheless, self-positioning on the right of the political spectrum consistently
yields significant coefficients. Furthermore, the sole potentially relevant inter-
action is between ideological political identification and self-positioning on the
right-wing. These two can be used to expand the explanatory power of Model III,
as seen in Table 5.2. Each addition makes a marginal contribution to the reduction
in RSS, but when Model III.1 is compared with Model III.3, the improvement by
11.99 in RSS is significant at p < 0.05. One problem is that the inclusion of the
interaction terms reduces the significance of the main coefficient of ideological
political identification to a marginally insignificant level, which will be consid-
ered as another aspect of the relatively low explanatory power of sociological
variables.
Therefore, Model III.3 will be taken as the model which represents the best fit
with the data. The coefficients of ideological political identification and its inter-
action with right-wing self-positioning will be treated as statistically significant
considering their p values slightly over 0.05 level (0.051 and 0.080 respectively).
The regression diagnostics in the next subsection will be run on this model. How-
ever, taking into account the small differences between the variants of Model III,
the investigation of country-level variation will be conducted with the shortest
version due to the small sample sizes of the subsets.
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Table 5.2: Further specification of Model III
Dependent Variable: views on MLP
Model III.1 Model III.2 Model III.3
Influence of transnational institutions 0.42 ∗∗∗ 0.43 ∗∗∗ 0.42 ∗∗∗
Strength of European institutions 0.20 ∗∗∗ 0.19 ∗∗∗ 0.19 ∗∗∗
Competences of subnational authorities 0.43 ∗∗∗ 0.43 ∗∗∗ 0.43 ∗∗∗
Importance of European funds 0.42 ∗∗ 0.41 ∗∗ 0.42 ∗∗
Effectiveness of TNOs for external activity 0.73 ∗∗∗ 0.71 ∗∗∗ 0.70 ∗∗∗
Effectiveness of direct relations for external activity 0.36 ∗ 0.31 ∗ 0.32 ∗
Political identity: European 0.09 0.09 0.09
Political identity: Cultural 0.29 ∗ 0.33 ∗∗ 0.31 ∗
Political identity: Ideological -0.20 ∗ -0.20 ∗ -0.26 ·
Ideological position: Left v. Centre 0.02 0.06
Ideological position: Right v. Centre -0.27 ∗ -0.58 ∗∗
Pol. id.: Ideological × Id. pos.: Left -0.04
Pol. id.: Ideological × Id. pos.: Right 0.44 ·
Reduction in Residual Sum of Squares 6.19 · 5.70 ·(df=2; 764) (df=2; 762)
Notes: Significance codes: ∗∗∗p < 0.001 < ∗∗p < 0.010 < ∗p < 0.050 < ·p < 0.100 ;
Number of observations: 802 ; Adjusted R2 = 0.43 ; Residual standard error is 1.03 ;
27 country fixed effects are included in all models.
5.1.2 Regression diagnostics
A violation of the basic assumptions of OLS regression would damage the validity
of the model. For this reason, the results of several diagnostic tests are considered
to decide whether a model respecification is necessary. More precisely, the exis-
tence of influential observations, the quality of the linear fit, and the normality of
the distribution of residuals are discussed below in this respect.
First, the overall influence of individual observations is measured through
Cook’s distance (Cook, 1977). In order to further investigate the causes of influ-
ence, the significance of outliers, hence the magnitude of their residuals, is tested
through Bonferroni-corrected cut-off values, and the leverage of observations is
measured in Hat values. Those which display unusually high Cook’s distances are
listed in the Table B.1 of Appendix B together with the corresponding residuals
and Hat values. Examining the relationship among these three through the charts
given in the Figure B.1 of Appendix B, three clear outliers and two influential
observations combining moderate levels of residual and leverage represent dis-
proportionate influence over the model fit, which can be improved by excluding
them from the dataset.
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Second, the multicollinearity of independent variables is tested through the
measurement of variance inflation factors (VIF) (Marquaridt, 1970), as presented
in Appendix B.22. The relatively higher VIF values are seen in the interaction
term and its main effects, but the relationship among these is already evident. Ad-
ditionally, the linearity of the association of each independent variable with the
dependent variable is examined through partial regression plots and comparison
against the lines of locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (LOWESS) (Cleve-
land, 1979). Figure 5.1 below presents the plots of nine main effects wherein the
influential observations are marked with purple diamond-shaped dots.
Figure 5.1: Partial regression plots with influential observations
For the binary-coded variables, smoothed local regression lines mostly fol-
low the linear fit despite slight oscillations in some cases. For the continuous
variables, first, the influence of transnational institutions seems to have a more
2The VIF values are calculated on the same model designed with an intercept, since these
values are calculated through R2 estimates which are not very meaningful in the absence of an
intercept.
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consistent linear fit as compared to the bivariate analysis which displayed dimin-
ishing effects. Nonetheless, the strength of European institutions and subnational
competences display slightly convex-down and convex-up patterns respectively.
Considering the position of influential observations, these divergences can be cor-
rected by dropping them from the data. Excluding the points in the bottom-left of
the plot on European institutions will flatten the locally sensitive line in the left
section and reduce the overall slope of the linear line, thus match them on both
ends. Similarly, excluding the points in the mid-bottom and the bottom-right sec-
tions of the plot on subnational competences will flatten the locally sensitive line
in the middle, and increase the overall slope of the linear line. In this sense, drop-
ping influential observations will also correct the problems related to the linearity
of model fit.
Finally, the distribution of the residuals is summarized in Appendix B.3. First,
it is visible that the overall distribution is left-skewed since outlying observations
mostly have negative residuals; all significant outliers and four out of five influen-
tial observations conform to this pattern. Second, the variance of residuals is not
completely independent from the values of the dependent variable, as it appears
larger around medium to high values of the latter. Although the Breusch-Pagan
test (Breusch and Pagan, 1979) is not significant, it returns a borderline value
(p = 0.057). Removing influential observations also solves these problems, as
shown in Appendix B.3 where two figures compare the distributions with and
without influential observations, which leads to a new result from the Breusch-
Pagan test which is only significant at p = 0.144.
Therefore, the main correction to the specified model in the light of regression
diagnostics will be dropping five influential observations. A more ideal strategy
would be better fitting the model to the data instead of fitting the data to the model.
Nonetheless, just like other variables available in the survey data do not improve
the model fit statistics, they also cannot correct the diagnosed problems as suc-
cessfully as dropping influential observations. Additionally, the fact that all these
diagnosed issues can be corrected through this measure shows the extent of prob-
lems caused by such irregularities in the data. In this sense, the excluded data
points will be assumed to result from possible measurement errors, the sample
without them will be assumed more reliable, and Model III.3 will be still taken as
the model representing the best statistical fit.
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5.1.3 Country-level variation
Given the cross-national nature of the data and the sampling strategy which was
developed through country-based clustering, the non-independence of the obser-
vations, that is another assumption of parametric statistical tests, cannot be as-
sumed. An ideal strategy in this respect would be multilevel modelling, but the
limitations of the data do not allow this method, for reasons discussed in Sec-
tion 3.1.3. Since these standards cannot be met by the available survey data, the
model is constructed with country fixed effects. Although unobserved country
characteristics are controlled for in this method, fixed effects do not provide mean-
ingful information about possible patterns in the country-level variation.
Meanwhile, paying close attention to country-level variation is imperative for
theoretical reasons as well. Since the research question is motivated by the need to
understand common institutional patterns across Europe, and since the argument
is formulated in these terms, the variables that constitute the statistical model do
not capture national factors. However, a decrease in the relative importance of
national institutions is a quintessential aspect of multilevel politics, and persisting
cross-national variation still shapes its development, as discussed in Section 1.2.
For this reason, country-level variation must be examined before moving on to the
interpretation of the posited variables, and the interpretation of the country fixed
effects must be categorically distinct from and prior to other sets of variables.
In view of the methodological and theoretical centrality of the country level,
the discussion below will both check the robustness of the statistical model, and
reveal the relationship of national variation with common institutional patterns, by
focusing on the portion of the variance due to national backgrounds and whether
this variance is systematic. For this reason, the discussion below will investigate
whether unobserved country characteristics explain a significant portion of the
variance. For this purpose, 11 countries with reasonably large sample sizes are
selected for detailed analyses. The first analysis will compare the results between
models where country dummies are included and excluded. The second analy-
sis will run the same model within each country to examine the changes in the
coefficients. Model III.1 will be used here since sample sizes are small.
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Covariance of countries and main variables Country fixed effects are already
included in the models discussed above. An analysis of covariance (ANCOVA)
will reveal whether the inclusion of these effects makes a large difference to the
models. Table 5.3 below compares the variance explained by the countries only,
by the posited variables only, and when the two are combined. The similarity
of the last output to the original summary Model III indicates that the selected
countries represent accurately the patterns observed in the entire dataset, with 649
out of 802 observations.
Table 5.3: Covariance between selected countries and the variables of Model III
DV: Views on Multilevel Politics
Countries Model III Combined
Reference country: Germany
Belgium -0.16 -0.45 ·
France 0.45 ∗∗∗ 0.21
Ireland 0.19 -0.08
Italy 0.54 ∗∗∗ 0.00
Netherlands -0.31 -0.17
Norway -0.21 -0.28
Spain 0.44 ∗∗∗ -0.36 ∗
Sweden -0.34 -0.19
Switzerland -0.68 · -0.05
United Kingdom 0.02 0.06
Influence of transnational institutions 0.38 ∗∗∗ 0.43 ∗∗∗
Strength of European institutions 0.20 ∗∗∗ 0.21 ∗∗∗
Competences of subnational authorities 0.47 ∗∗∗ 0.47 ∗∗∗
Importance of European funds 0.47 ∗∗ 0.41 ∗∗
Effectiveness of TNOs for external activity 0.68 ∗∗∗ 0.71 ∗∗∗
Effectiveness of direct relations for external activity 0.35 ∗ 0.30 ·
Political identity: European -0.01 0.01
Political identity: Cultural 0.36 ∗∗ 0.44 ∗∗
Political identity: Ideological -0.22 ∗ -0.20 ·
Constant 2.60 ∗∗∗ -1.65 ∗∗∗ -1.77 ∗∗∗
Observations 649 649 649
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.41 0.42
Residual Std. Error 1.35 1.05 1.05
F statistic 3.35 ∗∗∗ 51.94 ∗∗∗ 25.87 ∗∗∗(df = 10; 638) (df = 9; 639) (df = 19; 629)
Note: Significance codes: ∗∗∗p < 0.001 < ∗∗p < 0.010 < ∗p < 0.050 <· p < 0.100
The first column in the table lists only the countries, where Germany is set as
the reference country based on its median status according to its mean score of
2.60 on the dependent variable. Overall, this simple analysis of variance among
countries is statistically significant. The second column lists the variables of
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Model III. Finally, the third column lists both the countries and the covariates,
which again returns a significant result of the analysis of covariance, but which
makes a marginally insignificant contribution to Model III. Yet the borderline sig-
nificance test (p = 0.055) suggests that the variation among countries is still worth
discussing.
The first remarkable result in the first column is that only the countries with
higher mean scores on the dependent variable return significant coefficients, al-
though there is a stronger negative result in the case of Switzerland. When the
countries are combined with other covariates, only Spain remains significant, and
this time with a negative coefficient. This would imply that after the variance
explained by the covariates is accounted for, the positive contribution that Spain
would otherwise make as compared to Germany is lost, and becomes even nega-
tive. This also applies to other countries, since the effect of France is cut by half,
and the effect of Italy is totally lost. In these two initially significant cases, the
inclusion of covariates pulls them closer to Germany partially or entirely. Overall,
the same happens to Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden and especially Switzerland.
While the UK and Norway remain more or less at the same position, the differ-
ence between Belgium and Germany becomes even more stark. Despite these
differences, the overall interpretation that can be offered is that the inclusion of
covariates reduces the effect of the variation among countries, and as such, the
country-level variance is not a significant part of the explanatory framework.
It should be remarked that three cases which yield significant results in the
first column share the feature of having a regionalized territorial administration,
and they are the only regionalized countries in this list as distinct from federal and
strictly unitary structures. This would suggest that the system of territorial orga-
nization might be relevant even if countries themselves do not make a significant
effect. When these 11 countries are grouped into four categories—unitary (Ire-
land, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden), regionalized (France, Italy and Spain),
federal (Germany, Belgium and Switzerland), and mixed or asymmetric (UK)—
the same model of covariance does not return any near-significant results for them.
In this sense, it is difficult to say that the variation among countries or groups of
countries makes a remarkable difference to the model fit.
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Multivariate model within countries The effect of unobserved country char-
acteristics on the dependent variable may also be mediated by the independent
variables. In order to check this possibility, the model is run within each country
and the resulting coefficients are compared. It should be noted that very few vari-
ables return significant coefficients due to small sample sizes, even if a relatively
short model is applied. For this reason, the comparisons will not take into account
the significance levels and focus on detecting patterns irrespectively. Table 5.4
presents the outputs of all regressions, ordered from the lowest mean score on
the dependent variable to the highest. When each independent variable is exam-
ined within this, it is difficult to detect any sustained pattern. Coefficients usually
change from one country to another in an unpredictable direction and magnitude,
which is illustrated in Figure 5.2. In this figure, each line representing the change
in the coefficient of a variable across countries, the best pattern one can detect is
the existence of a few lines which remain relatively flat, which is either analyti-
cally uninteresting or indicative of no country-level variation.
To simplify the examination, the countries can be divided into three groups
with regard to the mean scores on the dependent variable: a low scoring category
that includes Switzerland, Sweden, Netherlands, Norway and Belgium; a medium
scoring category that includes Germany, the UK and Ireland; and a high scoring
category that includes Spain, France and Italy. Although these categories do not
display consistent patterns overall, some individual variables show a certain de-
gree of similarity. For instance, similar levels in the medium scoring category
with regard to subnational competences around 0.30 and ideological identifica-
tion around -0.40 could be meaningful. Nevertheless, similarly consistent results
cannot be found in other categories, and thus it is difficult to claim that the pat-
terns of relationship among variables change in a certain way with increasing or
decreasing values of the dependent variable.
When the countries are grouped into the categories based on their systems of
territorial organization, some interesting results can be found. Federal countries
seem to display consistency in relatively larger coefficients on the effectiveness of
direct relations, while unitary countries are consistent with regard to larger coeffi-
cients in subnational competences. The first finding conforms to existing studies
which are discussed in Chapter 1 (e.g. Tatham, 2011) which argue that strong
subnational units rely less on European institutions. Although this usually means
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Table 5.4: Application of Model III in selected countries
Dependent Variable: Views on Multilevel Politics
Switzerland Sweden Netherlands Norway
mean: 1.92 mean: 2.26 mean: 2.29 mean: 2.39
Influence of transnational institutions 0.56 ∗∗∗ 0.58 0.29 0.14
Strength of European institutions 0.06 0.13 0.27 0.44 ∗∗
Competences of subnational authorities 0.12 0.42 · 0.23 0.28
Importance of European funds 0.53 ∗∗ 0.42 0.21 0.54
Effectiveness of TNOs for external activity 0.35 ∗ 0.07 0.78 · 0.35
Effectiveness of direct relations for external activity 0.78 ∗∗∗ 1.39 -0.63 1.19 ·
Political identity: European -0.04 -0.23 0.56 0.11
Political identity: Cultural 0.40 · 1.42 0.16 0.65
Political identity: Ideological -0.06 -0.44 -0.30 -0.60
Constant -1.20 ∗ -2.42 -0.04 -1.30
Observations 150 43 40 44
Adjusted R2 0.39 0.11 0.30 0.40
Residual Std. Error 0.89 1.16 1.10 1.01
F statistic 11.73 ∗∗∗ 1.60 2.82 ∗ 4.21 ∗∗(df = 9; 140) (df = 9; 33) (df = 9; 30) (df = 9; 34)
Dependent Variable: Views on Multilevel Politics
Belgium Germany UK Ireland
mean: 2.44 mean: 2.60 mean: 2.62 mean: 2.79
Influence of transnational institutions 0.06 0.28 0.32 · 0.14
Strength of European institutions 0.15 -0.09 0.39 ∗∗∗ -0.01
Competences of subnational authorities 0.47 ∗ 0.33 ∗ 0.30 ∗ 0.28
Importance of European funds -0.29 0.29 0.52 N/A
Effectiveness of TNOs for external activity 0.28 0.85 ∗∗∗ 0.80 ∗∗ 0.17
Effectiveness of direct relations for external activity 0.73 0.41 -0.03 0.82
Political identity: European 0.17 0.10 0.70 · -0.33
Political identity: Cultural 0.16 0.41 0.45 1.29
Political identity: Ideological 0.02 -0.35 -0.46 -0.40
Constant -0.48 -0.03 -0.93 0.79
Observations 45 92 96 27
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.27 0.44 0.00
Residual Std. Error 1.04 1.02 1.05 1.14
F statistic 1.62 4.73 ∗∗∗ 9.22 ∗∗∗ 0.78(df = 9; 35) (df = 9; 82) (df = 9; 86) (df = 8; 18)
Dependent Variable: Views on Multilevel Politics
Spain France Italy
mean: 3.04 mean: 3.05 mean: 3.14
Influence of transnational institutions 0.46 0.77 ∗ 0.19
Strength of European institutions 1.11 ∗ 0.29 0.29
Competences of subnational authorities -0.40 0.78 ∗∗∗ 0.75
Importance of European funds -0.97 0.67 -0.25
Effectiveness of TNOs for external activity 2.82 · 0.54 0.93
Effectiveness of direct relations for external activity 0.73 0.12 -0.88
Political identity: European -0.85 -0.46 -0.21
Political identity: Cultural 0.22 0.45 0.55
Political identity: Ideological -0.06 0.18 0.03
Constant -2.66 -4.06 ∗∗ -0.63
Observations 25 40 47
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.55 0.46
Residual Std. Error 1.47 0.96 0.88
F statistic 2.09 6.21 ∗∗∗ 5.41 ∗∗∗(df = 9; 15) (df = 9; 30) (df = 9; 37)
Note: Significance codes: ∗∗∗p < 0.001 < ∗∗p < 0.010 < ∗p < 0.050 <· p < 0.100
162 Chapter 5. Institutional effects and multilevel politics
Figure 5.2: Unsystematic variation among countries
cooperation with national governments, strong domestic competences and finan-
cial resources are seen as necessary for being able to conduct foreign activities
(Blatter et al., 2008, 2010), hence direct relations are a more feasible option for
subnational actors from federal states. The second finding can be seen as the coun-
terpart of this pattern, since acquiring stronger competences is a prerequisite for
successful engagement in multilevel politics for those who are not yet powerful
enough.
Another relevant distinction can be made between the member states of the EU
and the non-members. A weaker association of European institutions and multi-
level politics could be expected, but Switzerland and Norway constitute contrast-
ing cases in this respect. Additionally, the importance of European funds has large
and positive coefficients in both, suggesting that valuing the supranational aspect
of multilevel politics is not exclusive to the members of the EU. Furthermore, both
countries are in the group with relatively low mean scores on the dependent vari-
able, but they cannot be distinguished from Sweden and Netherlands which are at
the same level.
To conclude, there are no overarching country-level patterns that explain the
views on multilevel politics, either through direct effects or the indirect mediation
of other variables. The only exception to the absence of a systematic relationship
is the reflection of federal-unitary difference over the views on subnational com-
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petences and the feasibility of direct relations. Apart from this, country effects are
relatively minor and unsystematic. Thereby, country fixed effects as used in the
model specification here should be sufficient to account for the unobserved char-
acteristics of national contexts and to provide reliable estimates for other variables
in the model.
5.1.4 Readjusted model
To summarize, first, Model III.3 which includes all hypothesized variables as
well as political self-positioning is selected as representing the best fit; second,
dropping a few unusually influential observations which also contribute to the
problems of slight non-linearity and heteroskedasticity improves the model fit;
and third, although no overarching systematic pattern is found in the country-
level variation, the inclusion of country dummies or fixed effects are still useful
to account for the unobserved characteristics of national contexts and possible
non-independence of observations coming from the same context. Taking stock
of these findings, Table 5.5 presents the regression output of Model III.3 on the
dataset without influential observations, and lists the country fixed effects which
serve as the intercepts of the country-specific regression lines.
Table 5.5: Readjusted Model III.3 and country fixed effects
DV: Views on MLP Country fixed effects
Influence of transnational institutions 0.42 ∗∗∗ Austria -0.99 Luxembourg -1.22
Strength of European institutions 0.13 ∗∗∗ Belgium -1.91 Malta -0.98
Competences of subnational authorities 0.48 ∗∗∗ Croatia -1.49 Netherlands -1.69
Importance of European funds 0.33 ∗∗ Czech Rep. -2.12 Norway -1.85
Effectiveness of TNOs for external activity 0.71 ∗∗∗ Denmark -1.74 Portugal -1.09
Effectiveness of direct relations for external activity 0.40 ∗ Estonia -1.63 Slovakia -1.69
Political identity: European 0.07 Finland -2.76 Slovenia -1.20
Political identity: Cultural 0.29 ∗ France -1.36 Spain -1.44
Political identity: Ideological -0.25 · Germany -1.58 Sweden -1.73
Ideological position: Left v. Centre 0.03 Greece -1.78 Switzerland -1.63
Ideological position: Right v. Centre -0.60 ∗∗ Iceland -1.73 UK -1.53
Pol. id.: Ideological × Id. pos.: Left 0.11 Ireland -1.57 Other EU -1.13
Pol. id.: Ideological × Id. pos.: Right 0.44 · Italy -1.45 Other non-EU -2.02
Lithuania -2.55
Observations 797
Adjusted R2 0.48
F statistic 193.3 ∗∗∗(df=40; 757)
Residual standard error 0.96
Note: Significance codes: ∗∗∗p < 0.001 < ∗∗p < 0.010 < ∗p < 0.050 < ·p < 0.100
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The overall improvement that the readjustment makes, as compared to the
same model summarized in Table 5.2, is seen in the goodness of fit statistics: R2
has been increased from 0.43 to 0.48 and residual standard error is reduced from
1.03 to 0.96. In addition, several changes in coefficients also testify to the dispro-
portionate influence that a small number of observations exerted. The coefficient
for the strength of European institutions is reduced from 0.19 to 0.13, and that of
subnational competences is increased from 0.43 to 0.48, conforming to the expec-
tations derived from the investigation of the location of influential observations.
Similar changes can also be seen in the importance of European funds and the
effectiveness of direct relations, for the same reasons. Finally, another change
that is not visible in the table, is a slight improvement in the significance level
of the interaction term between ideological political identification and right-wing
self-positioning, from 0.081 to 0.062. Additionally the main effect of ideological
political identification is significant at p = 0.051. Given that the terms related
to political ideology display borderline significance tests, they will be taken as
statistically significant in further interpretations.
Therefore, in order to formulate the equation which estimates the views on
multilevel politics, let the significant variables be denoted by the following:
MLP views on multilevel politics
TNI influence of transnational institutions
SEI strength of European institutions
CSA competences of subnational authorities
IEF importance of European funds
ETO effectiveness of transnational organizations
EDR effectiveness of direct relations
CPI political identification as cultural
IPI political identification as ideological
IPR ideological position in right
Then the linear equation will be expressed by the following:
MLPic =κc + 0.42 · TNIic + 0.13 · SEIic + 0.48 · CSAic
+ 0.33 · IEFic + 0.71 · ETOic + 0.40 · EDRic + 0.29 · CPIic
− 0.25 · IPIic − 0.60 · IPRic + 0.44 · IPIic · IPRic + εic
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where κc denotes the country-specific constants which are listed in Table 5.5,
and εic denotes the general error term. Although this equation is supposed to
provide methodologically valid estimations thanks to the procedures described
above, what is more interesting for the present study is its theoretical implica-
tions. Given that the measurements used in this model draw on constructs which
are operationalized for the purposes of this study, such implications will be dis-
cussed below in view of their meaning for the hypothesized association between
variables.
5.2 Interpretation of the findings
The primary finding of the multivariate model building is that the broad argu-
ment of this thesis is confirmed by the survey data. Since it has been shown by
model comparison that Model III, which involves all posited variables, provides
the best statistical fit to the data, the views on multilevel politics are best explained
when the influence of transnational institutions, power distribution across levels of
governance, material benefits and effectiveness, and political identification are all
taken into account. In other words, the general explanation derived from an eclec-
tic new-institutionalist theory, regarding the institutional influence on actors and
actor expectations from institutions, is empirically confirmed. Nonetheless, it can-
not be sustained that the data fully supports the argument given that significance
levels vary and some covariates are negatively associated with the dependent vari-
able. Moreover, different magnitudes of the coefficients provide additional in-
formation on the relative weight of posited variables. In this sense, following
subsections will evaluate the hypothesized relationships in the light of statistical
findings.
5.2.1 Influence of transnational institutions
The basic idea of the influence of transnational institutions is derived from the fun-
damental claim of new institutionalism, namely that institutions matter. In fact, all
other covariates included in the model are also derived from new-institutionalist
accounts which try to explain why institutions matter. Operationalized in a generic
way by focusing on the links between the individual and the institution, this vari-
166 Chapter 5. Institutional effects and multilevel politics
able measures a freestanding influence irrespectively of specific functions that
institutions are expected to deliver. In theoretical terms, it constitutes the core as-
pect of the argument, which distinctively captures institutional effects. In method-
ological terms, its coefficient signifies such effects when all other institutionally
relevant variables are controlled for.
In the linear model, one unit change in the influence of transnational institu-
tions leads to 0.42 unit change in the views on multilevel politics. When the ranges
of the variables are taken into account (the influence of transnational influence is
measured on a range of 2.78 in [1.61, 4.39] and the views on multilevel politics
is measured on a range of 4.96 in [0.04, 5.00]), the effect of one unit change in
the independent variable corresponds approximately to 8.5% of the total range of
the dependent variable. The effect of the difference between the maximum and
the minimum scores would be 1.17 units which correspond to the 23.6% of the
total range. In other words, the difference between individuals who are the least
and the most influenced subnational actors would account for one quarter of fully
favourable views on multilevel politics. Having thus established the significance
of this variable, the first hypothesis can be confirmed:
H1: Subnational actors who have a stronger relationship with transna-
tional institutions will also have stronger preferences for a transfor-
mation towards multilevel politics in general.
In order to specify the meaning of the quantitative results, the range of the in-
fluence of transnational institutions can be roughly divided into three categories.
The first one third of the values come from subnational actors who are not mem-
bers of any transnational institution. If their subnational unit is represented in
any such institution, and if they are knowledgeable and motivated about them,
their views on multilevel politics become more favourable. The mid-section cor-
responds to the transition from non-membership to membership, which makes
the same effect. The last one third of the values come from the members of a
transnational institution, with regard to their experience in terms of timing, dura-
tion, professional satisfaction and personal importance. In this sense, the 23.6%
difference between the minimum and the maximum corresponds to the difference
between a subnational actor whose authority is not represented in any transna-
tional institution, whose knowledge of such institutions is very limited and who is
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not motivated to work in any of them, and another actor who has been working in
a transnational institution for a long time, who is professionally satisfied with this
experience and who attaches great personal importance to this membership.
In view of these dimensions which are taken to represent the links between
individuals and institutions, which do not necessarily rely on other institutionally
relevant factors, it can be concluded that institutions shape the attitudes of actors
simply by virtue of their existence towards more favourable views on multilevel
politics. Meanwhile, more specific expectations from the institutions determine
the views on multilevel politics alongside such a freestanding effect, as discussed
in the sections below.
5.2.2 Distribution of competences
The first set of variables which measure the expectations of actors from transna-
tional institutions is about the distribution of power. While a historical institution-
alist theoretical background offers the aspect of power distribution as an explana-
tion of how institutions sustain themselves by creating compliance on the part of
actors, this has been adapted to the purposes of the present study by shifting the
focus onto the distribution of competences across levels of governance. In other
words, instead of attempting to measure whether an actor is being empowered by
certain institutions, the survey aimed to measure the views on the empowerment
of large groups of actors working in different levels of governance. Multilevel pol-
itics can rise only if subnational and supranational levels of government become
relatively more important spheres of political action. In this sense, favourable
views on multilevel politics can be expected from those who also hold favourable
views on the necessary power distribution. The findings from the survey data
indeed confirm this posited relationship.
On the supranational side, one unit change in the variable of the views on
stronger European institutions yields 0.13 unit change in the views on multilevel
politics, corresponding to 2.6% of its total variation. Considering the full range
of this independent variable, that is 4.80 in [0.20, 5.00], the difference between
subnational actors who hold minimally and maximally favourable views on the
strength of European institutions corresponds to 0.62 units of the dependent vari-
able or 12.5% of its total range. Although these figures suggest a relatively low
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effect, in the light of the statistical significance of the variable, the second hypoth-
esis can be confirmed:
H2: Subnational actors who favour more power to be concentrated at
the European level will have stronger preferences for a transformation
towards multilevel politics.
On the subnational side, one unit change in the variable on the views on
stronger subnational authorities yields 0.48 unit change in the views on multi-
level politics, corresponding to 9.7% of its total variation. Considering the full
range of this independent variable, that is 4.00 in [1.00, 5.00], the difference be-
tween subnational actors who hold minimally and maximally favourable views
on subnational competences corresponds to 1.92 units of the dependent variable
or 38.7% of its total range. On top of its statistical significance, given that this
variable has a potential effect that can change the dependent variable by one third
of its total range, the third hypothesis is also confirmed:
H3: Subnational actors who favour more decentralized domestic struc-
tures will have stronger preferences for a transformation towards mul-
tilevel politics.
The meaning of the quantitative results can be clarified by looking at the com-
ponents of the variables. As discussed in the previous chapter, these two variables
are measured along the same dimensions, but responses vary in terms of how these
dimensions are ordered. Most visibly, foreign policy is at the top for European in-
stitutions and at the bottom for subnational authorities, and vice versa for social
policy, while economic policy seems to be relatively prioritized for both. The
common ground which might lay the basis of multilevel politics is the inclusion
of all levels in deciding economic policies. To reiterate what has been argued
by the existing works on bypassing the state, as discussed in Chapter 1, financial
autonomy and the availability of resources are not only political goals in their
own right, but also a prerequisite for effective multilevel political engagement.
What can be deduced from the current findings, with regard to both directions of
power redistribution, is that the expextations of subnational actors regarding bet-
ter involvement in economic decision making occupy a considerable place in their
conception of multilevel politics.
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The primary task attributed to European institutions in terms of foreign policy
concerns the relations with actors outside Europe, hence this is quite unrelated to
multilevel politics within Europe. Meanwhile, the top priority for the subnational
level, namely social policy, is concerned with providing services to citizens. In the
end, what determines the higher values of each variable, hence what dominates the
relationship with favourable views on multilevel politics, is outward-looking to-
wards the world at large and inward-looking towards the citizens. In that sense,
the two aspects of power redistribution are not simply a restatement of the def-
inition of multilevel politics. Instead, the highest values in each come from the
components which are not directly linked to a transformation towards European
multilevel politics. Therefore, the power-distributive effects of institutions are as-
sociated with the views on multilevel politics even when the levels of governance
are considered irrespectively of their constitutive role in a multilevel political sys-
tem. Meanwhile, the main link between the two seems to lie in the centrality
of economic power which necessitates increased cooperation among all levels of
governance.
Yet the difference in the magnitude of coefficients indicates an asymmetry in
the relevance of each level. The downward transfer of competences displays a
much stronger relationship than the upward transfer, suggesting that decentraliza-
tion rather than European integration can be seen as a more urgent aspect of the
phenomenon. Thus, this precedence of decentralization can be interpreted as both
a prerequisite and the objective of multilevel politics at the same time. In other
words, even if the consolidation of multilevel politics could be seen as a process
by which subnational authorities are strengthened, in fact stronger subnational
authorities are necessary for this very consolidation to happen in the first place.
In sum, two interrelated conclusions can be drawn from these results. First,
the views on the redistribution of competences across levels explain the views on
multilevel politics, not simply because the two can be taken to mean the same
thing, but also because of the intrinsic importance attached to stronger institu-
tions at supranational and subnational levels. Second, the higher significance of
the subnational level can be interpreted in terms of its consideration as a more
imminent political project, either as a prerequisite or the objective of multilevel
politics.
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5.2.3 Material benefits and effectiveness
The second set of institutionally relevant factors pertains to the material benefits
of institutionalized politics, as derived from the rational choice institutionalism.
Such benefits are defined in both a narrow and a broad sense; on the one hand, they
correspond to the incentives for actively taking part in institutional mechanisms
of multilevel politics, and, on the other hand, the increased efficiency of institu-
tionalized political activity. The first type is operationalized with the importance
attached to European funds, and the second with the perceived effectiveness of
formal and informal institutions for external activity.
European funds constitute the most prominent direct incentive for active in-
volvement in European politics. The corresponding variable in the model did not
measure whether the respondent actually benefits from these funds, but instead
focused on the attitudes towards them. Through this attitudinal measurement and
its relation to the dependent variable, the coefficient of the importance attached to
European funds is taken to reflect the motivation of an actor to engage in multi-
level political activities in order to derive such direct material benefits. According
to the results obtained from the multivariate model, such a motivation indeed ex-
ists. An actor who thinks European funds are important for subnational units, as
compared to another who does not, can be expected to display a higher score by
0.33 units on the dependent variable, corresponding approximately to 6.7% of the
total range of the latter. Thereby, the fourth hypothesis is confirmed by the data:
H4: Actors who consider European funds as important for subna-
tional politics will have stronger preferences for a transformation to-
wards multilevel politics.
However, given that the respondents overwhelmingly selected the positive an-
swers, it would be more appropriate to reverse the formulation of the hypothesis.
Accordingly, the actors who constitute a minority in thinking that European funds
are not so important for subnational units have weaker preferences for multilevel
politics.
Additionally, in view of the material benefits of institutions as higher effi-
ciency, both formal and informal channels are considered. The formal aspect is
measured through whether actors think that transnational organizations are effec-
tive, and the informal aspect through whether they think that direct relations are
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effective. The emphasis being on effectiveness, both variables return positive co-
efficients, but the possibility of more systematic relations that would be provided
by formal organizations appears to be more strongly associated with favourable
views on multilevel politics. More precisely, an actor who thinks that transnational
organizations constitute an effective channel of external political activity, as com-
pared to another who does not, can be expected to display a higher score by 0.71
units on the dependent variable corresponding to 14.3% of its total range. In con-
trast, an actor who thinks that direct relations constitute an effective alternative,
as compared to another who does not, can be expected to display a higher score
by 0.40 units on the dependent variable, corresponding to 8.1% of the total range.
Thereby, the fifth hypothesis that these two variables represent is confirmed:
H5: Subnational actors who prefer institutionalized transnational ac-
tivity for reasons of efficiency will have stronger preferences for a
transformation towards multilevel politics.
However, a reverse formulation would also be appropriate for the indirect chan-
nels, since 92% of respondents found direct relations effective. Thus, a minority
of subnational actors who think that even direct relations cannot be an effective
way of conducting external political activity have weaker preferences for multi-
level politics.
Finally, the third alternative, the effectiveness of national channels is not found
to be associated with the views on multilevel politics positively or negatively. The
lack of significance in this variable can be explained by contrasting the possible
reasons as to why it could have positive or negative effects. A positive relationship
could be expected, first, because of the emphasis on effectiveness. Furthermore,
as noted on several occasions, national channels can in fact be the best option for
domestically strong subnational authorities. However, the use of national channels
means that the gatekeeper position of national governments is reproduced, which
is not compatible with a systemic transformation towards multilevel politics.
In sum, European funds constitute a relevant form of material benefit as a
financial incentive, and the efficiency generated by transnational institutions ex-
plain favourable views on multilevel politics. Although both formal and informal
channels are found positively related, hence an important part of the explanatory
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model, more conventional channels are not part of the explanation even if they are
assessed on the basis of their effectiveness.
5.2.4 Political identification
The third set of institutionally relevant variables is related to political identifica-
tion, derived from sociological accounts of new institutionalism. Three variables
are designed to test hypothesized relationships which depart from conventional
identifications dominated by the prevalence of national or domestic politics: iden-
tification as a European politician provides this contrast in view of supranational
politics, identification as a politician representing a cultural or ethnic group pro-
vides this contrast in view of subnational distinctiveness, and identification as a
politician committed to an ideology or political party provides this contrast since
such a commitment can draw on cross-national affiliations. However, these vari-
ables display the least conformity with the hypothesized relationships.
To begin with European political identification, this was expected to be posi-
tively associated with the dependent variable since the latter measures the views
on multilevel politics which is conceptualized as a European system. However,
there is no sufficient evidence to support this explanation. It should be remarked
that the bivariate relationship of European political identification with the depen-
dent variable was higher than other forms of identification. In this sense, the
failure to confirm the sixth hypothesis can be explained methodologically by the
fact that its effects are absorbed by other independent variables in the multivariate
model. For instance, the mean change in the views on the strength of European
institutions is almost the same as the mean change in the dependent variable be-
tween those who identify themselves as a European politician and those who do
not. Another possibility is indicated by the relatively high correlation between
European and national forms of political identification. Accordingly, a more con-
ceptual explanation can be advanced based on the finding that European political
identification is not necessarily a radical departure from traditional politics.
Second, the finding for cultural political identification confirms the hypoth-
esized relationship. Thus, an actor who identifies oneself as a politician repre-
senting a culturally distinct group, as compared to another who does not, can be
expected to display a higher score by 0.29 units on the dependent variable, corre-
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sponding to 5.8% of its total range. In view of this significant result, the seventh
hypothesis will be confirmed:
H7: Subnational actors who identify themselves as culturally dis-
tinctive from their national political establishment will have stronger
preferences for a transformation towards multilevel politics.
The difference between cultural and European identifications indicates a parallel
pattern to the difference between the views on European and subnational compe-
tences. In general, it can be deduced that subnational factors constitute stronger
motives for multilevel politics as compared to supranational factors. Similarly to
the interpretations on power distribution, subnational distinctiveness could be a
more imminent ground of action since regionalist political agendas include de-
mands for autonomy or independence, while Europeanist political agendas do not
have such strong emotional content.
Third, the variable of ideological political identification contradicts the hy-
pothesized relationship by returning a negative coefficient. At a general level,
this is a confirmation of the sociological account, since a type of identification
is found statistically significant. But the negative sign of the coefficient must be
taken seriously. In this respect, it is wrong to associate party-political or ideologi-
cal identification with multilevel politics on the basis of not being confined to the
domestic sphere of politics. An alternative explanation would be based on under-
standing ideological identification as a representation of more traditional forms
of politics, hence incompatible with multilevel politics. In the end, if an explicit
commitment to established ideologies or party programmes is incompatible with
the basic properties of multilevel politics, this must be due to a mismatch between
the two.
The specificities of the findings should be considered in conjunction with the
closely related variable on self-positioning in political spectrum. Given that an
interaction term is already included in the model, the magnitudes of the coeffi-
cients are meaningful only when they are interpreted together. As both variables
are binary-coded, there are four possible combinations:
• if the actors neither identify themselves in ideological terms nor position
themselves in the right wing, the total predicted effect is 0.00
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• if the actors identify themselves in ideological terms, but do not position
themselves in the right wing, the total predicted effect is -0.25
• if the actors do not identify themselves in ideological terms, but position
themselves in the right wing, the total predicted effect is -0.60
• if the actors both identify themselves in ideological terms, and position
themselves in the right wing, the total predicted effect is -0.41
The first implication is that self-positioning in the right wing of the political spec-
trum has a larger negative effect than political identification with an ideology or
political party. Second, ideological political identification does not magnify the
negative effect of self-positioning in the right wing, but on the contrary diminishes
this effect. Hence, an altered version of the eighth hypothesis should be accepted:
H8-altered: Subnational actors who identify themselves as commit-
ted to their ideological and party-political positions, irrespectively of
the particular position on the left-right spectrum, will have weaker
preferences for a transformation towards multilevel politics.
Finally, the negative coefficient of the ideological position provides an addi-
tional finding which was not hypothesized from the new-institutionalist frame-
work. The explanation of this can be based on the intuitive incompatibility of
nationalist and Eurosceptic worldviews with multilevel politics. It should be re-
marked that the number of respondents who positioned themselves on the left were
considerably higher than those who marked right-wing positions. In this sense, it
can be assumed that the centre also represents more moderate right-wing views,
while the right mostly represents relatively radical views such as nationalism and
Euroscepticism.
In sum, unlike other sets of variables which have been discussed in previ-
ous subsections, the sociological hypotheses are not consistently confirmed by the
data. The only confirmed hypothesis is on subnational distinctiveness through cul-
tural identification, but this has a relatively small coefficient. While no sufficient
evidence was found for the relevance European political identification, ideologi-
cal political identification proved to be a negatively related variable. Additionally,
right-wing political views are found to be negatively associated with the depen-
dent variable. Despite mixed evidence regarding the hypotheses, the sociological
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account is still an important part of the broader argument, since the unexpected
and even the non-confirmatory findings lead to interesting interpretations.
5.3 General evaluation of the model
To recapitulate, the chapter has offered the main quantitative analysis of the sur-
vey data by constructing a multivariate model and interpreting the results therein.
The specification of an OLS model with country fixed effects, which includes all
posited sets of variables, testifies to the broad accuracy of the main argument and
the eclectic new-institutionalist approach of the thesis. Following the investigation
of regression diagnostics and country-level variation, Model III.3 being fitted to
the sample of 792 respondents provides a sound basis for testing the hypotheses.
In return, the majority of the hypothesized associations with the dependent vari-
able are confirmed by the survey data according to the results of the multivariate
model. The only exceptions include insufficient and contradictory evidence found
for the sociological hypotheses.
A variety of conclusions are drawn from these findings. First, transnational
institutions have a considerable influence over the actors, either directly or indi-
rectly, in a way that leads to more favourable views on multilevel politics. Addi-
tionally, although cross-national variation is revealed to be largely unsystematic,
it is methodologically and theoretically important to observe this result in a model
where fixed country effects are also controlled for. Second, the subnational aspect
of power redistribution has a greater leverage than the supranational aspect, which
can be explained by the imminence of subnational competences as a prerequisite
of multilevel political activity for many actors. Third, a similar conclusion can be
seen in political identification, as subnational distinctiveness has a more visible
effect on the views on multilevel politics than European political identification.
Fourth, the effectiveness of formal institutional channels have a stronger effect on
the views on multilevel politics than informal channels. Fifth, established ideolo-
gies are not adapted to a vision which can endorse the basic properties of multi-
level politics.
While these findings lead to such analytically interesting conclusions, they
will also inform the next stage of analysis at the institutional level. Above all,
the higher relevance of formal institutions justify the focus of the case study on
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European organizations. As for the specific dimensions to be discussed, when
institutional characteristics are assessed with regard to power distribution, special
attention will be paid to the empowerment of subnational authorities. Further-
more, the effectiveness of formal organizations is evidently an important quality
that institutions must meet. Finally, among sociological effects of institutions,
international socialization and the legitimation of European identity are not as im-
portant as the generation of norms which can compensate for the incompatibility
with the established ideologies and which can counteract right-wing antagonism
to multilevel politics.
Chapter 6
Institutional forms of multilevel
politics: a comparative case study
Having concluded the individual-level analyses by confirming the majority of hy-
pothesized associations with favourable views towards multilevel politics, this
chapter will shift the focus to institutional-level variation between two major cases
which institutionalize multilevel politics. The main purpose here is to advance a
comparative case study of the Committee of the Regions (CoR or Committee) and
the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities (CLRAE or Congress), catego-
rized as belonging to the same class of institutions and which are similar but dif-
ferent in a way that can lead to analytically useful conclusions. The preliminary
comparisons of the two organizations, as discussed in Chapter 1 and 2, suggest
that both organizations share the fundamental characteristic of providing subna-
tional actors with direct representation at the supranational level—a distinctive
feature of innovative institutional development.
This categorization also lies at the root of several commonalities which allows
for appropriate comparison. Both the CoR and CLRAE are consultative bodies
within two major European political organizations, established approximately at
the same time in the early 1990s. Their similarities also include, to name a few
features, a parliament-like functioning with regular plenary sessions which dis-
cuss drafts prepared by task-specific committees or commissions, the elaboration
of political positions along two lines of national delegations and political party
groups, and the selection of members according to national quotas with due re-
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spect to the geographical and political distributions in each country. Nonetheless,
not only do they differ in degree along these dimensions, but they may also display
categorically different attributes in other aspects which require an in-depth study
of their respective institutional architectures. For this reason, the comparative per-
spective adopted here will not take these similarities as constant, but approach the
cases with an exploratory agenda, while these features are unpacked throughout
the comparative analyses.
As discussed in Chapter 3, the methodological rationale behind this compara-
tive case study is to complement the individual-level analysis with the institutional
level, in order to observe two kinds of variation, hence to approach the question of
institutional effects from two angles. This complementarity means that the com-
parative case study is distinct from the quantitative analyses in several respects,
but parallel in others. It is distinct in that it does not seek to retest the same spe-
cific hypotheses, as the focus is rather on institutional features. For example, the
categories used in the content analysis and the questions asked in semi-structured
interviews do not repeat the questionnaire of the survey. Yet it is parallel to the
quantitative part of this thesis, since the overarching focus on institutional effects
as well as the new-institutionalist framework is retained. Accordingly, institu-
tional features are taken as the sources of influence, and their examination follows
the same structure of the eclectic theoretical framework: the potential to shape
members’ views towards multilevel politics, the redistribution of political compe-
tences, the likely impacts of intra-institutional mechanisms, and the generation of
relevant norms and values.
To begin with a re-examination of the survey data, the first section will show
that there is no satisfactory evidence to claim any significant difference between
CoR and CLRAE in quantitative terms. In order to account for this similarity,
or the lack of a significant difference, overarching commonalities between the
two cases will be highlighted in the second section. However, it should be ac-
knowledged that the quantification may fail to capture important details about the
cases, and CoR and CLRAE might have some comparative advantages which con-
tribute to their institutional effects separately. In this sense, the following sections
will scrutinize such advantages in institutionalist terms of the distribution of com-
petences between levels of decision making, institutional effectiveness, and the
capacity to generate and diffuse relevant political norms.
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It will be concluded that the constitution of supranational fora for subnational
actors emerges as a distinctive commonality: that the competence-level compara-
tive advantage of the CoR is on the side of the European level and an ideal form
of multilevel governance, while the advantage of the CLRAE leans towards the
subnational level and its more immediate empowerment; and that the CoR dis-
plays more effective institutional mechanisms, while the CLRAE is rather a place
of political and normative debate. In this respect, the CoR and the CLRAE dis-
play differences along the main dimensions of institutionalization, in contrast to
the individual-level observation that their respective members do not differ in the
variables that correspond to the same dimensions. Thus, institutional aspects such
as the distribution of competences, effectiveness, material incentives, and the gen-
eration of relevant norms and values do not constitute specific forms of influence
over actors that change their attitudes, but these can rather be understood as qual-
ities that the actors expect and separate institutions deliver.
6.1 Effects of institutional membership
In the analyses of survey data so far, the influence of transnational institutions is
included as a continuous variable, the measurement of which is primarily sensitive
to membership in an organization, but it also takes into account the variation in
various institutional factors for members and non-members separately. The focus
of this chapter is on the members of formal institutions, hence it is appropriate
to begin with a re-examination of the survey data by substituting membership for
institutional influence. The aim is, thereby, both to explore relevant characteristics
of membership in formal institutions, and to derive guidelines to inform following
qualitative analyses.
Table 6.1 presents this substitution in Model III.3 with dichotomous and cat-
egorical variables in turn. The dichotomous variable compares respondents who
declared membership in any international or transnational organization with those
who did not (Model B), while the categorical variable with three dummies com-
pares separately the members of CLRAE, CoR and another organization with
those who did not declare membership in any organization (Model C). All three
models display very close goodness of fit statistics; in that sense, the use of non-
continuous measurements does not radically reduce the explanatory power of the
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models. However, it should be noted that the coefficient of the substituted vari-
able has the same value across models A and B, suggesting that approximately
0.40 unit change in the views on multilevel politics can be accounted for by one
unit of the continuous variable from a range of [1.61, 4.39] encompassing mem-
bers and non-members, or the entire range of the dichotomous variable which only
distinguishes members from non-members.
Table 6.1: Model III.3 with different measurements of institutional influence
DV: Views on Multilevel Politics
Model A Model B Model C
Influence of transnational institutions 0.42 ∗∗∗
Membership in a transnational organization 0.39 ∗∗∗
Membership in CLRAE 0.58 ∗∗∗
Membership in CoR 0.26 ·
Membership in another organization 0.38 ∗∗
Strength of European institutions 0.13 ∗∗∗ 0.14 ∗∗∗ 0.14 ∗∗∗
Competences of subnational authorities 0.48 ∗∗∗ 0.48 ∗∗∗ 0.48 ∗∗∗
Importance of European funds 0.33 ∗∗ 0.38 ∗∗ 0.38 ∗∗
Effectiveness of TNOs for external activity 0.71 ∗∗∗ 0.77 ∗∗∗ 0.77 ∗∗∗
Effectiveness of direct relations for external activity 0.40 ∗∗ 0.43 ∗∗ 0.45 ∗∗
Political identity: European 0.07 0.11 0.10
Political identity: Cultural 0.29 ∗ 0.28 ∗ 0.29 ∗
Political identity: Ideological -0.25 · -0.28 ∗ -0.28 ∗
Ideological position: Left v. Centre 0.03 0.01 0.00
Ideological position: Right v. Centre -0.60 ∗∗ -0.65 ∗∗ -0.65 ∗∗
Pol. id.: Ideological × Id. pos.: Left 0.11 0.10 0.12
Pol. id.: Ideological × Id. pos.: Right 0.44 · 0.48 ∗ 0.48 ∗
Observations 797 797 797
Adjusted R2 0.48 0.46 0.46
Residual Std. Error 0.96 0.97 0.97
F statistic 193.30 ∗∗∗ 189.00 ∗∗∗ 180.20 ∗∗∗(df=40; 757) (df=40; 757) (df=42; 755)
Note: Significance codes: ∗∗∗p < 0.001 < ∗∗p < 0.010 < ∗p < 0.050 < ·p < 0.100
Model C unpacks this single dichotomy into three dummy dichotomies of
membership, with almost identical results in all other covariates. One surprising
result is that CoR appears as the membership category which is the least different
from non-membership, so much so that its coefficient is marginally insignificant
(p = 0.06). However, this does not necessarily mean that CoR members on av-
erage have less favourable views on MLP, but it is possible that its coefficient
is reduced more dramatically by the covariation with other factors in the model.
To observe the raw difference, this result should be interpreted against the back-
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ground of the differences in the score of the dependent variable among member-
ship categories independent of other covariates. When the dependent variable is
compared across membership categories only, it is predicted to be 2.63 for non-
members of any organization, and between 3.40 and 3.43 for the members of the
three categories of organizations1. In other words, all three membership categories
are almost equally different from non-membership. Nonetheless, this difference
is more strongly accounted for by other covariates in the case of the CoR, whilst
other membership categories seem to have a rather freestanding influence on ac-
tors. In this sense, as a guiding intuition for upcoming comparative analyses, the
CLRAE can be expected to display institutional features which are less likely to
be associated with those already included in statistical analyses.
To narrow down the scope, Table 6.2 summarizes the application of Model III.2
to the subset of data which consists of respondents who declared institutional
membership2. The first thing to notice is the lack of significance in predictors
which pertain to institutional influence. As noted in Chapter 4, the association
between the continuous variable of institutional influence and the dependent vari-
able is weaker at higher levels of the former, and this weak association seems to
be reflected in Model A of Table 6.2. Therefore, the indicators which measure this
range of the variable such as the timing and the duration of, the satisfaction with,
and the importance attached to transnational experience do not significantly relate
to the dependent variable according to the available data. Yet their relevance in
the broader models can be explained by the significance of the institutional char-
acteristics as the source of institutional influence, which will be discussed in the
upcoming sections.
In Model B, there is no statistically significant difference between membership
in another organization and membership of CoR or CLRAE, while the difference
between the coefficients of CoR and CLRAE is also too small to be significant.
This result, on the other hand, suggests that while membership in a transnational
organization makes a noticeable difference in actors’ views on multilevel politics,
1These statistics are the approximate mean scores of the dependent variable in each category,
but not the exact scores due to weighting, since the weights are based on the country distribution
in the entire dataset irrespective of the country distribution within each category of institution.
However, it can still be stated that the differences among these categories are negligible when not
controlled for by other covariates.
2A smaller model is selected due to the smaller sample size, by dropping the interaction terms.
In addition, country fixed effects are also dropped to retain higher degrees of freedom.
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Table 6.2: Model III in the subset of members
DV: Views on MLP
Model A Model B
Influence of transnational institutions 0.44
Membership in CoR v. another organization -0.17
Membership in CLRAE v. another organization -0.22
Strength of European institutions 0.27 *** 0.29 ***
Competences of subnational authorities 0.39 *** 0.36 ***
Importance of European funds -0.34 -0.32
Effectiveness of TNOs for external activity 0.98 *** 0.99 ***
Effectiveness of direct relations for external activity -1.05 * -1.02 *
Political identity: European 0.23 0.26
Political identity: Cultural 0.23 0.30
Political identity: Ideological -0.32 * -0.36 *
Ideological position: Left v. Centre -0.01 -0.07
Ideological position: Right v. Centre -0.71 *** -0.68 ***
Constant 0.16 2.02 **
Observations 203 203
Adjusted R2 0.40 0.39
Residual Std. Error 0.84 0.84
F statistic 13.05 *** 11.98 ***(df=11; 191) (df=12; 190)
Note: Significance codes: ∗∗∗p < 0.001 < ∗∗p < 0.010 < ∗p < 0.050
the type of institution is much less significant, at least for a quantified measure-
ment of the dependent variable. Similarly to what has been said for the categorical
predictor above, this can also be interpreted by isolating all other covariates. Even
then, differences across categories are not statistically significant, resulting in esti-
mates of 3.42 for ‘another organization’, 3.22 for CoR, and 3.12 for CLRAE3. The
absence of significant quantitative variation will thus be one of the main issues to
be addressed in qualitative analyses to follow, and for this reason, the observed
differences will be interpreted in terms of comparative advantages.
Changes in other covariates as compared to the previous models, nevertheless,
imply interesting patterns. On one hand, the strength of European institutions
and the effectiveness of transnational organizations become stronger predictors
of the dependent variable; on the other hand, the effectiveness of direct relations
becomes a negatively associated predictor. Both changes can be explained by
3Similarly to the above note, these figures correspond to weighted means when weights are
calculated according to the country distribution in the entire dataset, and differences from previous
figures are due to the change in the dataset.
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the fact that all respondents in this dataset are members of a formal transnational
organization, and for this reason, they may have a higher level of confidence in
formal institutions and lower level of confidence in relatively informal channels
such as direct relations. On this basis, it can be supposed that their expectations
from stronger and more effective supranational institutions replace freestanding
institutional influence to predict the dependent variable. Hence particular attention
should be paid to the strength and effectiveness of the studied organizations in
qualitative analyses.
Finally, narrowing down the scope further so that it corresponds to the compar-
ative case study, a similar analysis can be conducted on a subset consisting only
of members of CoR and CLRAE. In this respect, Table 6.3 summarizes a model
of selected variables4 specific to these two organizations. Similar conclusions to
those drawn from the previous model can be reconfirmed when other organiza-
tions apart from CoR and CLRAE are ignored. However, the coefficient for the
strength of European institutions conforms more to the results from the entire
dataset than those from the dataset of respondents with transnational experience.
In this sense, the strength of supranational organization is not indispensable while
promoting domestic empowerment of subnational authorities as an institutional
feature can still be expected to have greater leverage. On the other hand, the
absence of statistically significant differences between CoR and CLRAE can be
extended to major independent variables, as seen in Table 6.4. Therefore, it is dif-
ficult to claim that different organizations generate different expectations on the
part of their members, regarding the institutional functions relevant to multilevel
politics.
Meanwhile, several other measurements which were included in the survey
but which have not been discussed so far also fail to indicate any significant
difference. These were organization-specific questions which rated the desired
priorities such as economic development, the empowerment of subnational au-
thorities, promoting local democracy and multilevel governance, the desired fu-
ture status of the organization, and the significance of intra- or extra-institutional
factors such as commissions/committees, national delegations, party groups and
4With such a small sample size, in order to keep the number of variables as low as possible and
the degrees of freedom as high as possible, the variables which are most likely to be significant
are selected on the basis of previous models.
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Table 6.3: Model of selected variables in the subset of CoR and CLRAE
DV: Views on MLP
Membership in CLRAE v. CoR -0.06
Strength of European institutions 0.19 *
Competences of subnational authorities 0.50 ***
Effectiveness of TNOs for external activity 0.70 **
Effectiveness of direct relations for external activity -0.35
Political identity: Ideological -0.01
Ideological position: Left v. Centre 0.09
Ideological position: Right v. Centre -0.79 ***
Constant 1.00 ·
Observations 108
Adjusted R2 0.40
Residual Std. Error 0.78
F statistic 9.82 ***(df=8; 99)
Note: Significance codes: ∗∗∗p < 0.001 < ∗∗p < 0.010 < ∗p < 0.050 < ·p < 0.100
Table 6.4: Comparison of the main variables between CoR and CLRAE
CoR CLRAE
Views on Multilevel politics 3.27 3.27
Strength of European institutions 3.15 3.25
Competences of subnational authorities 3.35 3.26
Importance of European funds 95% 92%
Effectiveness of TNOs for external activity 80% 80%
Effectiveness of direct relations for external activity 98% 93%
Political identity: European 57% 62%
Political identity: Cultural 19% 13%
Political identity: Ideological 63% 73%
Ideological position: Right 31% 22%
subnational interests, which were asked in the third section of the questionnaire
(see Appendix A.3.2 for details). The overall similarity of the variables which
are specifically operationalized for the comparison of the organizations suggests
that their members have highly similar attitudes, not only towards multilevel pol-
itics and institutionally relevant aspects that have been discussed in the previous
chapters, but also towards their organizations as such.
The lack of definitive evidence about institutional differences between CoR
and CLRAE can be related to the limitations of either quantitative methods in gen-
eral or the data at hand in particular. However, the inability to detect differences in
quantitative terms does not necessarily prove that the two organizations are highly
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similar. A more plausible conclusion is that the Committee and the Congress have
comparative advantages, on top of overarching commonalities, which help them
to display similar quantitative levels of influence over their members with regard
to their views on multilevel politics. In addition, the interpretations that have been
advanced in this section also offer guiding intuitions for the upcoming discus-
sions: CLRAE is more likely to have a comparative advantage in terms of factors
which are not captured by the individual-level variables since its influence is not
reduced dramatically by the existence of these covariates; comparative advantages
will not necessarily mean specific forms of institutional influence since the mem-
bers of two organizations do not differ in the independent variables either; the
strength and effectiveness of organizations, and the supranational level matter but
these are not indispensable.
In the following sections, it will be shown that CoR benefits from the evi-
dent advantages of being placed within the EU, with regard to both the existence
of a strong institution at the supranational level and the effectiveness of institu-
tional processes. Yet in the light of the above-mentioned conclusions from the
re-examined survey data, the distinctive features of CLRAE should not be under-
estimated: its emphasis on decentralization which has greater leverage for multi-
level politics than supranational integration, and its normative capacity which was
probably not captured by the individual-level analyses.
6.2 Supranational fora for subnational actors
The overarching commonalities between CoR and CLRAE are not only the met-
hodological bases of their comparability, but also the possible sources of the con-
vergence in their effects as observed in the survey data. Such commonalities align
closely with the reasons for their selection as the typical cases of the institutional-
ization of multilevel politics. Namely, they both embody the direct links between
subnational and supranational levels, in the form of the representation of subna-
tional political actors in European organizations, which is likely to result in shared
institutional characteristics. The following subsections will present the internal
structures of CoR and CLRAE in turn, in order to specify these characteristics
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in further detail5. The third subsection will draw on the recurrent themes in the
qualitative interviews to frame such characteristics in terms of the importance of
the existence of supranational fora for subnational actors.
6.2.1 The structure of the Committee of the Regions
The Committee of the Regions is an advisory body within the institutional archi-
tecture of the EU. It was established in 1994, following the Maastricht Treaty, to
provide input from subnational interests to the legislation and policy at the EU
level; although its name has an emphasis on regions, it represents both local and
regional entities. Its role within this architecture was recognized and strengthened
through successive treaties, especially the Treaty of Lisbon through which it was
given the formal power to appeal to the European Court of Justice on issues re-
lated to subsidiarity. While this is not a power to make a real difference in the
day-to-day business of the EU legislation, and does not change the status of the
Committee as an advisory body, its symbolic and nominal significance should not
be underestimated. In addition, as compared to the other advisory body of the
EU, the European Economic and Social Committee, CoR is distinctive in having
a parliament-like structure bringing together political actors from across Europe.
It is composed of 350 members from 28 countries; all members are demo-
cratically elected members of regional or local entities in their home countries,
and their primary political mandate lies with their regions or localities, while they
participate in the activities of CoR with six plenary session meetings and six com-
mission meetings per year. Members are normally selected for five years, but they
lose their CoR mandate if they lose their domestic mandate. Since it is practically
impossible to represent all local and regional entities, members are decided on by
national governments and approved by the Council of the EU. The selection pro-
cess must satisfy the conditions of a democratic electoral mandate of members,
5Some major characteristics of CoR and CLRAE are already discussed in previous chapters:
Chapter 1 includes a review of the literature which contextualizes the two organisations within the
institutional channels of multilevel politics, and Chapter 2 shows that they fit well into the pro-
posed theoretical framework. While some repetition is inevitable, the aim here is to complement
these—that is, to contribute to the literature and to provide empirical evidence to the theoretical
arguments—with a systematic analysis and a complete picture. For this purpose, the descriptions
provided in this section also utilizes primary sources in the form of official documentation of the
CoR and CLRAE, in particular their websites and the documents published through these websites.
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and fair representation of all political parties and all geographic parts of the coun-
try. Since participation in meetings in Brussels may not always possible for all
members, an equal number of alternate members are also selected to replace full
members if necessary, and eventually to ensure the highest level of attendance in
the meetings.
The ultimate product of the work of the Committee is the adoption of opinions
and resolutions. Formal opinions are the input of CoR to European legislative pro-
posals, while resolutions are texts adopted on topical political issues without nec-
essarily relating to legislation. The Committee must be consulted for legislative
proposals when the legislation is expected to have direct implications for local and
regional authorities. The process of adopting an opinion begins with the appoint-
ment of a relevant CoR commission, and a rapporteur to prepare a draft opinion.
After discussion, amendments and adoption in the commission, the opinion is sub-
mitted to the plenary assembly where further amendment proposals are discussed
and the final text is adopted. An adopted opinion is sent to the EU institutions for
consideration in the legislative process.
All this process works along three lines of organization. First, grouping of
members into six commissions organizes a specialized division of labour. As the
drafts submitted by commissions form the basis of the eventual opinion, commis-
sion members are selected to reflect the national and political composition of the
Committee. A broad range of subjects is thus covered by them: the Commis-
sion for Citizenship, Governance, Institutional and External Affairs (CIVEX), the
Commission for Territorial Cohesion Policy and EU Budget (COTER), the Com-
mission for Economic Policy (ECON), the Commission for the Environment, Cli-
mate Change and Energy (ENVE), the Commission for Natural Resources (NAT),
and the Commission for Social Policy, Education, Employment, Research and
Culture (SEDEC). Second, members are organized into political groups, corre-
sponding to five European party families: the European People’s Party (EPP), the
Party of European Socialists (PES), the Group of the Alliance of Liberals and
Democrats for Europe (ALDE), the European Alliance Group (EA), and the Eu-
ropean Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR). These groups represent not
only diverse ideological positions, but also different approaches to European inte-
gration and the role of European institutions. Political groups meet before plenary
sessions to discuss possible common positions about draft opinions in accordance
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with their general principles. Third, similarly, national delegations representing
28 member states meet before plenary sessions to reconsider draft opinions with
respect to possible implications for their countries.
This structure is coordinated by the Bureau which meets eight times a year,
six of which precede the plenary sessions. The Bureau consists of the president
and the first vice-president of the CoR, leaders of political groups, and 56 other
members, 28 of which act as vice-presidents representing every national delega-
tion, with a mandate of two years and a half. In addition to coordinating the work
of the commissions and the plenary sessions, the Bureau more broadly decides the
political programme of the CoR and supervises its implementation. Alongside the
Bureau, the secretariat with the secretary general and six directorates, consisting
of civil servants, perform administrative tasks and ensure the day-to-day running
of CoR.
Overall, although CoR is an advisory body of the EU, it has to deal with com-
plex issues on several fronts, such as the representation of subnational units from
all member states which have different systems of territorial administration, draft-
ing opinions on a broad range of subjects which inform the EU legislation, and
reaching decisions on proposals which may be relevant for different political posi-
tions and diverse national backgrounds. This complexity seems to be successfully
institutionalized so far through commissions, political groups, national delega-
tions, the Bureau and the secretariat-general.
6.2.2 The Structure of the Congress of Local and Regional
Authorities of Europe
The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe, or the Congress of
the Council of Europe was established in 1994 with a statutory resolution of the
Committee of Ministers to make it a permanent part of the institutional architec-
ture of the CoE. However, it is the product of a longer history of more than 50
years. The Conference of Local Authorities of Europe was established in 1957,
eight years after CoE. It was expanded in 1975 to include regional authorities,
and acquired a permanent status in 1979 with the name Standing Conference of
Local and Regional Authorities of Europe. The most crucial point in its history
is arguably the adoption of the European Charter of Local Self-Government in
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1985, and its immediate opening to signature. As the Charter has become the
international legal benchmark for local democracy in Europe, the Standing Con-
ference eventually attained its current status to oversee its implementation. While
the Congress has thus a mandate based on international law, its role is usually
bound to make recommendations.
The CLRAE is composed of 324 members from 47 countries, representing
over 200,000 authorities according to its self-depiction (CLRAE, 2016a). Their
membership is dependent upon electoral mandate in their localities or regions.
Their participation in CLRAE activities primarily takes place in two meetings
each year. The selection of delegates by member states must ensure fair repre-
sentation with respect to the landscape of local and regional politics, geographic
distribution, and local-regional balance, as well as a 30% quota for women. An-
other 324 members are selected as substitutes to ensure that preventing conditions
during meeting times do not reduce participation levels.
Having a special mission under the European Charter of Local Self-
Government, CLRAE aims to draft new international treaties to promote local
and regional democracy, which would then be effective to the extent that national
governments adopt them. Drafting such treaties, however, is naturally part of a
long-term political strategy and requires considerable effort spread over years.
On a more regular basis, CLRAE adopts several types of texts which document
monitoring missions and debates in its chambers and plenary assembly. Accord-
ingly, it adopts reports on the state of local and regional democracy in member
countries, in view of the implementation of the Charter. Its overseeing of local
and regional democracy is also complemented by monitoring missions to observe
local and regional elections. In addition to monitoring, members debate topical
political subjects which relate to the role of subnational authorities and the im-
portance of local and regional democracy. The different types of texts adopted by
CLRAE include, first, drafts proposed by a rapporteur which are adopted as re-
ports. Second, texts addressed to the Committee of Ministers for implementation
by national governments are framed as recommendations. Third, texts addressed
to the local and regional authorities are framed as resolutions. Finally, if the Com-
mittee of Ministers or the Parliamentary Assembly consults the Congress on a
specific subject which is expected to have implications for subnational authori-
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ties or which could be improved by their input, the resulting text is framed as an
opinion.
The process of adopting a text begins by the preparation of a draft by a rap-
porteur, discussed in the first place in a relevant committee. Currently CLRAE
has three committees, each committee representing the overall composition of
the Congress members. The division of tasks among committees is established
according to the nature of the work corresponding to the main missions of the
Congress. The Monitoring Committee, or with its full name, The Committee on
the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Euro-
pean Charter of Local Self-Government is responsible for reporting on the above-
mentioned monitoring missions. The responsibility of the Governance Commit-
tee covers other areas of the mandate of CLRAE, such as systems of governance,
public finance, cooperation among subnational authorities or with other intergov-
ernmental organizations, etc. Finally, the Current Affairs Committee focuses on
major contemporary social and political issues which relate to the role of subna-
tional authorities and the core values of CoE.
Another important line of organization is the separation of local and regional
chambers. Although CLRAE consists of both local and regional representatives,
and although the final decisions are taken in the plenary assembly which brings to-
gether both groups, the Chamber of Local Authorities and the Chamber of Regions
also hold separate sessions to provide potentially distinct views which local and
regional authorities may have. While this division is less meaningful for countries
which do not have a federal or regionalized system of government, consistency
across member states is ensured through distinguishing, for instance, counties and
provinces from cities and towns. Before voting in chambers or plenary sessions,
members have the opportunity to discuss the issues in the agenda, seek support
for their views or reports, or propose common positions in political groups and
national delegations. The current political groups are the Group European Peo-
ple’s Party (EPP/CCE), the Socialist Group (SOC), the Independent and Liberal
Democrat Group (ILDG), and the European Conservatives and Reformists Group
(ECR), in addition to a considerable number of members who have not indicated
political affiliation with any of these groups. While members can follow cross-
national principles and values around which political groups are organized, they
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can also consider the implications of the texts to be adopted for specific properties
of their countries in the meetings of national delegations.
On top of this structure, the presidency and the Bureau of the Congress reflect
primarily the local-regional divide, and the composition of the Statutory Forum
emphasizes national composition. The Bureau, tasked with ensuring the conti-
nuity of the work of CLRAE between sessions, consists of the president of the
Congress and the members of the chamber bureaux including their presidents.
While the Bureau works on the general policy of the Congress, specific moni-
toring missions and the coordination of committees, the Statutory Forum, which
consists of all members of the Bureau and presidents of national delegations, can
act on behalf of the Congress for the adoption of texts, in particular reports. Thus,
the Statutory Forum can increase the number of meetings where decisions can be
taken, while the Bureau ensures the continuity between plenary and forum meet-
ings. Furthermore, the chairs of committees and the presidents of political groups
can also participate in Statutory Forum meetings as ex officio members without
voting rights. In addition to the Bureau and the Statutory Forum, the secretariat
performs administrative tasks and ensures day-to-day running of CLRAE.
Overall, the national, political and domestic-institutional diversity of subna-
tional authorities that CLRAE represents is institutionalized through the organi-
zation of national delegations, political groups and two chambers for local and
regional entities. Meanwhile, the diversity of working areas relating to statutory
tasks and political goals is addressed through the three committees, and the con-
tinuity between plenary, chamber and committee meetings is provided by the Bu-
reau, Statutory Forum and the secretariat.
6.2.3 Comparison of main structural features
The descriptions given above show that the CoR and CLRAE are highly similar
organizations with respect to their major structural features. To reiterate, this
similarity can be summarized by the following observations:
• They are established as advisory bodies within two major European organi-
zations, the European Union and the Council of Europe.
• Their original inception follows the foundation or major reform of their
parent organizations.
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• If their final forms are taken as reference, their establishment coincides in
1994, covering the same time period up to today.
• Membership is based on selective representation paying attention to domes-
tic electoral mandate and fairness with respect to political landscape and
geographic coverage of each country.
• The core of activities is regular meetings of plenary sessions.
• The major result of these core activities is the adoption of official documents
in response to institutional mandates and contemporary issues.
• The drafting process works through subject- or task-specific commissions
or committees.
• The diversity in the background of members is institutionalized through
having both political groups and national delegations.
• Executive-like branches ensure the continuity and coordination despite long
periods between meetings and the complexity of overall organization.
Nonetheless, they are by no means identical, and a number of details can be found
in the descriptions to show the points of divergence—categorical or in degree.
This section will focus on overarching similarities and leave the discussion of
differences to the upcoming sections.
First of all, the methodological implications of these common features high-
light the comparative logic of the case study. In addition to being similar enough
for comparability, CoR and CLRAE are proposed as cases belonging to the same
category of institutions, and typical cases representing this category. Therefore,
the above list of characteristics can be seen as ideal-typical qualities of the formal
organizations which institutionalize multilevel politics through direct representa-
tion of subnational political actors with a Europe-wide scope. Second, if the level
of similarity which has been demonstrated so far is considered together with the
findings from the survey data, the proximity of quantitative measurements across
cases can be condoned more confidently. Thereby, by virtue of their overarching
similarities, CoR and CLRAE are expected to exert similar degrees of influence
in terms of the relationship between institutions and actors, or in this case, orga-
nizations and their members.
However, both implications—comparability and similar degrees of influence—
need further explication. First, even if CoR and CLRAE are selected as typical
cases, they are also the only cases when a narrow definition of the formal insti-
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tutionalization of multilevel politics is adopted. Further analytical value can be
derived by identifying the qualities that should be expected from the institutional-
ized forms of multilevel politics in general. In other words, drawing on Sartori’s
‘ladder of abstraction’ (1970), a certain degree of generalization can be achieved
by relaxing some defining attributes of the category and thus allowing a larger
coverage of cases. Second, while similar degrees of influence and similar institu-
tional characteristics are observed separately, an explanation should be offered to
link the two.
Framing the common features of CoR and CLRAE as the provision of supra-
national fora for subnational political actors will address both analytical objec-
tives, namely, determining the basis of generalizability and linking institutional
influence and institutional characteristics. First, other cases apart from the Com-
mittee and the Congress can also be understood as institutionalizing multilevel
politics by virtue of providing supranational fora for subnational actors, even if
their scope of representation is narrower and their degree of formality lower than
CoR and CLRAE. Second, this quality of institutions means an exposure of sub-
national actors to a new form of political activity capable of shaping their views.
The existence of supranational fora6 is also a distinctive quality, unlike any-
thing that can be found outside of the institutionalized practices of multilevel pol-
itics, least of all in the conventional practices of national politics. For subnational
actors, regular sessions mean systematically meeting and working with their coun-
terparts from other countries; the secure institutional status within the EU and
the CoE means sharing an environment with other diplomatic or Eurocratic staff
hence an at least equivalent standing; the wide range of addressed issues means
the assumption of a role much larger than local or regional responsibilities without
necessarily losing sight of subnational concerns; drafting opinions in specialized
bodies means the possibility of having an impact which would otherwise be un-
available to them; and the organization along national and party-political lines
means an opportunity to differentiate intra-national and cross-national matters.
6It should be noted that the term ‘supranational’ is used here with a rather broad meaning,
to draw attention to the multinational or international character of these fora. In other words,
it does not stand for one side of the supranational-international dichotomy. In this sense, this
terminological choice does not imply an implicit claim about the CoE being a supranational as
opposed to an intergovernmental institution.
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The idea that providing supranational fora is one of the most significant added
values of CoR and CLRAE is also prevalent among the members of these or-
ganizations. All interviews in which a question on the areas of strength of the
institutions is asked confirm this view without exception, although this was not
posited in advance and there was no specific probing to evaluate such a statement.
Moreover, interviewees who are members of both institutions did not distinguish
the Committee and the Congress in this respect. Therefore, the expression of this
feature as an important quality common in both organizations on the part of the
members yields additional empirical support to the explanation that the similarity
in institutional characteristics is manifested in the similar degrees of institutional
influence. These views are usually qualified by expressions like ‘meeting new
people’, ‘seeing the opportunities of cooperation’, ‘hearing new ideas’, ‘learning
from other experiences’, ‘sharing good practice’, ‘understanding different per-
spectives’, etc. More specifically, this point is expressed in one of the interviews
as follows:
On the both sides, even if the issues are different in the Council [of
Europe] and the European Union, you have one important common
point, in the Congress and in the Committee. It is the secondary ef-
fect of the activities, which is very very helpful for the regions. If you
are coming together with all these members, it is a unique opportu-
nity to have contacts, to make networks, to know each other, to go
into relationships and discover what happens in the different member
states—not only in the national level that you can see on television
reports but also what happens inside, on a very concrete basis in dif-
ferent countries. So it is a great opportunity to make progress with a
kind of integration coming [from] bottom-up. (Interview 1)
To illustrate these effects, another interviewee mentions the speeches given by
guest speakers:
In the last session in March [2015], we had a speech of the mayor of
Lampedusa [...], we had a speech of the mayor of Calais, also of the
mayor of Kobane. It is interesting to have direct contact with people
[like them], it is another thing to see them on TV. [...] We are taking a
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little time to do [this job], because we are convinced that this is useful.
For me it is a positive experience. (Interview 2)
It can be remarked that the selection of speakers in view of topical issues of the
time—the situation of refugees in Europe in the case of Lampedusa and Calais,
and the civil war in Syria in the case of Kobane—engages subnational political ac-
tors with European and even international issues. Since immigration and asylum
pose political challenges to be addressed by subnational authorities, the sharing
of experiences among the local and regional actors of Europe is crucial to develop
effective policies. Meanwhile, the reconstruction of a new political system in a
country which is neighbouring Europe, and enduring a civil war provides the op-
portunity to learn about innovative ways of local and regional self-government,
democracy and autonomy, which is realized through the institutional channel of
the Congress. It is also interesting to see the emphasis on the importance of actual
and direct contact in contrast to learning about political developments through
other media. Therefore, by facilitating networking, transnational cooperation
and policy learning, the institutionalization of multilevel politics contributes to
a change in the perceptions of subnational actors about their role in the politics of
Europe and the world.
To conclude, the Committee and the Congress can be understood as similar
institutions with respect to their formal structures. On one hand, the analytical
implication is a further support for their comparability. On the other hand, their
ability to constitute supranational fora for subnational actors points to a signifi-
cant institutional effect on actors. The subjective views, which are expressed by
the interviewees about the importance of establishing relations with their counter-
parts from other countries thanks to these organizations, illustrate the link between
institutional influence and favourable views on multilevel politics. However, this
may not be the only explanation for the similarity of their influence over the views
of the actors on multilevel politics. For this reason, differences between them will
also be discussed in the following sections to examine relevant nuances.
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6.3 Relative priority of European and subnational
levels
One of the central dimensions of studying multilevel politics, according to the new
institutionalist approach as proposed in this thesis, and especially historical insti-
tutionalism, is the redistribution of competences, resources and power among the
levels of decision making. This has been operationalized in terms of actors’ views
on the strength of European institutions and on the domestic competences of sub-
national authorities. The quantitative measurement of these factors in the survey
design proved to be significant in explaining the views on multilevel politics, but
showed negligible difference across CoR and CLRAE. The aim of this section is
to revisit this dimension of analysis in view of observed institutional characteris-
tics. In principle, both the Committee and the Congress, by virtue of embodying
direct relations between subnational and supranational levels, would be expected
to contribute to the redistribution of power upwards and downwards away from
the national level. However, as the findings presented in this section will illus-
trate, the two organizations differ in this aspect; while CoR displays a stronger
tendency to define itself as part of a supranational institutional architecture and to
set its mission in terms of advancing European political projects, CLRAE is still
predominantly interested in promoting local and regional democracy and decen-
tralization.
6.3.1 The CoR, European level and multilevel governance
In order to understand the extent to which CoR emphasizes the centrality of the
European level7, the way in which its self-description and mission statements are
presented in the official documentation is a useful place to start. First of all, the
raison d’être of CoR is stated as ‘bringing citizens closer to the European Union’8.
The reasoning that underlies this statement can be summarized as follows: first,
7The claim that CoR prioritizes the European level is not intended to suggest that it disregards
the subnational dimension. Instead, in view of comparative analytical goals, the aim is to highlight
how the European level is indispensable to understand CoR’s missions, in a way that cannot be
said to be the case in CLRAE.
8This expression is used in the official website of CoR (2016), on the page ‘Key Facts’. The
expression ‘bringing EU closer to citizens’ is also in other official documents; two expressions
seem to be used interchangeably to express the same idea.
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the EU suffers from a democratic deficit; second, an awareness of its role in polit-
ical life should be raised and its citizens should be included more in the European
democratic process in order to enhance the legitimacy of the EU; and third, sub-
national actors are in the best position to perform these tasks as they live and work
at the level closest to the citizens. In this sense, an existential aspect of CoR is
explained through a fundamental challenge faced by the European integration and
the EU. In addition, CoR puts great emphasis on the fact that a large part of the
EU legislation and policy has impact at the subnational level or should be im-
plemented by subnational authorities, giving a strong basis for the legitimacy of
including them in European political processes.
Nonetheless, the three main principles put forward by CoR as part of its ‘Key
Facts’ (CoR, 2016), namely multilevel governance, proximity and subsidiarity
point to a much less simplistic self-image. Proximity, defined in terms of grass-
root participation in political processes, can be seen as closely associated with the
reasoning above, which implies an instrumental conception of the principle and
the position of subnational authorities. Subsidiarity, which is distinctive in having
legal leverage, points to the most appropriate and the lowest possible level of deci-
sion making. Yet its definition is given as the sharing of competences between all
three levels. Multilevel governance, which is closely related to this conception of
subsidiarity, is defined in terms of coordination and partnership of all levels with
reference to the EU policy making. These three main principles therefore draw
attention to the importance of a reorganization of governance among all levels
and the special importance of the subnational level, while the point of reference
usually stays as the European level. Moreover, the definition of multilevel gover-
nance is formulated in terms of cooperation and partnership, while a redistribution
of competences is seen as predicated on subsidiarity.
All these can be seen in the Committee’s ‘Mission Statement’ (CoR, 2009a).
To quote a few passages from the one-and-a-half page statement, the importance
attached to the European level can be illustrated by the following phrases:
• “We are a political assembly [...] serving the cause of European integration”
• “Our mission is to involve regional and local authorities in the European
decision-making process”
• “We vote on political recommendations for European strategies and partic-
ipate in the preparation of community legislation”
198 Chapter 6. Institutional forms of multilevel politics
• “We want to see Europe, united in diversity in a globalised world”
• “We play our part in promoting European democracy and citizenship and
their values”
• “We are ambassadors of Europe in the regions, cities and municipalities and
speak for them in the European debate”
• “Let’s build Europe in partnership!”
In addition to these, several phrases emphasize the coordination and partnership
across all levels, and cooperation among subnational authorities, while the only
phrase which seems to make an assertion for the latter in its own right is the
following:
We claim autonomy for regional and local authorities and their right
to secure appropriate financial resources to enable them to carry out
their duties. We therefore promote the principles and mechanisms of
good governance and encourage the process of decentralisation.
However, when a similar examination is conducted on the document titled
‘The political priorities of the European Committee of the Regions: 2015-2020’
(2015), terms related to ‘autonomy’ or ‘decentralization’ do not occur except for
the presentation of subnational units of member states. Instead, five major points
of priority are listed as European economy, the territorial dimension of the EU
legislation, simpler and more connected Europe, stability and cooperation within
and outside the EU, and dialogue between the EU institutions and citizens. While
the European level stands as the reference point, stated goals which concern the
subnational level in its own right are limited to secondary implications such as
bridging the knowledge gap between regions and cities, and in a related way be-
tween urban and rural areas.
Finally, CoR has a renewed commitment to multilevel governance. Even if
the analytical focus is shifted away from taking the European level as the refer-
ence, it is difficult to see explicitly whether this framing of multilevel governance
automatically entails the strengthening of the subnational level. The Committee’s
first white paper, ‘The White Paper on multi-level governance’ (CoR, 2009b), and
the ensuing ‘Charter for Multilevel governance in Europe’ (CoR, 2011) illustrate
a conception of multilevel governance which emphasizes partnership and coor-
dination, and which tends to promote certain political values with respect to all
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levels of decision making and the links between them. In this sense, the mean-
ing of multilevel governance for subnational authorities is, first, their inclusion in
supranational political processes, which is undoubtedly a crucial development as
discussed when concluding the previous section, and second, the improvement in
their institutional capacity alongside other levels. Both meanings presume a rel-
ative strengthening of the subnational level, as this is a prerequisite for effective
participation at the European level and having an institutional capacity compara-
ble to national and European levels. However, the materialization of this presump-
tion is not set as a concrete and imminent political goal, or at best, it is expressed
more tacitly, vaguely or with a lighter emphasis.
To conclude, an analysis of the official documents of CoR, in which common
views on the levels of government can be observed, shows that it has a greater ten-
dency to emphasize the importance of a stronger European level as compared to
the subnational level. In general, either the European level is consistently taken as
reference, or the emphasis is put on coordination and partnership among all levels,
whereas the calls for stronger subnational authorities remain minor in comparison.
Therefore, if the institutional characteristics of CoR are to be evaluated in terms
of upwards and downwards redistribution of power, it can be more appropriately
categorized as an organization which promotes the European level more system-
atically.
6.3.2 The CLRAE, subnational level and decentralization
To begin with the self-description of CLRAE, the following statement which is
posted on its official website (CLRAE, 2016a) can be seen as capturing the central
elements:
Its role is to promote local and regional democracy, improve local
and regional governance and strengthen authorities’ self-government.
It pays particular attention to application of the principles laid down
in the European Charter of Local Self-Government. It encourages
the devolution and regionalisation processes, as well as transfrontier
co-operation between cities and regions.
Although CLRAE does not have a more extensive statement of core principles,
it is easy to deduce from this quotation the special value attributed to local and
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regional democracy, self-government, devolution and regionalization, supporting
the claim that the strengthening of the subnational level is prioritized vis-à-vis
other levels.
On the other hand, the national level also occurs quite frequently in the self-
descriptive and adopted texts of CLRAE. For instance, it urges national govern-
ments to involve subnational authorities in their political decisions, the monitor-
ing missions are aimed to assess the situation of local and regional democracy in
member states as a whole, the Congress works on maintaining regular dialogue
with member states and national associations of local and regional authorities, its
addresses to other CoE bodies such as the Committee of Ministers are intended
to be transmitted to national governments, and so on. However, the major impli-
cation of all these practices is the redistribution of power towards the subnational
level; according to the definition by CLRAE, subsidiarity requires the transfer of
some responsibilities and financial resources from central to local and regional
authorities.
Within this context, any reference to the European level is almost non-existent
in the case of CLRAE. However, this is hardly surprising. The Congress is,
after all, a body of CoE, an organization which, when considered in terms of
a supranational-intergovernmental dichotomy, is more appropriately qualified as
intergovernmental9 an intergovernmental organization which cannot be uncontro-
versially qualified as supranational. CoE does not have any agenda for a deeper
integration, or any claim to constitute a new layer of government or a new lo-
cus of sovereignty. Furthermore, the most valued legal and political ground for
the Congress is the Charter which derives its significance from the ratification by
member states, hence having an international legal standing. The Congress con-
tinues to draft treaties—charters and conventions—as part of its long-term goals,
and the effectiveness of these rely solely on the endorsement by national govern-
ments. Therefore, CLRAE can be seen as mainly operating to influence the axis
between national and subnational levels.
9However, this dichotomy is too simplistic for an accurate understanding of European institu-
tions. For example, exceptions to the characterization of CoE as intergovernmental include, most
importantly, its role with regard to the European Convention on Human Rights, and the supra-
national status of the European Court of Human Rights, although the implementation of court
decisions still rests with the nation states.
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This modus operandi can be seen as realistic, or realist in terms of interna-
tional relations theory, as it acknowledges the primacy of national governments
in political reality, by focusing efforts onto the national level and by relying on
international legal norms. Yet, for the similar reasons, it can be seen as unre-
alistic to expect a meaningful effect on sovereign national competences due to
encouragement by a body of an intergovernmental organization which expresses
the willingness of local and regional entities. However, to the extent that electoral
democratic processes genuinely work and that local and regional politics have in-
dependent leverage from central politics, CLRAE can contribute to the domestic
demands for reform. For instance, to overcome the limitations posed by selective
representation in the Congress, liaisons with national associations of local and re-
gional governments can have a distinctive influence. In this area or other areas of
action, the Congress can avoid accusations of illegitimate interference thanks to
its international legal status.
The importance attached to empowering subnational authorities through de-
centralization can be illustrated by the content of the document ‘Priorities of the
Congress: 2013-2016’ (CLRAE, 2013). In this text which was adopted as a res-
olution in the 23rd session (16-18 October 2012), three major objectives are de-
fined. The first one, ‘raising the quality of local and regional democracy and
human rights in Europe’ is a restatement of the overall mission of CLRAE as dis-
cussed above. Second, ‘rising to the new challenges resulting from the economic
and financial crisis’ is framed with a focus on subnational resources and decen-
tralization, by emphasizing local and regional funding, and local and regional
authority reform. Finally, ‘developing co-operation and partnerships’ is taken to
entail the promotion of local and regional democracy in countries neighbouring
Europe. Any statements which can be interpreted as referring to the European
level are about either the institutional reform of the Congress or partnership with
the EU, showing that the relevance of the European level for the Congress is in
large part contingent upon the role of the EU.
To conclude, the main focus of CLRAE is almost exclusively on the strength-
ening of subnational authorities. The constant references to the national level can
be best understood as challenging the dominance of central authorities at the ex-
pense of local and regional authorities, but as taking into account the political
reality at the same time. Meanwhile, the European level is almost absent from
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its narratives. While it is not necessarily a promoter of multilevel governance in
this respect, according to the broader conception developed in this thesis, it has a
significant role to play in multilevel politics by promoting the downward transfer
of competences.
6.3.3 Comparison on prioritized levels of government
Drawing on the documentary analyses presented above, the comparative posi-
tions of CoR and CLRAE with respect to levels of government can be identified
and linked to the views expressed by interviewed members. If the comparison is
framed as one of supranational versus subnational, the subsection on CoR con-
cluded on the priority of the former while that on CLRAE concluded on the pri-
ority of the latter. However, these conclusions entail subtler implications. CoR
has an emphasis on relationships rather than power redistribution, with commit-
ment to multilevel governance understood as coordination and partnership among
all levels of decision making. Although subnational empowerment is a natural
outcome of this strategy, this can only be deduced more indirectly. Meanwhile,
the emphasis of CLRAE on the subnational level is more open and direct, with
explicit and consistent encouragement of decentralization.
In this context, one question to be addressed is whether the comparative po-
sition of either side has any greater leverage. On the one hand, having observed
in the main statistical models that subnational competences are more strongly as-
sociated with favourable views on multilevel politics, subnational autonomy can
be put forward as a prerequisite of effective multilevel political activities. On the
other hand, a strong European level is what distinguishes multilevel politics from
decentralized national structures. In this respect, the Congress can be consid-
ered as having a more down-to-earth approach, while the Committee is prepared
for a more ideal system of multilevel politics. If it is acknowledged that multi-
level political practices do not represent the actual circumstances of politics for a
considerable part of subnational actors, and further that there is still a huge dis-
parity in the autonomy enjoyed by subnational authorities coming from different
domestic backgrounds, the position of CLRAE is more likely to have an impact
on a possible change in the balance between the levels of decision making. The
approach of CoR has been interpreted as presuming the presence of competent
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subnational authorities, the accuracy of which depends on the success of the ap-
proach of CLRAE which has been interpreted as more realistic. In this respect,
the Committee and the Congress possess comparative advantages with regard to
different aspects of multilevel politics, and thus complement each other.
These interpretations are also confirmed by the qualitative interviews. In one
of the most clear assessments of the mandate, the mission and the raison d’être of
both organizations, they are compared as the following:
[I]t is clear that the CoR does not have the expertise of the Congress
on fundamental analysis of local democracy. On the other hand, the
Congress is not expected to position itself in the (monitoring of) EU
decision-making process. Sometimes the Congress’ expertise may
be of added value in a particular EU topic, but it will always be an
outside and complementary expertise that does not replace the in-
stitutional legitimacy of the CoR’s positioning within the European
Union’s decision-making process. (Interview 12)
Thus, local or regional self-government and the European level are seen as com-
plementing each other, which also means a complementarity between the CoR
and CLRAE. This understanding is reflected in the conceptions of multilevel gov-
ernance10 which embodies this complementarity. Several interviewees defined
multilevel governance as a concept that can also apply to the internal structure of
a country (notably Interviews 1, 2 and 10). More specifically, according to one
interviewee, the German federal system is a successful example of multilevel gov-
ernance in its own right, while the inclusion of the European level is a necessary
extension which meets the rising importance of the EU (Interview 10).
Despite these conceptions of multilevel governance in a positive light, several
ambiguities are also pointed out by the interviewees. For instance, it is admitted
that multilevel governance is a good in itself especially because it involves the
European level, but it is not very practical for actual politics at the subnational
level:
No local or regional politician will run a campaign in his or her con-
stituency on the issue of multilevel governance. However, the pursuit
10The interviewees are asked to state their opinions on multilevel governance, since this would
be a more familiar concept than multilevel politics. The views on multilevel governance are taken
here as a proxy for the views on multilevel politics.
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of multilevel governance is legitimate in the sense that, like subsidiar-
ity, it constitutes in my view a sort of ‘meta-topic’ of European poli-
cies which aims at ensuring a proper methodology in decision-making
and securing added value of European actions. (Interview 12)
Additionally, possible reasons for a reluctance to sign the Charter for Multilevel
Governance in Europe, promoted by CoR, include reasonable grounds for ques-
tioning the necessity of making this kind of political proclamation with no real
political or economic benefits (Interview 7). However, it is not entirely fair to
depict the Committee as so distant from a vision of immediate empowerment of
subnational authorities. Although decentralization and regionalization have not
been an explicit part of the EU legislation, they were incentivized through crite-
ria for structural funds and accession, as discussed in Chapter 1 with reference to
existing studies on this subject (e.g. Brusis, 2002). This view is also confirmed
by the interviewees from newer member states, mentioning this role of the EU
as a driving force for territorial and institutional reform (Interview 5). CoR, with
the inclusion of enlargement and neighbourhood policies on its agenda, played a
crucial role in this process. But this role has a rather historical character in the
face of slowing enlargement, and the impact of CoR for existing members is still
less clear.
Meanwhile, the Committee situates itself within the institutional architecture
of the EU, and the Congress bases its role on the international legal ground laid
by the Charter and the task of supervising its implementation. Therefore, their
complementarity also extends to their respective legal standings. With regard to
driving decentralization during the accession of new members, for instance, it
should be remarked that the EU relies on the norms generated by the CoE for a
considerable part of the accession conditionalities (Sasse, 2008). Thus the CoE
had come to the fore as the primary organization assisting Central and Eastern
European countries with democratic transition, and with regard to the local and
regional aspects of this assistance, the expertise of the Congress and the legal
basis provided by the European Charter of Local Self-Government became im-
portant assets. In this respect, focusing on democracy was stated as the correct
way forward for the CoE and CLRAE (Interview 1), while the CoR should not
try to do what the Congress does (Interview 2). An experienced member of both
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organizations asserts that CoR and CLRAE indeed try to avoid duplicates (Inter-
view 11).
When the missions of CoR and CLRAE are clearly distinguished, the mission
of the Committee was depicted by an interviewee almost exclusively with refer-
ence to the EU and the relationship among European regions, in a parallel way to
the examined documents:
We have basically three missions. One mission is that we have to give
advice to the Commission. [...] From my point of view, a much more
important mission is that we are fostering the internal cohesion be-
tween the regions. We meet at least twice a month, with colleagues in
the working groups and in the plenary, and on all issues we can im-
mediately reflect and ask our colleagues if it is true what we read in
the media about their situation at home with one problem or another,
and they will tell us. Over time, they will learn that we are really in-
terested in their own problems, and that we want to work together to
try to solve it in a European context. If you know colleagues from all
European regions, you can understand them better, you can tell your
own people at home what the situation is, because you can learn from
them first-hand. This is fostering the internal cohesion between the
European regions. [...] The third thing is that we have to explain to
people at home what the European Union is good for. In some coun-
tries, governments adopted the habit of making the European Union
the scapegoat for their own shortcomings and failures. [...] We try to
tell the people at home what the European Union does and what the
benefits are. [...] [An additional] fourth point, also growing in im-
portance, is staying in contact with our colleagues from the outside of
the European Union. We need reliable contacts with our colleagues
within the European Union and around it. (Interview 10)
It can be remarked from the above quotation that its second point reiterates what
has been identified as the overarching commonality of both organizations in the
previous section, but frames it with an emphasis on Europe as a cohesive unit
which takes part in the solution of problems. In addition, the third and fourth
points show that the mission of CoR is ensuring not only the representation of
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subnational authorities at the European level, but also the representation of the EU
at the subnational level, either within or outside its borders11. In this sense, these
statements confirm the observation that the rising importance of the European
level and multilevel politics are closely linked in the case of CoR.
To conclude, the members of CoR perceive the major characteristics of their
organization largely in the framework of the EU, while the members of CLRAE
emphasize local democracy. These observations stand witness to the link between
the views on the redistribution of competences across levels of governance and
the views on multilevel politics. However, there is not sufficient evidence to claim
that the CoR encourages more favourable views on stronger European institutions,
and CLRAE encourages more favourables views on decentralization, as the survey
data do not suggest a difference across these cases in the values of corresponding
variables. Therefore, these links are more accurately explained as the satisfaction
of separate expectations from institutions, whereby the intensity of expectations
are independent of institutional membership. The view that the Committee and
the Congress should and do perform different tasks and complement each other
affirms this conclusion: one does not have to be a member of the Committee to
recognize the added value of the European level and the role of CoR in this regard,
and one does not have to be a member of the Congress to recognize the value
of local and regional self-government and the role of CLRAE in enhancing it.
The crucial point is that, for successful institutionalization of multilevel politics,
institutional characteristics of relevant organizations must embody these features
at least partially.
6.4 Institutional effectiveness
Having discussed the overarching similarities between CoR and CLRAE, and dif-
ferent prioritizations of the levels of governance, their comparative advantages
will also be explained through rationalist and sociological approaches of new in-
stitutionalism. To begin with the dimension of effectiveness, this section will
11This interviewee has had particular duties with regard to neighbouring and candidate coun-
tries. The addition of the fourth point to the tree main missions can be linked to his personal
interests in this regard.
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present the reasons why CoR is in a more advantageous position in this respect12.
More precisely, the effectiveness of an institution from a rationalist perspective is
primarily concerned with the possibilities of reaching collective decisions, and the
degree of effectiveness can be observed in three areas: first, the amount of collec-
tive decisions that have been reached, second, the existence of mechanisms which
facilitate such decisions, and third, the impact of these decisions on intended re-
sults. The following subsections will stress the advantages that the Committee
possesses in these three areas.
6.4.1 Output
The CoR and CLRAE differ in degree with regard to several institutional char-
acteristics which are presented as areas of similarity in Section 6.2. Among
these, the frequency of meetings, the number of commissions/committees, and the
amount of output in terms of adopted texts are particularly relevant for observing
the workload that each organization accomplishes.
First of all, although plenary meetings are a common feature of both organi-
zations, the Committee meets six times a year for plenary sessions as compared
to the Congress which meets only twice a year. In addition, six CoR commission
meetings are scheduled for times between plenaries, doubling the number of work
days that are spent for CoR activities throughout the year. The number of commis-
sions/committees also makes a difference between CoR and CLRAE. Not only the
six commissions of CoR as compared to the three committees of CLRAE show
a higher degree of specialization, but also this difference results in arrangements
whereby CoR members usually participate in two commissions, while CLRAE
members serve as the full member of one committee and sometimes the alternate
of a second. Therefore, when the higher frequency of plenary and commission
meetings, the separate scheduling of commissions, and the multiple membership
in commissions are taken into account, the balance between the dual responsibil-
ity of subnational actors in relation to the European institutions and the local or
regional units is pulled towards the former in the case of CoR.
12Most of the points which are discussed in this section draw on the major institutional char-
acteristics presented in Section 6.2, and focus on the differences in degree between the cases. In
order to avoid unnecessary repetition, descriptions of each organization are not separately pro-
vided, unlike previous sections.
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The intensity of the work of CoR naturally results in a larger output in the
form of adopted texts. For instance, in 2015, the Committee adopted 59 opin-
ions and resolutions, while the Congress adopted only 16 recommendations, 19
resolutions and one declaration. Yet the output of CoR is even larger in terms
of its content for two reasons. First, many statements are repeated between the
resolutions and recommendations of the Congress which address the same issues.
Furthermore, CoR opinions are much longer than CLRAE resolutions and rec-
ommendations, and a much higher proportion of the texts adopted by CLRAE is
reserved for formalities, such as recalling the legal bases and addressing the text to
relevant authorities. Thereby, a significantly larger amount of substantive content
is presented in the texts adopted by CoR.
In order to investigate the link between this output and multilevel politics, a
content analysis of a sample of texts was also conducted, by measuring the refer-
ences made to the domestic, supranational and multilevel spheres of politics, as
discussed in Chapter 3. The overall difference between the two organizations was
not found statistically significant, in a way that affirms the lack of difference in
the survey data. Precisely, CLRAE texts display 50% reference to the domestic
sphere, 26% to the supranational, and 24% to the multilevel; while CoR texts dis-
play 40% reference to the domestic sphere, and 30% to each of the supranational
and multilevel spheres13. However, when the proportions of references are dis-
aggregated into commissions/committees within each organization, the effect of
internal arrangements are more visible, as presented in Table 6.5.
These results show that the difference between the committees of CLRAE is
larger and more significant than those of CoR14. At the same time, however, the
main source of difference in references to the multilevel sphere is the Governance
Committee, the main tasks of which include institutional matters such as the rules
and procedures of the Congress and cooperation with other organizations. In this
regard, the link between the institutional mechanisms and multilevel politics is by
and large limited to the organizational matters of CLRAE, while the debates on
13The largest proportion difference, which is in the references to the domestic sphere at 10%, is
only significant at p = 0.21.
14Since the equality of variance cannot be assumed in the subset of CLRAE documents accord-
ing to significant results from Levene’s test (Levene, 1960), robust post-hoc analyses of pairwise
comparison are conducted using Games-Howell test (Games and Howell, 1976) to ascertain the
significance levels.
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Table 6.5: References to spheres of governance in adopted texts
Domestic Supranational Multilevel N
CoR 40% 30% 30% 72
CIVEX 45% 18% 37% 13
COTER 26% 36% 38% 14
ECOS 40% 31% 29% 18
EDUC 57% 17% 26% 10
ENVE 35% 43% 22% 14
NAT 47% 28% 25% 3
ANOV A p < 0.05 p < 0.05 insig.
CLRAE 51% 24% 26% 87
Monitoring 68% 17% 15% 37
Current affairs 43% 30% 27% 42
Governance 5% 44% 51% 8
ANOV A p < 0.01 p < 0.05 p < 0.01
current affairs display a more balanced distribution and the monitoring of subna-
tional democracy and elections is naturally concerned with the domestic sphere.
On the other hand, CoR follows a more thematic differentiation among commis-
sions, whereby CIVEX assumes the responsibility of several institutional affairs
as well as decentralization and subnational governance, and COTER deals with
budgetary issues, among other policy areas. The absence of significant difference
in references to the multilevel sphere of governance can be attributed to this equiv-
alence among commissions apart from differing policy areas, and interpreted as an
illustration of how the internal mechanisms of CoR are designed to favour multi-
level politics in a holistic way. Meanwhile, the only significant differences among
the commissions of CoR occur in the preference for the domestic sphere for edu-
cation policy, and in the preference for the supranational sphere for environment
policy15, while in general CoR is not very selective in terms of the correspondence
between levels of government and policy areas.
Therefore, not only the higher frequency of CoR meetings ensures more in-
tense contacts between subnational actors and European institutions, but also the
amount of textual output and the proportion of multilevel politics therein indi-
cate stronger institutional arrangements. While this is not starkly visible in the
total output, a detailed examination of the commissions/committees shows that
15Pairwise comparisons through Tukey tests (Tukey, 1949) reveal that the only significant con-
trasts are found in EDUC-COTER, ENVE-CIVEX and EDUC-ENVE.
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CoR has a higher potential for generating common positions favouring multilevel
politics across a wide range of policy areas.
6.4.2 Party-based mechanisms
While the higher frequency of meetings and more specialized organization lead
to more effective institutional processes resulting in a larger output, the stronger
position of political parties in CoR constitutes an additional dimension of effec-
tiveness through permanence and efficient decision making mechanisms. One
interviewee who has a long experience in both CoR and CLRAE states that the
main problem facing these organizations is the non-permanence of the members
(Interview 1). The administrative bodies ensure the continuity of the processes,
but these are staffed with bureaucratic rather than political members. Political
groups play an important role in providing continuity, but this is more crucial in
the case of CoR as compared to CLRAE:
We must make a difference between the Committee and the Congress.
In the Congress, the political groups are not so important. [...] It de-
pends also on the focus of the work and the situation in monitoring
affairs, because there you have issues which are not much related to
classical political parties, [but rather related to] more general con-
ceptions of state management and different national interests. In the
Committee of the Regions, political groups are playing a central role.
They became more and more important in the last years. Political
groups are well-organized, they have stable staff, and for the mem-
bers it is a way to compensate the non-permanent presence. The staff
of political groups are the link between the administration of the Com-
mittee and the members from different groups. [...] [Over time], in
the Committee of the Regions, political groups became really stronger
than in the beginning. At the same time the national groups are de-
clining in importance. They are still important but things changed.
And this is not the same in the Congress. (Interview 1)
This statement points to two important contrasts regarding the strength of po-
litical groups: with national delegations in CoR, and between CoR and CLRAE.
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First, within the Committee, national delegations are not in a position to provide
the same degree of continuity as political groups. In many cases, the most ef-
fective form of national coordination can only be realized by regional offices (In-
terviews 5, 7 and 8), whereas party group coordination offices are organized and
staffed within the CoR’s premises. Meanwhile, the patterns of leadership display
variation across countries; for instance, while the delegation of Poland had been
chaired by the same member of CoR for a long time at the time of the fieldwork
(Interview 5), for the delegations of Spain and Germany the rotation of leadership
was emphasized as a way of ensuring the fair representation of all autonomous
communities or länder (Interviews 8 and 10).
In addition to these organizational advantages, all interviews from CoR state
political groups as the main pillar of organization. The answers given by the
head of the French delegation to the questions on the place of national delegations
highlight the clear relative importance of political groups:
The national delegation is the defence of the interests of a nation. The
political group means a much more European vision. [...] Therefore,
the political group has a very large importance and it is legitimate,
because it allows to go past the national egoisms to the benefit of a
more European vision. [...] You should not attach too much impor-
tance to national delegations. It is not the decisive element of voting.
What constitutes the decisive element is the membership in this or
that party, and its vision on this or that subject. (Interview 3)16
Although it is admitted in one part of the interview that fundamental interests for
a country will lead to going beyond political cleavages, giving the example of
Common Agricultural Policy for France, the emphasis on the primacy of political
groups is prevalent throughout the conversation. Another noteworthy point is that
the legitimacy of party-based political activities at the European level is framed
in view of the necessity to diminish the divisiveness of nationally based activities.
From a rationalist perspective, this can be explained by the fact that it is easier to
form common positions, hence reach collective decisions, through a small num-
ber of political parties as compared to 28 national delegations. The head of the
German delegation, representing the largest country in the EU, expressed similar
16Author’s translation from the French original.
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opinions and remarks that, as a national delegation, they are a minority in CoR
and cannot pursue an initiative by seeking support from other national delegations
(Interview 10).
In this sense, the central procedures of CoR are institutionalized through po-
litical groups, as explained by a member of staff (Interview 4). The drafting of an
opinion begins with the appointment of a rapporteur, and the fair distribution of
these appointments is ensured through a point-based system including the leader-
ships of political groups. Accordingly, each group has a certain amount of points
for a period, which is determined by the number of seats, and which they can use
to secure a rapporteurship in their prioritized policy areas. They also have wild
cards which can be used for highly prioritized areas. While these wild cards can be
an important advantage for smaller groups and the issues which they particularly
care about, larger groups still prevail in case of conflict. Therefore, the rules and
procedures that are designed along the lines of political groups enable the system
to work by avoiding the complete exclusion of minorities and potential stalemates
at the same time.
Finally, when the Committee and the Congress are compared in terms of the
relative importance of political groups and national delegations, it is difficult to
observe such a stark difference in the case of CLRAE. While the political groups
of the Congress do not benefit from separate secretariats and rely on those of the
Parliamentary Assembly, one advantage vis-à-vis national delegations is the reg-
ular meetings of the group leaders with the Bureau (Interview 2). However, this
has not resulted in a system comparable to the point-based distribution of rappor-
teurships in CoR. Similarly, political groups of CLRAE cannot provide the same
effect of permanence as those of CoR since the coordination between plenary ses-
sions is quite weak. In more general terms, as seen in the above-quoted segment
of Interview 1, the political groups in CLRAE have not reached the same degree
of importance as their counterparts in CoR. On the contrary, national delegations
may sometimes become stronger sources of allegiance, as one interviewee noticed
that the delegates from certain countries tend to follow national directives at the
expense of party positions (Interview 2). The interviewee interprets this type of
attitudes, first, as a result of weak subnational autonomy at home countries, and
second, as a challenge against open-minded debate in the Congress. On this basis,
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the relative strength and weakness of political groups can be seen as a source of
the differences in the institutional capacity between the two organizations.
6.4.3 Impact
In terms of the general institutional architecture of the Council of Europe and the
European Union, the Congress has the prima facie advantage of having an equal
standing with the Parliamentary Assembly with special competences while the
Committee is only an advisory body. But CoR should still be seen as stronger as
it has ‘more money, more activity and effective institutional mechanisms’ (Inter-
view 11). It should also be remarked that the Committee of Ministers is the single
most important body of CoE, and just like the European Parliament is stronger
than the Parliamentary Assembly, CoR is stronger than CLRAE despite its merely
advisory status (Interview 1).
While it is possible to notice a quick adoption of the recommendations of
the Congress in some cases and a gradual evolution towards better subnational
democracy in others (Interview 2), the impact through European legislation that
the Committee may have means the chance of sanctioned implementation which
is qualitatively distinct from mere recommendations (Interview 9). Moreover,
even though the European Charter for Local Self-Government is an international
legal document, enforcement is difficult as it cannot be brought before the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights or any other international court; the best chance of
sanctioning is linked to the approach of domestic supreme courts regarding the
constitutional status of the Charter, which does not have a pan-European pattern
(Interview 2). In this context, CoR can be expected to exert a more significant
impact on politics, and this impact primarily materializes in the form of the input
to the European legislation.
The Committee has been preparing impact reports since 2008, which track the
influence of its opinions through legislative procedures and implementation. An
analysis of the last available report (CoR, 2014) shows that a broad definition of
‘impact’ is used and includes four types: proposals which are taken up in the final
legislation, recommendations which are considered in proposed legislation, con-
tributions to ongoing political debates, and references made to CoR positions. One
important policy tool that CoR uses is follow-up activities for opinions, which is
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seen in these reports as an important part of the strategies to increase the impact.
Among other strategies, the report observes that the relations with the European
Parliament and the European Commission are already very good, and that other
institutions of the EU expect CoR to focus on locally and regionally relevant top-
ics. In this regard, the report also suggests improving relations with the Council
of the EU and delivering the contributions expected by other institutions.
The equivalent of the Committee’s impact reports and follow-up activities for
the Congress are activity reports17. The last published report at the time of writ-
ing (CLRAE, 2016b) similarly emphasizes the strengthening of monitoring and
post-monitoring procedures akin to the follow-up activities of CoR, such as the
roadmap agreements with several governments on decentralization. Another sim-
ilarity with CoR impact reports is the importance attached to rather informal ef-
fects such as knowledge transfer and capacity building at the subnational level.
The most notable difference, however, is the fact that the Congress operates on
the basis of the European Charter of Local Self-Government. For instance, one
of the main challenges identified in the report is the high number of derogations
on the Charter. For this reason, the impact of the Congress largely depends on
the cooperation of each and every national government, and it is highly variable
across countries. Thereby, the same degree of impact cannot be expected from
CLRAE since this depends on the contingency of the cooperation on the part of
national governments, and even when this is achieved, this is at best uneven across
Europe.
Alongside the internal mechanisms of each body, another aspect of overall
effectiveness is the efficiency of the existence of two separate organizations of
multilevel politics. One of the interviewees (Interview 13) attached great impor-
tance to this issue. First, her vision for the future development of institutions is
based on closer cooperation between the EU and the CoE, while she emphasized
that this should not entail any sort of hierarchy. Second, she thought that CLRAE
has an important role to play regarding multilevel politics as much as the CoR.
However, she also drew attention to the fact that this duality increases the risk of
duplication which should be minimized. In fact, the Committee and the Congress
have been coordinating their activities since the establishment of the former. This
17In CLRAE, the reports addressed to the Committee of Ministers are also called activity re-
ports. Here, the focus is on the reports published with the title ‘State of the Congress’.
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cooperation was formalized in 2005 with an agreement between the two organi-
zations, and involves regular meetings of a ’Contact Group’ and a ’High Level
Group’ comprising of presidents and vice-presidents. Given the evident value
of coordination, a relatively low level of effectiveness, which can be attributed to
CLRAE in view of the criteria discussed in this section, does not necessarily mean
a weak institution insofar as this results in a meaningful complementarity between
institutions.
To conclude, with different legal and policy tools at their disposal, both CoR
and CLRAE make the best of their capabilities to exert significant impact on poli-
tics. However, thanks to more frequent and efficient institutional processes, hence
a larger amount of output, CoR is more likely to be more influential overall. Ad-
ditionally, its direct relationship to the European legislation is a significant factor
which facilitates the translation of opinions into practice as compared to the diffi-
culties of negotiating with each national government separately. For these reasons,
the evaluation of the two organizations suggests that CoR has the comparative ad-
vantage of being a more effective institution than CLRAE, although this can be
expected in a constellation of complementarity whereby the latter has other com-
parative advantages, such as normative qualities as discussed in the next section.
6.5 Normative qualities of institutions
The final aspect in which the comparative advantages of institutions will be dis-
cussed is their capacity to generate and develop political norms which contribute
to the rise of multilevel politics. Such contributions can be seen in both organi-
zations. For instance, in the case of the Committee, the aforementioned White
Paper on Multilevel Governance and the more recent Charter for Multilevel Gov-
ernance in Europe aim to diffuse the view that multilevel governance should be the
normal state of affairs. The Congress has a much longer history of international
norm generation as the author of the European Charter of Local Self-government.
It has also broadened the scope of subnational democracy through a draft Euro-
pean Charter of Regional Democracy which has fallen short of being adopted as
a binding text but which has led to a set of principles in the form of the Refer-
ence Framework on Regional Democracy. Although the main focus of CLRAE
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is subnational democracy, it also works on developing similar texts on multilevel
governance which can serve as a stronger legal basis in the future (Interview 11).
On the one hand, CLRAE’s expertise is the source of a comparative advantage
vis-à-vis CoR in the normative aspect of institutionalization. On the other hand,
several factors which make CoR a more effective institution are also those which
pose obstacles against the development of political norms for multilevel relations.
More specifically, its high degree of specialization through six subject-specific
commissions may be the reason for missing more fundamental political debates
on multilevel politics, or its strong focus on technical details in order to impact
European legislation may alienate the members from the content of the texts that
they discuss. In the words of one interviewee:
One of the great problems of [CoR and CLRAE] is the fact that they
are not permanent. The members also have work to do at home, and
during some days they are coming together and they must realize
something. [...] We have plenaries, six in the Committee and two in
the Congress, with some interesting results. We have interesting dis-
cussions, we have the possibility of adopting opinions. There are also
opportunities of networking. But I think, especially in the Committee
(I mean in the Congress it is easier), we are losing too much time with
hundreds and hundreds amendments during hours and hours, and this
is not the best way to use the time that we spend together. We must re-
duce this kind of exercise with better preparation in the commissions.
And we need more time for deep political debate with members, with
commissioners and also other responsible people from the European
sphere. We need classical debate about opinions. We need more time
for political debate, and we also need more time for networking. (In-
terview 1)
In this respect, the larger amount of output and the systematized rules and pro-
cedures that have been discussed as the comparative advantages of CoR come at
the cost of classical political debate. It is apparent from the above statement that
the Congress does not suffer from the problem of over-specialization as much as
CoR. Instead, even though the total amount of time spent for CLRAE meetings
is more limited, this time can be better used for political debates with potentially
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normative effects. For instance, one interviewee describes the main instrument
that the Congress uses as providing ’a safe space for talking’, and thus creating
political debate that might not have been otherwise possible (Interview 13). Fur-
thermore, another interviewee who thinks that the political culture of the Congress
is very important describes its mission as the following:
The mission of the Congress is to offer a meeting place to explore
the possibilities but also the limits of democracy. It is a good place
to give orientation on the big questions that are now in our soci-
ety. The Congress is really a place for discussion with open mind,
without the risk of being sanctioned. For me it is important that we
have this larger European context, this kind of forum, to meet each
other, to have this discussion, with a positive attitude to find a way
[to reach] a consensus, to promote democratic initiatives, to give sup-
port to democracy, and also to pick up important questions which we
have—not only institutionally, but also in other areas. For instance,
what you have in democracy, in cultural area, diversity in society and
other questions. (Interview 9)
The concerns about over-specialization have interesting implications, which
can be extended to reconsider some fundamental issues of political theory, such as
Max Weber’s (1946) distinction between professional politicians and the bureau-
cracy. These observations suggest that the members of CoR resemble more and
more technical specialists. Yet this does not mean that the subnational actors are
moving to positions which live off politics rather than for politics; instead, taking
up responsibilities in the Committee is hardly motivated by individual material
gain, hence it requires dedication to certain political goals. On the other hand,
the legitimation that CoR serves also leads to a reconsideration of Weberian ideal
types (ibid.). The inclusion of subnational actors in European processes is deemed
necessary since the proximity to the citizens, the special knowledge of local and
regional politics, and the experience of implementation enable them to provide a
valuable input to policy decisions, hence rational-bureaucratic legitimation. But
the same logic can also be used as an inherently democratic legitimation18 to in-
18Although democratic legitimation is not among the ideal types that Weber identifies, one
interesting implication is concerned with the intertwinement of descriptive and normative accounts
of legitimacy.
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clude those actors who are directly affected by decisions taken at the European
level.
In this sense, the CoR in particular and probably European institutions in gen-
eral constitute a situation in which the lines between political and bureaucratic
processes, and between rationalistic and democratic forms of legitimation are
blurred. The following excerpt from an interview highlights this mixed type of
legitimation for CoR:
European level understands more and more that if you want to make
solutions, if you want to give answers to challenges, and if you want
to make improvements for European citizens, local and regional level
can give input of what is really going on and what people really needs,
and also give input on the way you could execute their policies, be-
cause more than 50% of the implementation of European measures
and policies in different sectors are done by the local and regional
levels. So if you want to be successful, make sure that we can do
it, make sure that it is effective in our reach. Therefore it is neces-
sary that local and regional level gets a good position in this policy
making process, in the law making process, so to put us ahead in the
process of policy making, in the expert groups, in drafting; [we need]
to give our expertise, to give the European level more comfort that
their policy will be worked out. [...] So it is about giving us a better
position in this governance, it is about giving us a better position in
policy making and policy execution, it is about giving us more skills,
opportunities to work on this level, and of course it is about the effec-
tiveness of measures, maybe some money too. (Interview 6)
The legitimacy of the Committee, therefore, is derived from not only channelling
the real needs of people into the European level, but also from being successful
and effective, and making use of subnational expertise. In the approach embedded
in the above statement, it is not possible to categorically distinguish these types of
legitimation.
Another implication concerns the dual function of CoR, being both an advi-
sory body and a representative assembly as discussed in Chapter 1, for which the
mixed legitimacy is arguably the most accurate approach. However, the inter-
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esting point is that its evolution is moving in a direction opposite to the initial
expectations of academics who evaluated the establishment of the Committee.
Among the early assessments of CoR, pessimistic accounts dismissed the possi-
bility of real impact from an advisory body, while optimistic accounts drew atten-
tion to the potential of an assembly consisting of actual politicians. Both camps
are challenged by the present observations. To the extent that the concerns re-
garding over-specialization are valid, CoR in fact evolved into an influential and
stronger institutional position, but at the cost of certain political qualities. While
it could not be realistically expected to become a third chamber of the EU, its
self-strengthening through specialized competences rather than political leverage
was even more unexpected.
To conclude, just like the Council of Europe is the main organization cham-
pioning fundamental European political values such as the rule of law, human
rights and democracy, CLRAE performs its function as a body of CoE and adds
local and regional self-government to this list. Therefore, in comparison with CoR
which has visibly more effective institutional features, CLRAE has the distinctive
advantage of being an institution which develops and diffuses norms and values
accustoming subnational actors to, above all, democratic local and regional self-
government, and by that virtue, to multilevel politics.
6.6 Complementary institutions of
multilevel politics
In this chapter, the re-evaluation of the survey data with respect to membership
in different organizations has shown that no significant quantitative difference is
observed in either the dependent variable or the independent variables. In this
sense, the findings of the comparative case study of CoR and CLRAE has been
presented in terms of their overarching similarities and comparative advantages.
Namely, the Committee and the Congress display the common feature of provid-
ing supranational fora for subnational actors, which has been found as extremely
valuable by the members of both organizations and which is arguably the fun-
damental aspect of the institutionalization of multilevel politics. Furthermore,
one area of comparative advantage is the prioritized levels of governance; while
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the Committee is primarily interested in consolidating the European level as a
legitimate sphere of action for subnational actors, the Congress aims to further
the intrinsic competences of local and regional authorities by championing de-
centralization. The second area of comparative advantages is concerned with the
pragmatic and normative capacities of institutions; CoR draws on effective insti-
tutional arrangements through more permanent, efficient and influential mecha-
nisms, but it is difficult to sustain norm-generating qualities at the same time as
these processes. Meanwhile, CLRAE, with its focus on drafting texts which set
international precedents, contributes to the diffusion of European political norms
and values which parallel the broader vision of the CoE.
Although this comparative case study is designed within the same theoretical
framework as the quantitative part of the empirical research, the findings from
the quantitative and qualitative parts do not exactly match. More precisely, the
comparative advantages regarding institutional characteristics are not reflected in
the survey data which yield similar results in the corresponding variables. One
possible explanation for this mismatch could be the imperfections related to the
quantitative data. However, assuming that the sample is accurately representative
and sufficient, another explanation is possible. An actor’s views on the compe-
tences of the authorities at various levels of governance, his/her assessment of the
effectiveness of institutions, and various forms of political identification are not
necessarily the direct result of the corresponding institutional characteristics of
the organization of which the actor is a member. Instead, these should be under-
stood as relevant expectations of actors from institutions, the satisfaction of which
complements the institutionalization of multilevel politics. In this respect, even if
any organization does not satisfy all of these expectations, a roughly equivalent
distribution of comparative advantages, as argued in this chapter, encourages more
favourable views on multilevel politics as compared to the absence of institutional
effects, and results in similar degrees of favourable attitudes across cases.
Nonetheless, this does not mean that the findings from quantitative and qual-
itative parts of the research are disconnected. If these institutional characteristics
affect actors in a way that leads to favourable views on multilevel politics, this
effect should be captured, at least implicitly, by the variable of institutional in-
fluence. More explicitly, the measurement of the variable included two ways of
assessing the institutions from the perspective of the member: professional sat-
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isfaction and personal importance. In this respect, the variable of institutional
influence contains information on the degree to which institutions meet actor ex-
pectations in two ways. A two-layered new-institutionalist explanation can be
constructed on this basis. First, when individual-level attitudes on power dis-
tribution, the effectiveness and the material benefits of institutions, and political
identification are controlled for, the influence of transnational institutions is a sig-
nificant factor which enhances positive views on multilevel politics. Second, this
very influence is shaped by institutional-level factors in the form of specific char-
acteristics of organizations regarding power distribution, effectiveness and norm
diffusion, which meet the expectations emanating from individual-level attitudes.
Irrespectively of the cross-level links between the analysed variables and in-
stitutional characteristics, the clearest conclusion that can be drawn from the com-
parative case study is the complementarity of the two organizations. In this sense,
the Committee and the Congress perform essential but separate tasks that con-
tribute to the consolidation of multilevel politics. This does not necessarily imply
that they should not try to improve on the institutional characteristics that have
been discussed above as comparative advantages. CoR may decide to place more
emphasis on the strengthening of subnational authorities while CLRAE may rec-
ognize more explicitly supranational integration as a facilitator of decentraliza-
tion; or CoR may be reformed to allow more time to be spared for normative
political debate among its members, while CLRAE may intensify its work and
develop more effective mechanisms for its internal processes. Nonetheless, an
optimum institutionalization of multilevel politics would require an equilibrium
whereby duplicates and rivalry are avoided across institutions. The awareness
about the distinctiveness of the two organizations, which was apparent in all the
interviews, the history of coordination and cooperation between them, and the vis-
ible willingness to sustain these arrangements indicate that the future institutional
developments are unlikely to disturb such an equilibrium.

Conclusion
This thesis has offered a comprehensive institutional explanation for the possibil-
ity of transformation towards a multilevel political system. Beginning with the
premise that the world political order is undergoing certain fundamental changes,
which can be conceptualized as glocalization, cosmopolitan response to undemo-
cratic effects of globalization, territorial rescaling or global governance, this study
has set out the task of examining whether the conditions of such a transformation
are being met. The review of the academic literature on related topics, discussed in
Chapter 1, specifies the analytical focus of this thesis. As the theories of European
integration envisage a certain degree of autonomous leverage for supranational in-
stitutions, a transformation towards multilevel politics should be expected from its
institutionalization. In this respect, it is not a coincidence that a considerable part
of the studies which take the European Union as an autonomous political entity
depict it as one of multilevel governance.
Multilevel governance, or multilevel relations in general, render domestic and
international spheres interlinked with manifestations in both. Institutional devel-
opments at the European level supply channels of multilevel relations while com-
mon trends in domestic institutional development lead to increased demand for
these channels. As the common trends operate against the background of per-
sisting variation, existing studies on multilevel governance mostly chose to em-
phasize the fuzziness of emerging practices, such as their diversity, complexity,
spontaneity, etc. With an interest in institutionalization, the present study has
instead chosen to focus on the institutions that embody the direct links between
supranational and subnational levels, and proposed the Committee of the Regions
and the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities as the crucial cases, as they
minimize the interference from the national level. In contrast, the institutionally-
focused studies of multilevel governance were at best concerned with explaining
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institutional change itself, without explicit attention to the effects of emerging in-
stitutions. For this reason, the interactions between institutions and actors, and
especially the influence of institutions on actors, have been put forward as a criti-
cal but relatively understudied feature of institutionalization, hence the analytical
focus has been defined as the involvement of subnational actors in European in-
stitutions.
Chapter 2 proposes new institutionalism as a broad framework which provides
a coherent theory of institutions, in terms of their origins, evolution and effects as
interconnected aspects of institutionalization. The conformity of the institutions
of multilevel politics to the theoretical premises of new institutionalism, as well
as their embeddedness in the European institutional architecture, testify to the
institutionalization of multilevel politics. Drawing on historical, rationalist and
sociological variants of new institutionalism, it has been hypothesized that free
standing influence of institutions, as well as attitudes favouring power redistribu-
tion across levels of government, material incentives of institutionalized political
activity, and relevant political identities are aligned with attitudes favourably dis-
posed to multilevel politics in general.
The empirical evidence needed to test these two sets of hypotheses call for
observations of individual attitudes and institutional features, hence two levels of
analysis, which shape the overall research design as one of mixed-method. With
the motivation to observe variation at both levels, the research project has been
divided into a Europe-wide survey involving subnational actors with varying de-
grees of relationship with European institutions, and a comparative case study of
the Committee of the Regions (CoR) and the Congress of Local and Regional Au-
thorities (CLRAE). The data collected through the survey provide a sufficient rep-
resentation of European subnational political actors, reveal generally favourable
attitudes towards multilevel politics as well as other posited factors, and confirm
the hypothesized individual-level explanations when considered separately.
The empirical test of the overall argument at the individual level of analysis
has been conducted through the multivariate statistical model discussed in Chap-
ter 5. Considerations of goodness of fit statistics, conformity with methodological
assumptions and sufficient control for country-level variation result in a model
that includes all posited variables. In other words, according to the best model
to explain the dependent variable and given the available data, all hypothesized
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variables are relevant. Further examination of each variable also suggests that the
survey data provide statistically significant evidence to confirm the majority of
hypotheses, while sociological explanations are less convincing than political and
rationalist accounts. Overall, drawing on the theoretical background and the col-
lected data, it is argued that the direct influence of institutions over actors, as well
as individual attitudes shaped according to the presumed functions of institutions
are strongly linked to favourable views on multilevel politics.
Finally, the comparative analysis of the institutional characteristics of the Com-
mittee and the Congress has indicated a complementarity between them. First, a
reassessment of the survey data with regard to these cases reveals no difference in
quantitative terms, and this finding can be linked to the fact that both organizations
serve the primary function of providing supranational fora for subnational actors
as a fundamental feature of multilevel politics. Second, in view of the redistri-
bution of competences, CoR focuses more on European integration and CLRAE
on decentralization. Third, CoR clearly displays higher degrees of institutional
effectiveness while CLRAE is stronger on the normative aspects of institution-
alization. Given that these relative areas of strength and comparative advantage
are not reflected in the quantitative measurement of corresponding variables for
their respective members, the differences between the two organizations do not
necessarily generate different expectations. Instead, they are better understood as
responding to separate areas of expectations, but exerting similar degrees of direct
influence.
In sum, multilevel politics can be said to be institutionalized through CoR and
CLRAE alongside other formal and informal institutions, as actor-institution inter-
actions align with individual attitudes and institutional characteristics favourable
towards multilevel politics. Actors who are more under the influence of Euro-
pean institutions have more positive views on multilevel politics, and the func-
tioning of CoR and CLRAE ensures the participation of subnational actors into
supranational-level institutionalized political processes. Actors who favour Eu-
ropean integration also favour multilevel politics, and CoR works for a stronger
European level, while actors who favour decentralized domestic structures also
favour multilevel politics, and the Congress works for stronger subnational au-
thorities. Actors who find institutionalized activities more effective and want to
access European resources have more positive views on multilevel politics, and
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CoR offers a relatively high probability of making a real impact on the European
legislation. Actors whose political identification challenges traditional norms of
national primacy have more favourable views towards multilevel politics, and the
Congress champions local and regional self-government as European values.
In this context, this thesis offers several broad findings on the institutionaliza-
tion of multilevel politics, on the basis of an existing academic interest in multi-
level relations, new-institutionalist theory, a multi-method approach, and a focus
on two specific organizations. The conclusions that are offered here can inform fu-
ture research and policy in terms of these constituent aspects of the thesis. For this
purpose, the final paragraphs below will discuss the implications and limitations
of this study for the concept of multilevel governance/politics, new-institutionalist
theory, methodology, and policy.
Conceptual implications This thesis has discussed the concept of multilevel
politics, defined as a system characterized by a web of horizontal and vertical re-
lations within and across levels of decision making without the presumed primacy
of any level. This conceptualization has in fact resulted from approaching the lit-
erature on multilevel governance from a novel perspective. Namely, the departure
from the typical approaches to multilevel governance has been marked by two
main motivations: first, not limiting the scope to the EU governance and extend-
ing it to other multilevel political activities, and second, prioritizing the search for
common institutional patterns which will be better indicators of political-systemic
change, as opposed to the tendency to emphasize the diversity, high complexity or
unpredictability of the institutional forms of multilevel governance, or the com-
plete lack thereof.
It should be noted that this choice of analytical interest is not meant to deny
the general tendencies of the literature on multilevel governance, and this literature
constitutes the main area to which this thesis is meant to offer new insights. It is
obvious that multilevel governance within the contours of the EU constitutes the
most pervasive form of multilevel relations in Europe, and, indeed, that it operates
against the background of high institutional complexity and diversity. For this
reason, the aim of this thesis is not to claim that the entire literature should be
overhauled with the approach defended here, but instead to contribute such an
approach to the literature as a previously overlooked aspect of multilevel political
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relations. In this sense, the positive findings of the empirical research can also
be taken as a confirmatory conclusion that the overall approach of this thesis has
been worth the endeavour.
Regarding the conceptualization of multilevel politics as broadening multi-
level governance, the following points can be noted: when the survey data are
examined across institutions, no significant difference is observed in the institu-
tional effects of the Committee and the Congress, or even other organizations;
such a non-difference is explained by the case study with respect to overall com-
monalities as well as several aspects of complementarity; since this complemen-
tarity results from different institutional features of each organization, it is difficult
to classify one as more important than the other. Regarding the institutional neat-
ness versus fuzziness, the primary finding about a generic institutional influence
is quite strong. This is especially true when this European-level institutional influ-
ence is compared to the state-level: cross-country variation constitutes a notice-
able part of the overall variation explained by the statistical model, but it cannot
rival or undermine the significance of the institutional variable. Moreover, further
examinations failed to associate the cross-country variation to relevant national
characteristics, suggesting that the influence of European-level institutions is not
conditioned on certain domestic structures.
In view of the implications of conceptualizing multilevel politics, this thesis
can offer new insights to the literature on multilevel governance and inform future
research in the area, with respect to the two axes of how this conceptualization
sought to modify multilevel governance: paying attention to the developments
beyond the EU, while acknowledging that EU governance is probably the most
significant aspect; and paying attention to common institutional patterns, while
acknowledging that multilevel relations are necessarily characterized by diversity
and complexity. Yet these conclusions are reached by focusing exclusively on the
neat side of institutionalization; therefore, this study is not enough to extend these
conclusions to how neatness weighs against the fuzziness of the institutionaliza-
tion of multilevel politics. Moreover, data limitations, such as the small sizes of
national sub-samples, also made it difficult to test country-level factors more rig-
orously. In this sense, possible improvements in the data quality would be one
of the most useful steps forward regarding the question of common patterns of
change and persisting variation in the background.
228 Conclusion
Implications for new institutionalism In addition to the academic literature
on multilevel governance, this thesis is also capable of offering contributions
to new institutionalism which laid the foundation of its theoretical framework.
This framework is primarily characterized by an eclectic approach bringing to-
gether the three strands of new institutionalism with respect to their commonalities
and complementarities. To begin with the commonalities, new institutionalism is
based on the premise that institutions matter as they originate, evolve and affect
actors. While it is taken as almost self-evident for the theory itself, this premise
can be seen as relying entirely on counterfactuals from a critical perspective. Be-
tween these two extremes, one central theoretical contribution of this thesis is
making ‘institutions matter’ an empirically testable claim. The positive findings
from the empirical research should be interpreted in favour of new institutional-
ism, and its relevance for explaining political phenomena. Furthermore, since the
primary independent variable of institutional influence is operationalized in a way
that can be relevant for all strands, the same findings can also suggest the useful-
ness of an eclectic approach, when the analytical interest is in a generic category
of institutions.
As for complementarities, more specific variables are derived from the three
strands of new institutionalism, but their relative explanatory power in statisti-
cal analyses differ visibly. As discussed in the interpretation of the multivariate
model, the most significant results are obtained from the variables on the distri-
bution of competences across levels of governance, hence attributed to historical
institutionalism. These are followed by the variables on material incentives and
the effectiveness of institutional channels, hence rational choice. Meanwhile, the
only failed hypotheses are related to certain types of political identification, de-
rived from sociological approaches. In this respect, the overall usefulness of an
eclectic approach is not necessarily translated into the individual strength of each
component of the theory. Therefore, empirical research provides the strongest
feedback to historical institutionalism, which is the most adept for explaining po-
litical questions, and the weakest feedback to sociological institutionalism.
Nonetheless, it should be remarked that the eclectic framework and the accom-
panying research design have come at the cost of departing from the distinctive
features of each strand of new institutionalism. These are aligned together with
the help of an attitudinal research design. With regard to historical and rational
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choice institutionalisms, it meant empirical tests on the views on the distribution
of competences and the effectiveness institutional mechanisms, rather than actual
distribution and effectiveness. The departure is especially stark with regard to
sociological institutionalism, since binary measurement of political identification
can be seen as an oversimplification. In this sense, the relatively weaker results
on sociological variables should not be interpreted as negative feedback on the
unsimplified version of sociological institutionalism. In other words, the relative
explanatory power of each component of the eclectic framework may not directly
translate into the relevance of original new-institutionalist perspectives for multi-
level politics.
While quantitative analyses can be used to assess the relative explanatory
power of each strand of new institutionalism, qualitative analyses testify to their
more equivalent complementarity. For instance, effectiveness comes to the fore
in one case, but normative qualities come to the fore in the other. On one hand,
different theoretical perspectives shed light on the complementarity of CoR and
CLRAE; on the other hand, the co-existence of CoR and CLRAE shed light on
the analytical complementarity of the three strands of new institutionalism. Fur-
thermore, the specific value of a historical perspective and its capacity to provide
a common ground for rational and cultural accounts can be established by linking
this complementarity back to institutional origins and evolution. More specif-
ically, the European and material orientations of CoR, and the subnational and
normative orientations of CLRAE can be attributed to their origins and evolution,
as well as those of the EU and the CoE.
In view of these contributions and limitations, this thesis can inform future in-
stitutionalist studies of multilevel politics in the following ways. Above all, due to
the general concern with testing institutional effects here and the ensuing simplifi-
cation, the distinctive features of the different types of new institutionalism can be
reintroduced, with a higher confidence in the relevance of institutions that oper-
ate at European level. To improve the historical-institutionalist explanations, case
studies can be helpful for understanding the actual power-distributional effects
of the institutions of multilevel politics on subnational actors. To improve ratio-
nalist explanations, game-theoretical analyses of institutional mechanisms can be
helpful for a more detailed account of the effectiveness that the institutions of
multilevel politics can entail. To improve sociological explanations, the focus can
230 Conclusion
be shifted onto the socialization and legitimacy effects of institutions on actors,
by designing qualitative interviews to ask questions about the actors themselves
rather than the institutions, and possibly using other qualitative data collection
methods such as ethnography.
Methodological implications While this thesis cannot be seen as a contribution
to the methodology of political science as such, its multi-method research design,
and in particular the quantitative component of this design can prove useful for the
study of European politics. For political issues that are European in scope, quanti-
tative data offer an expedient way of summarizing and analysing vast and diverse
information through comprehensive models. However, analysing the behaviour of
such a large group of political actors is often difficult due to the unavailability of
quantitative data. For this reason, an important part of the research process was
dedicated to survey design and implementation, and data preparation. Thanks to
the widespread use of the internet, it has been possible to collect a reasonably
representative dataset in a limited time and with limited resources. The fact that
this dataset has been used successfully to test a series of hypotheses suggests that
data collected from targeted groups of political actors could be a useful way of
analysing questions concerning a large population.
Nonetheless, the representativeness of the sample is limited in several ways as
discussed in the relevant chapters. The data and the analysis could be improved
with a dataset containing more responses from each country and from more coun-
tries. This was primarily an obstacle against multilevel modelling which has been
substituted by more rudimentary ways of controlling for country-level variance.
Given that much of the argument has been developed with respect to the challenge
posed to the primacy of the national level of government, the most imminent im-
provement to the statistical model would be a more exact measurement of the
share of the variance explained by country-level factors. Furthermore, limitations
of data may also have resulted in some inadequacies of the statistical tests, which
are more likely to be Type II errors. In that sense, the low degree of confidence in
the significance of sociological variables, as well as the conclusions drawn from
the apparent lack of difference between CoR and CLRAE should be open to rein-
terpretation in case better-quality data yield different results.
Conclusion 231
More generally, the multi-method design offers valuable insights for questions
which cannot be addressed solely through quantitative data and methods. This is
especially true when institutional characteristics are an important part of the anal-
ysis, which means a small number of data points carrying in-depth information
rather than a large number of data points carrying information simplified through
quantification. In line with the implications discussed for new institutionalism,
utilizing the relative merits of different methods and approaches will enrich the
literature on multilevel politics.
Political implications Finally, the political implications of the findings of this
research have to be discussed with caution. Conceptualizing multilevel politics
as a systemic feature of European politics, and explaining its institutionalization
through a theoretical framework which includes possible feedbacks to the political
structure magnifies its importance to a certain extent. Furthermore, the use of data
representing a large population and quantitative methods magnifies the confidence
in the inferential strength of the analysis. Nonetheless, arguing that institutional-
ization drives a transformation towards multilevel politics is not meant to argue
that European politics has become a multilevel system to completely replace old
forms of politics, nor to predict that it will definitely become so in the foreseeable
future. What this thesis has ultimately shown is that multilevel political practices
have become an integral part of European politics, and this is an outcome difficult
to reverse, as it has happened through institutionalization which entails entrench-
ment in the political system.
It may be true that the nation state has become too small for the big problems
of life, and too big for the small problems of life, as noted in the opening statement
of this thesis, and that world politics is moving towards a system which erodes the
primacy of the nation state and links all levels of governance. This thesis has def-
initely found signs in that direction, and what these signs can suggest so far is a
coexistence of old and new forms of governance and politics. This thesis has also
found that such a transformation happens through institutionalization, and in re-
turn, institutionalization works through individual agency. Therefore, the primary
political implication concerns the institutions examined here and subnational po-
litical actors across Europe.
232 Conclusion
Institutions of multilevel politics, particularly CoR and CLRAE, have already
entrenched their status in European politics, and can be expected to continue to
display self-asserting properties. However, institutional evolution follows the best
use of available power and resources at the disposal of institutional actors. Given
that these institutions begin with limited powers and resources, their prospects of
assuming a central place of European politics are unlikely to happen in the fore-
seeable future. The first implication, therefore, is that sound strategies must take
into account existing institutional capacities. Second, the comparative findings on
the complementarity or comparative advantages of CoR and CLRAE suggest the
adequacy of the cooperation and partnership between these organizations, which
already has a long history. Within the complex web of multilevel political rela-
tions, institutional diversity is only natural and should be endorsed by actors. This
idea does not have to be limited to CoR and CLRAE, and can be extended to
smaller institutions of multilevel politics as well. Therefore, an additional layer of
multilevel politics can be characterized by inter-institutional relations.
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Appendix A
Survey
This appendix presents the relevant information with regard to the design and the
management of the survey, as discussed in the main chapters of the thesis. The
contents can be described as the following:
Pilot study This section includes the regression output of two major
models as anticipated in the pre-test stage of the survey re-
search, which have been run on data collected from a sepa-
rate sample.
Sampling This section includes subsections on three major stages of
sampling procedures:
Sampling frame This subsection presents the figures re-
lated to the selection of clusters, the drawing of the
sampling frame, and the eventual response rates.
Response rate This subsection presents figures related to
possible factors which may influence response rates.
It also describes the calculation of obtained numbers,
and analyses the relationships among these factors.
Weights This subsection presents the calculation of weights
in the full sample and according to the adjusted sam-
ple size, based on the representation of countries in the
sample and their populations.
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Response collection This section includes subsections on major aspects of sur-
vey management:
Call for participation This subsection presents the temp-
late of the e-mail invitation sent to potential respon-
dents, that is, everyone included in the sampling frame.
Questionnaire This subsection includes the printed format
of the questionnaire, covering 20 pages. Although the
response collection was completely conducted online,
the printed version is selected here to illustrate the
questionnaire more accurately.
Screenshots This subsection includes two screenshots from
two sample questions from the web-based question-
naire, one in English and one in French.
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A.1 Pilot study
Table A.1: Full models from pliot study
DV: Views on MLP
Model I Model II
Influence of transnational institutions 1.099 ∗∗ 2.689 ∗
Views on the power of European institutions 0.133 0.125
Views on the power of SNAs 0.302 ∗∗∗ 0.266 ∗∗
Considering European funds as important 1.030 5.000
Views on the usefulness of IOs 0.383 ∗∗∗ 0.519
Considering IOs as effective 1.593 2.193
Considering direct channels as effective 1.047
Considering national channels as effective -0.046
Self-identification as a European politician 3.494 ∗∗∗ 0.213
Self-identification as a National politician -1.001
Self-identification as a Local politician -2.770
Influence of TNOs × European funds -1.808
Influence of TNOs × usefulness -0.036
Influence of TNOs × effective IOs -0.046
Influence of TNOs × European identity 1.137
Age (squared) 0.000 0.000
Gender: male 0.701 0.341
Education: higher 1.507 1.629
Ideological position (1-9 left-right scale) -0.224 -0.228
Country: UK v. Ireland -0.184 0.133
Constant 7.989 ∗ 1.653
Observations 123 123
Adjusted R2 0.519 0.513
Residual Std. Error 4.438 4.465
F Statistic 9.213 ∗∗∗ 9.019 ∗∗∗(df=16; 106) (df=16; 106)
Note: ∗∗∗p < 0.001 < ∗∗p < 0.01 < ∗p < 0.05
256 Appendix A. Survey
A.2 Sampling
A.2.1 The sampling frame and the sample
Table A.2: Figures on clustering, sampling frame and responses
Country Clusternumber guide
Targeted
number of
clusters
Clusters with
available
contact
Contacts
through
clusters
Contacts
through
TNOs
Total contact Adjusted totalcontact*
Full
responses Response rate
Albania 5 10 0 0 8 8 7 2 28.57%
Andorra 1 1 0 0 4 4 4 0 0.00%
Armenia 5 7 0 0 8 8 7 0 0.00%
Austria 10 11 11 511 53 564 523 18 3.44%
Azerbaijan 5 6 0 0 12 12 11 1 9.09%
Belgium 10 16 16 661 41 702 651 45 6.91%
Bosnia 5 10 0 0 10 10 9 2 22.22%
Bulgaria 10 13 9 196 38 234 217 2 0.92%
Croatia 10 12 11 194 41 235 218 15 6.88%
Cyprus 5 4 1 19 18 37 34 1 2.94%
Czech R. 10 10 10 546 36 582 540 10 1.85%
Denmark 10 10 10 395 35 430 399 21 5.26%
Estonia 5 6 6 136 25 161 149 10 6.71%
Finland 10 16 11 571 48 619 574 13 2.26%
France 20 31 8 771 94 865 802 40 4.99%
Georgia 5 2 0 0 8 8 7 1 14.29%
Germany 20 21 19 1746 122 1868 1732 92 5.31%
Greece 10 19 6 62 39 101 94 5 5.32%
Hungary 10 12 6 114 38 152 141 0 0.00%
Iceland 1 1 1 15 7 22 20 3 15.00%
Ireland 10 10 10 380 25 405 376 27 7.18%
Italy 20 26 26 1131 99 1230 1141 47 4.12%
Latvia 5 9 4 66 25 91 84 1 1.19%
Liechtenstein 1 1 1 13 4 17 16 0 0.00%
Lithuania 5 6 6 212 27 239 222 7 3.15%
Luxembourg 1 1 1 28 17 45 42 3 7.14%
Macedonia 5 2 0 0 16 16 15 0 0.00%
Malta 1 1 1 1 17 18 17 3 17.65%
Moldova 5 9 1 33 0 33 31 0 0.00%
Monaco 1 1 0 0 4 4 4 0 0.00%
Montenegro 5 6 0 0 6 6 6 0 0.00%
Netherlands 15 15 15 808 43 851 789 40 5.07%
Norway 10 21 20 940 20 960 890 44 4.94%
Poland 20 19 10 443 77 520 482 4 0.83%
Portugal 10 12 3 31 42 73 68 7 10.29%
Romania 15 18 4 132 53 185 172 2 1.16%
Russia 20 26 12 564 38 602 558 4 0.72%
San Marino 1 1 0 0 4 4 4 0 0.00%
Serbia 5 7 0 0 12 12 11 1 9.09%
Slovakia 10 10 9 449 28 477 442 12 2.71%
Slovenia 5 5 2 52 17 69 64 4 6.25%
Spain 20 21 9 631 94 725 672 25 3.72%
Sweden 10 15 11 888 42 930 862 43 4.99%
Switzerland 10 17 16 1682 13 1695 1562 150 9.60%
Turkey 20 23 0 0 21 21 19 0 0.00%
Ukraine 20 25 0 0 23 23 21 1 4.76%
United Kingdom 20 33 31 2311 95 2406 2231 96 4.30%
Total 437 558 317 16732 1547 18279 16940 802 4.73%
Note: * Final number of total contacts is calculated by multiplying the raw number of total contacts with 0.9274 and rounding off the product. This
adjustment is needed to reflect the elimination of duplicates and undelivered invitations.
A.2. Sampling 257
A.2.2 Response rate
Table A.3: Possible factors influencing response rate
Country Response rate
Contacts from
TNO/cluster
Rate of
contactability
Availability of
official languages
Availability of
known languages
Albania 0.29 9.00 0.00 0 0.65
Andorra 0.00 5.00 0.00 1 1.00
Armenia 0.00 9.00 0.00 0 0.85
Austria 0.03 0.11 1.00 1 1.00
Azerbaijan 0.09 13.00 0.00 0 0.35
Belgium 0.07 0.06 1.00 1 1.00
Bosnia 0.22 11.00 0.00 0 0.45
Bulgaria 0.01 0.20 0.69 0 0.25
Croatia 0.07 0.22 0.92 0 0.49
Cyprus 0.03 0.95 0.25 0 0.73
Czech Republic 0.02 0.07 1.00 0 0.27
Denmark 0.05 0.09 1.00 0 0.86
Estonia 0.07 0.19 1.00 0 0.56
Finland 0.02 0.09 0.69 0 0.70
France 0.05 0.12 0.26 1 1.00
Georgia 0.14 9.00 0.00 0 0.70
Germany 0.05 0.07 0.90 1 1.00
Greece 0.05 0.63 0.32 0 0.51
Hungary 0.00 0.34 0.50 0 0.20
Iceland 0.15 0.50 1.00 0 0.90
Ireland 0.07 0.07 1.00 1 1.00
Italy 0.04 0.09 1.00 1 1.00
Latvia 0.01 0.39 0.44 0 0.67
Liechtenstein 0.00 0.36 1.00 1 1.00
Lithuania 0.03 0.13 1.00 0 0.80
Luxembourg 0.07 0.62 1.00 1 1.00
Macedonia 0.00 17.00 0.00 0 0.50
Malta 0.18 9.00 1.00 1 0.89
Moldova 0.00 0.03 0.11 0 0.50
Monaco 0.00 5.00 0.00 1 1.00
Montenegro 0.00 7.00 0.00 0 0.50
Netherlands 0.05 0.05 1.00 0 0.90
Norway 0.05 0.02 0.95 0 0.90
Poland 0.01 0.18 0.53 0 0.34
Portugal 0.10 1.34 0.25 0 0.27
Romania 0.01 0.41 0.22 0 0.31
Russia 0.01 0.07 0.46 1 1.00
San Marino 0.00 5.00 0.00 1 1.00
Serbia 0.09 13.00 0.00 0 0.45
Slovakia 0.03 0.06 0.90 0 0.26
Slovenia 0.06 0.34 0.40 0 0.59
Spain 0.04 0.15 0.43 1 1.00
Sweden 0.05 0.05 0.73 0 0.86
Switzerland 0.10 0.01 0.94 1 1.00
Turkey 0.00 22.00 0.00 0 0.17
Ukraine 0.05 24.00 0.00 0 0.83
United Kingdom 0.04 0.04 0.94 1 1.00
Mean 0.05 3.53 0.53 34% 0.71
Std. Dev. 0.06 6.03 0.42 N/A 0.28
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Values in Table A.3 are obtained by the following methods:
Response rate The ratio of the number of full responses over adjusted total
number of contacts
Contacts from TNO/Cluster The ratio of the number of contacts from transnational organi-
zations over those from subnational clusters
Rate of contactability The ratio of the number of contacted clusters over targeted num-
ber of clusters
Availability of official languages Whether or not the questionnaire is available in at least one of-
ficial language of the country
Availability of known languages The percentage of people competent in the most widely spoken
second language in each country; relying on cross-national sur-
veys where available or national estimations; assuming 100%
for the countries with one official language available
Table A.4: Correlations among possible sources of response rate
Response rate TNO/Cluster Contactability
Language
availability
Response rate 1.00
TNO/Cluster 0.18 1.00
Contactability 0.02 -0.64 *** 1.00
Language availability 0.03 -0.24 0.32 * 1.00
Official language (mean
difference) -0.01 -2.92 0.23 ·
Note: ∗∗∗p < 0.001 < ∗∗p < 0.01 < ∗p < 0.05 < · p < 0.1
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A.2.3 Weights
Table A.5: Calculation of weights
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A.3 Response collection
A.3.1 Call for participation
E-mail template for the invitation sent to potential participants:
Subject line Research on local and regional politics
Mail body Dear (Title) (Name),
I am writing to invite you to participate in a survey for my research on local and
regional authorities. Different language options are available: (list of languages with
original names).
I am a Ph.D. candidate in the University of Cambridge, conducting research on the
role of local and regional authorities in European institutions. An essential input for
my research is politicians’ views on related political issues, and contributions from
(Locality/Delegation), (Country/Organizations) will be extremely valuable.
If you a have a few minutes to spare of your time, I would like to ask you to answer
some questions via the following link:
(URL link to the questionnaire)
The questionnaire is hosted on a special and secure website, it takes approximately 10
minutes, and the answers are completely anonymous. You can find more information
about the research and confidentiality on the first page of the questionnaire.
If you have any queries, please do not hesitate to contact me on (e-mail address), or
by simply replying to this message. Many thanks.
Best regards
(Signature)
(Institutional affiliation)
(Contact information)
 
 
 
 
Survey on the Role of  
Local and Regional Actors in European Politics 
About the questionnaire 
This questionnaire is intended to be used for the doctoral research project conducted by 
Rusen Yasar (Ph.D. Candidate at the University of Cambridge, Department of Politics and 
International Studies and King's College, contact: {e-mail address}). The project explores the 
place of local and regional authorities in European politics and the functioning of 
international organizations in which they participate. 
Your participation will be very much appreciated and will contribute to the better 
understanding of local and regional dimensions of European and domestic politics which are 
usually overlooked. 
Completing the questionnaire will take approximately 10 minutes. There will be four types of 
questions: on your local or regional unit, on your views on several political issues, on your 
international experience, and on some personal information. The answers are completely 
anonymous, the only information which will be associated with the questionnaire is the date 
and time of submission. 
You can answer by putting an "X" or any mark into the relevant boxes and by typing where 
required. In case you do not want to respond to any of the questions, you can choose the 
"refuse to reply" option, or simply leave the question blank. 
You can start with the section 1 on page 2, after the confidentiality notice. Thank you for 
your time! 
Confidentiality Notice 
The research and the researcher are bound by the ethical rules of the University of Cambridge 
and the academic discipline of Political Science. The research is also subject to ethical review 
by the University Ethics Committee. Via the following links you can access some guideline 
documents for research ethics that will apply: 
- University of Cambridge ethical rules: 
{URL} 
- Economic and Social Research Council (UK) framework of research ethics: 
{URL} 
- American Political Science Association ethics guidelines: 
{URL} 
Accordingly, the information you provide will be stored in a password-protected hard drive 
and secure cloud storage, and it will be processed anonymously and with utmost 
confidentiality. The data will be analysed with a view to contributing to a doctoral thesis and 
other academic publications that may ensue. If any participant believes that the dataset 
includes information that could reveal his/her identity, necessary corrections will be made to 
his/her satisfaction. The participants' right to opt out is inalienable at any time. 
 
A.3. Response collection 261
A.3.2 Questionnaire: printed format
 
 
 
 
Section 1: Some basic information about your local or regional unit 
Question 1. In which country is your local or regional unit located? 
  
Question 2. Which one of the following best describes the type of your local or regional 
unit? 
 Local government: city, town, commune, municipality, county, etc. 
 Region with administrative powers: province, region, etc. 
 Region with legislative powers: land, canton, autonomous region/community, etc. 
 Other: (please indicate)  
Question 3. What is the approximate population of your local or regional unit? 
  
Question 4. What is your position in this local or regional unit? 
 Head of government, mayor, or equivalent 
 Vice-president, deputy mayor, ministerial position, or equivalent 
 Councillor or member of assembly/parliament 
 Consultant, member of staff, secretary, personal assistant, or similar 
 Other: (please indicate) 
 Refuse to reply 
Question 5. Which political party are you a member of? 
 
Question 6. Has your local or regional unit received financial support from European 
organizations? 
 No, it has never received financial support. 
 Not now, but it received financial support in the past. 
 Not now, but it will receive financial support in the near future. 
 Yes, it is currently receiving financial support. 
 I don't know. 
----------Please continue to the next section----------
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Section 2: Your opinions about some aspects of European politics 
Question 7. For some observers, national governments are no longer the only dominant 
actors in international relations. Could you please state to what extent you agree or disagree 
with the following statements? 
 Completely 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
disagree 
nor agree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Completely 
agree 
No opinion/ 
Refuse to 
reply 
Local and regional 
authorities should be 
among the main actors of 
European politics. 
      
For local and regional 
authorities it is important 
to have direct relations 
with similar authorities 
from other countries. 
      
For local and regional 
authorities it is important 
to be represented in 
international 
organizations. 
      
Local and regional 
authorities should be 
recognized as actors in 
international law 
      
External relations of local 
and regional authorities 
should not be obstructed 
by national constraints. 
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Question 8. The sharing of powers between European institutions and member states has led 
to many discussions. In your opinion, how powerful should European institutions be in 
different policy areas and overall? 
 
Very weak 
Somewhat 
weak 
Neither 
weak nor 
powerful 
Somewhat 
powerful 
Very 
powerful 
No opinion/ 
Refuse to 
reply 
Social policy: education, 
health, pensions, etc. 
      
Economic policy: trade, 
development, market 
regulation, etc. 
      
Internal affairs: 
immigration, security, etc. 
      
Foreign affairs: 
international cooperation, 
agreements, diplomacy etc. 
      
Overall 
      
Question 9. In recent years, the concepts of 'multi-level governance' and 'subsidiarity' have 
been put forward to support the place of local and regional authorities in European politics. 
What is your opinion about these concepts? 
 Very 
negative 
Somewhat 
negative 
Neither 
negative nor 
positive 
Somewhat 
positive 
Very 
positive 
No opinion/ 
Refuse to 
reply 
Multilevel governance 
      
Subsidiarity 
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Question 10. The sharing of competences between national governments and local and 
regional authorities varies to a great extent across countries. In your opinion, domestically 
how powerful should local and regional authorities be in different policy areas and overall? 
 
Very weak 
Somewhat 
weak 
Neither 
weak nor 
powerful 
Somewhat 
powerful 
Very 
powerful 
No opinion/ 
Refuse to 
reply 
Social policy: education, 
health, pensions, etc. 
      
Economic policy: trade, 
development, market 
regulation, etc. 
      
Internal affairs: 
immigration, security, etc. 
      
Foreign affairs: 
international cooperation, 
agreements, diplomacy etc. 
      
Overall 
      
Question 11. Federal and decentralized-unitary structures are two alternatives to centralized 
decision-making. What is your opinion about these principles? 
 Very 
negative 
Somewhat 
negative 
Neither 
negative nor 
positive 
Somewhat 
positive 
Very 
positive 
No opinion/ 
Refuse to 
reply 
Federalism       
Decentralization       
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Question 12. Local and regional authorities may use a variety of ways to conduct external 
relations. Do you think that the following options are effective methods of conducting 
external relations? 
 No Yes 
Representation in an international organization   
Direct relations with local and regional authorities from other 
countries 
  
Participation in diplomatic missions or delegations of 
national governments 
  
Question 13. International and transnational organizations may or may not be beneficial for 
local and regional authorities. Moreover, one may expect different types of benefits from 
these organizations. In your opinion, how useful are existing international and transnational 
organizations for your local or regional authority? 
 Very 
useless 
Somewhat 
useless 
Neither 
useless nor 
useful 
Somewhat 
useful 
Very 
useful 
No opinion/ 
Refuse to 
reply 
Economic: e.g. trade, 
investment, access to 
funds 
      
Political: e.g. influencing 
decision-making at 
national and European 
levels 
      
Cultural: e.g. working 
with people with the 
same ethnic background, 
religious affiliation 
      
Question 14. In your opinion, how important are European funds for local and regional 
development? 
 Very important 
 Somewhat important 
 Not very important 
 Not important at all 
 No opinion / Refuse to reply 
----------Please continue to the next section----------
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Section 3: About your experience in international and transnational 
organizations 
Please continue to the relevant section depending on your answer to the following question. 
Question 15. Have you represented your local or regional authority in an international or 
transnational organization? 
 No. 
Please continue to the section 3A on the next page 
 Yes. In two or more different international/transnational organizations. 
Please continue to the section 3B on page 9 
 Yes. In the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities. 
Please continue to the section 3C on page 10 
 Yes. In the Committee of the Regions. 
Please continue to the section 3D on page 12 
 Yes. In another international or transnational organization 
Please continue to the section 3E on page 14 
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Section 3A: Your opinions about international and transnational organizations 
Question 16. Is your local or regional government being represented in an international or 
transnational organization? 
 No. 
 Yes. 
 I don't know. 
Question 17. How much do you know about organizations which represent local and regional 
authorities at European level? 
 I don't know anything about them 
 I know a little about them 
 I know a reasonable amount about them 
 I know a lot about them 
 I know everything about them 
 Refuse to reply 
Question 18. If you had the opportunity to represent your local or regional authority in an 
international or transnational organisation, how motivated would you be to take on this 
position? 
 Not motivated at all 
 Somewhat unmotivated 
 Neither unmotivated nor motivated 
 Somewhat motivated 
 Very motivated 
 Refuse to reply 
Question 19. What is your opinion about the future of transnational organizations which 
represent local and regional authorities at European level? 
 They should become as powerful as other international organizations 
 They should remain in their current status and powers 
 They should be reduced in competences or dissolved 
 Refuse to reply 
----------Please skip to the section 4 on page 16----------
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Section 3B: About multiple organizations which you have been a member of 
Question 34. Which organizations have been a member of? Please tick as many as applies. 
 Congress of Local and Regional Authorities 
 Committee of the Regions 
 Other: (please indicate)  
Question 35. In total, what is the duration of your experience in these organizations? 
 6 months or less 
 Between 6 months and 12 months 
 Between 1 year and 2 years 
 Between 2 years and 4 years 
 4 years or more 
Question 36. Your experience in which one of these organizations has been more significant 
than others? 
Please select one and continue to the relevant section based on your selection. 
 Congress of Local and Regional Authorities 
Please skip to the section 3C on page 10 
 Committee of the Regions 
Please skip to the section 3D on page 12 
 Other: (please indicate)  
Please skip to the section 3E on page 14 
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Section 3C: About your experience in the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities 
(CLRAE) 
Question 20. Are you currently a member of CLRAE, or were you a member in the past? 
 I am currently a member. 
 I was a member in the past. 
Question 21. How long have you been, or were you, a member of CLRAE? 
 6 months or less 
 Between 6 months and 12 months 
 Between 1 year and 2 years 
 Between 2 years and 4 years 
 4 years or more 
Question 22. Which one of the following expressions best describes your experience in 
CLRAE? 
 Very unsatisfying 
 Somewhat unsatisfying 
 Neither unsatisfying nor satisfying 
 Somewhat satisfying 
 Very satisfying 
 Refuse to reply 
Question 23. Personally, how important is/was it for you to be a member of CLRAE? 
 Very unimportant 
 Somewhat unimportant 
 Neither unimportant nor important 
 Somewhat important 
 Very important 
 Refuse to reply 
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Question 24. In your opinion, how accurate are the following statements to describe the 
importance of CLRAE? 
 Very 
inaccurate 
Somewhat 
inaccurate 
Neither 
inaccurate 
nor accurate 
Somewhat 
accurate 
Very 
accurate 
No opinion/ 
Refuse to 
reply 
It helps the economic 
development of local and 
regional authorities 
      
It makes local and 
regional authorities 
politically more powerful 
      
It promotes 
decentralization and local 
democracy 
      
It promotes multi-level 
governance and 
subsidiarity 
      
Question 25. What is your opinion about the future of CLRAE? 
 It should become as powerful as other bodies of the Council of Europe 
 It should remain in their current status and powers 
 It should be reduced in competences or dissolved 
 Refuse to reply 
Question 26. When you have voted in plenary sessions, how significant have the following 
factors been in influencing your decisions? 
 
Very 
insignificant 
Somewhat 
insignificant 
Neither 
insignificant 
nor significant 
Somewhat 
significant 
Very 
significant 
No 
opinion/ 
Refuse to 
reply 
The preparatory 
work done by the 
relevant committee 
/ commission 
      
The position of my 
national delegation 
      
The position of my 
party group 
      
The interests of my 
local/regional unit 
      
----------Please skip to the section 4 on page 16----------
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Section 3D: About your experience in the Committee of the Regions (CoR) 
Question 27. Are you currently a member of CoR, or were you a member in the past? 
 I am currently a member. 
 I was a member in the past. 
Question 28. How long have you been, or were you, a member of CoR? 
 6 months or less 
 Between 6 months and 12 months 
 Between 1 year and 2 years 
 Between 2 years and 4 years 
 4 years or more 
Question 29. Which one of the following expressions best describes your experience in CoR? 
 Very unsatisfying 
 Somewhat unsatisfying 
 Neither unsatisfying nor satisfying 
 Somewhat satisfying 
 Very satisfying 
 Refuse to reply 
Question 30. Personally, how important is/was it for you to be a member of CoR? 
 Very unimportant 
 Somewhat unimportant 
 Neither unimportant nor important 
 Somewhat important 
 Very important 
 Refuse to reply 
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Question 31. In your opinion, how accurate are the following statements to describe the 
importance of CoR? 
 Very 
inaccurate 
Somewhat 
inaccurate 
Neither 
inaccurate 
nor accurate 
Somewhat 
accurate 
Very 
accurate 
No opinion/ 
Refuse to 
reply 
It helps the economic 
development of local and 
regional authorities 
      
It makes local and 
regional authorities 
politically more powerful 
      
It promotes 
decentralization and local 
democracy 
      
It promotes multi-level 
governance and 
subsidiarity 
      
Question 32. What is your opinion about the future of CoR? 
 It should become as powerful as other bodies of European Union 
 It should remain in their current status and powers 
 It should be reduced in competences or dissolved 
 Refuse to reply 
Question 33. When you have voted in plenary sessions, how significant have the following 
factors been in influencing your decisions? 
 
Very 
insignificant 
Somewhat 
insignificant 
Neither 
insignificant 
nor significant 
Somewhat 
significant 
Very 
significant 
No 
opinion/ 
Refuse to 
reply 
The preparatory 
work done by the 
relevant committee 
/ commission 
      
The position of my 
national delegation 
      
The position of my 
party group 
      
The interests of my 
local/regional unit 
      
----------Please skip to the section 4 on page 16----------
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Section 3E: About your experience in this transnational organization 
Question 37. Are you currently a member of this organization, or were you a member in the 
past? 
 I am currently a member. 
 I was a member in the past. 
Question 38. How long have you been, or were you, a member of this organization? 
 6 months or less 
 Between 6 months and 12 months 
 Between 1 year and 2 years 
 Between 2 years and 4 years 
 4 years or more 
Question 39. Which one of the following expressions best describes your experience in this 
organization? 
 Very unsatisfying 
 Somewhat unsatisfying 
 Neither unsatisfying nor satisfying 
 Somewhat satisfying 
 Very satisfying 
 Refuse to reply 
Question 40. Personally, how important is/was it for you to be a member of this 
organization? 
 Very unimportant 
 Somewhat unimportant 
 Neither unimportant nor important 
 Somewhat important 
 Very important 
 Refuse to reply 
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Question 41. In your opinion, how accurate are the following statements to describe the 
importance of this organization? 
 Very 
inaccurate 
Somewhat 
inaccurate 
Neither 
inaccurate 
nor accurate 
Somewhat 
accurate 
Very 
accurate 
No opinion/ 
Refuse to 
reply 
It helps the economic 
development of local and 
regional authorities 
      
It makes local and 
regional authorities 
politically more powerful 
      
It promotes 
decentralization and local 
democracy 
      
It promotes multi-level 
governance and 
subsidiarity 
      
Question 42. What is your opinion about the future of this organization? 
 It should become as powerful as other international organizations 
 It should remain in their current status and powers 
 It should be reduced in competences or dissolved 
 Refuse to reply 
----------Please continue to the next section---------- 
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Section 4: About your experience in external offices 
Please continue to the relevant section depending on your answer to the following question. 
Question 43. Have you worked in an external office of your local or regional authority 
outside of your home country? 
 No. 
Please continue to the section 4A on page 17 
 Yes. In an office in Brussels or Strasbourg. 
Please continue to the section 4B on page 18 
 Yes. In an office based in the area of a partner government. 
Please continue to the section 4B on page 18 
 Yes, other: (please indicate)  
Please continue to the section 4B on page 18 
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Section 4A: Your opinions about external offices 
Question 44. Does your local or regional authority have an external office outside of your 
home country? 
 No. 
 Yes. 
 I don't know. 
Question 45. How much do you know about offices which local and regional authorities 
have in foreign countries? 
 I don't know anything about them 
 I know a little about them 
 I know a reasonable amount about them 
 I know a lot about them 
 I know everything about them 
 Refuse to reply 
Question 46. If you had the opportunity to work in an external office of your local or 
regional authority, how motivated would you be to take on this position? 
 Not motivated at all 
 Somewhat unmotivated 
 Neither unmotivated nor motivated 
 Somewhat motivated 
 Very motivated 
 Refuse to reply 
 
----------Please skip to the section 5----------
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Section 4B: About your experience in this external office 
Question 47. Are you currently working in this office, or did you work there in the past? 
 I am currently working 
 I worked in the past 
Question 48. How long have you worked, or did you work, in this office? 
 6 months or less 
 Between 6 months and 12 months 
 Between 1 year and 2 years 
 Between 2 years and 4 years 
 4 years or more 
Question 49. Which one of the following best describes your experience in this office? 
 Very unsatisfying 
 Somewhat unsatisfying 
 Neither unsatisfying nor satisfying 
 Somewhat satisfying 
 Very satisfying 
 Refuse to reply 
Question 50. Personally, how important is it for you to work outside of your home country? 
 Very unimportant 
 Somewhat unimportant 
 Neither unimportant nor important 
 Somewhat important 
 Very important 
 Refuse to reply 
----------Please continue to the next and final section----------
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Section 5: Finally some personal information about yourself 
Question 51. Which country are you from? 
 
Question 52. How old are you? 
 
Question 53. What is your gender? 
 Female 
 Male 
 Other 
 Refuse to reply 
Question 54. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 Primary or secondary education 
 University - undergraduate or equivalent 
 University - postgraduate 
 Refuse to reply 
Question 55. On a scale from 1 to 9, how would you define political position? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
         
Question 56. Would you describe yourself with each of the following statements? 
 No Yes 
A politician of your locality or region   
A politician of your country or nation-state   
A European politician   
A politician of your ethnic, religious or cultural group   
A politician of your political party or ideology   
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If you have any other information or comment that you would like to share with us, please 
feel free to use the box below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for taking the time to complete the questionnaire. If you have any 
queries, please do not hesitate to contact me on {e-mail address}. You can change your 
responses or withdraw from the survey at any time.  
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A.3.3 Screenshots from web-based questionnaire
Figure A.1: Screenshot from web-based questionnaire, sample in English
Figure A.2: Screenshot from web-based questionnaire, sample in French

Appendix B
Regression diagnostics
This appendix presents the procedures of regression diagnostics which were taken
into account during model specification and respecification. As discussed in the
main chapters of the thesis, diagnostics are examined in three groups: influen-
tial observations, independent linear relationships, and normal and homoskedastic
distribution of residuals. The improvements provided by dropping the influential
observations is illustrated in relevant sections.
Influential observations This section includes a table displaying unusually high
observations (in terms of Cook’s distance). The section
also includes charts which represent high influence, and
the relationships among residuals, leverage and influ-
ence, before and after adjustment.
Linear relationship This section includes a table displaying the variance in-
flation factors which are used to examine multicollinear-
ity, by also taking into account the number of categories
of categorical variables. Individual linear relationships
are not presented in this appendix, as they are discussed
in the main chapters of the thesis.
Heteroskedasticity This section presents charts and statistical tests related
to the distribution of residuals in two models. The charts
in the top rows of the figures are used to examine the
normality of the distribution of residuals. The charts in
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the bottom rows are used to examine the change in the
variance of these distributions with respect to the fit-
ted values. The figures are accompanied by the results
of Breusch-Pagan tests, which determine the statistical
significance of the level of heteroskedasticity.
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B.1 Influential observations
Table B.1: Observations with relatively high influence
Observation no Stud. Residual Hat values Cook’s distance
196 -5.36 ∗∗∗ 0.05 0.04
497 -4.43 ∗∗ 0.07 0.07
654 -3.04 0.21 0.07
682 2.48 0.21 0.04
692 -5.68 ∗∗∗ 0.05 0.06
Note: ∗∗∗p < 0.001 < ∗∗p < 0.01 (Bonferroni)
Figure B.1: Diagnostic plots of influential observations
Figure B.2: Diagnostic plots of influential observations after adjustment
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B.2 Linear relationship
Table B.2: Variance inflation factors
V IF Df V IF
1
2·Df
Countries 2.75 26 1.02
Influence of transnational institutions 1.40 1 1.18
Strength of European institutions 1.24 1 1.11
Competences of subnational authorities 1.17 1 1.08
Importance of European funds 1.22 1 1.10
Effectiveness of transnational organizations 1.28 1 1.13
Effectiveness of direct relations 1.14 1 1.07
Political identity: European 1.23 1 1.11
Political identity: Cultural 1.11 1 1.05
Political identity: Ideological 1.12 1 1.06
Ideological position 1.19 2 1.04
PolId.ideology:LRC 21.25 2 2.15
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B.3 Heteroskedasticity
Figure B.3: Diagnostic plots for the distribution of residuals
Results of the Breusch-Pagan test in the initially specified model:
BP = 53.88
df = 39
p = 0.057
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Figure B.4: Diagnostic plots for the distribution of residuals after adjustment
Results of the Breusch-Pagan test in the adjusted model:
BP = 48.41
df = 39
p = 0.144
Appendix C
Qualitative Interviews
This appendix explicates how the qualitative interviews are conducted, in three
sections:
Research ethics This section includes the ‘participant information sheet’
and the ‘consent form’ in their original printed formats,
illustrating how appointment requests are made to prospec-
tive interviewees.
Interview guidelines This section presents the main questions asked during in-
terviews. Due to their semi-structured nature, interviews
did not necessarily follow a definite format, but these
questions provided guidelines which ensured that all im-
portant points are covered, and that there is a necessary
degree of consistency across interviews. These questions
are divided into two groups:
General questions This set of questions is used as a guide-
line in the interviews with the political members of
the organizations. The exact formulation depends
on whether the interviewee is a members of CoR,
CLRAE or both.
Specific questions This set of questions specifically tar-
gets the aspects related to political groups and na-
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tional delegations. These are directed to staff mem-
bers working for political groups or national dele-
gations, as well as political members who have a
leading role in the political groups or national dele-
gations (in addition to the general questions).
Conducted interviews This section includes a table summarizing the relevant
information regarding the conducted interviews. The top
part of the table provides individual details about the pro-
file of interviewees, and the bottom part provides tech-
nical details. For those who did not consent to the use
of their names, the term Undisclosed is used instead of
information which may reveal their identities, and other
such information is masked accordingly.
Participant Information Sheet for the Study on: 
The Role of Local and Regional Authorities in European Politics 
Rusen Yasar 
PhD Candidate 
University of Cambridge 
Dear {{Title}} {{Name}}, 
I am writing to invite you to take part in a research project. Before you decide, I would like to bring 
to your attention several points about this study. 
Purpose and Content of the Study. I am conducting this study as part of my doctoral research 
project on the role of local and regional authorities in European politics, with a particular focus on 
the influence of European institutions. My dissertation will include case studies of the Committee of 
the Regions and the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities.  
Participation and Participants. For the case studies, I am willing to conduct face-to-face 
interviews with the members of these organizations. Participation is completely voluntary. You will 
be asked to complete a consent form and a copy will be given to you. Please note that your right to 
opt out is inalienable. You can withdraw before, during or after the interview, and you do not have 
to give any reason for your withdrawal. 
Interviews. This invitation is for a 'semi-structured qualitative interview' estimated to last about 30 
minutes. You will be directed a small number of questions, and you can take as much time as you 
please to answer these. You will decide whether the interview will be audio-recorded. The 
information that you wish to keep 'off the record' will be neither transcribed nor used in the study. 
The interview venue and time will be agreed at your convenience. 
Confidentiality and Data Protection. The information you provide will be kept strictly 
confidential. Confidentiality measures will be in line with data protection legislations of the UK and 
the EU. Your name will be used only if you give explicit consent. Digital data will be stored in 
password-protected environments, and non-digital data will be kept in a private space. I will be the 
only person who can access these. 
Results. The main result of the study will be a thesis submitted to the University of Cambridge for 
the degree of PhD. This thesis may also be used as the basis of my further academic publications. 
All the data will be destroyed when the main objectives are achieved. 
Questions and Complaints. If you require further information or would like to ask a question 
regarding this study, you can directly contact me with the details given below. If you wish to report 
misconduct or make a complaint, you can also contact the Department of POLIS or the Ethics 
Committee at the University of Cambridge. 
Contact Details.  
Correspondence:  {{ Address line 1 }} 
   {{ Address line 2 }}  
Email:   {{ e-mail address }} 
Mobile:   {{ Belgium phone number }}  
   {{ UK phone number }} 
Yours faithfully, 
 
 
Rusen Yasar 
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C.1 Research ethics
  
 
Consent Form for the Interviews for the Study on: 
The Role of Local and Regional Authorities in European Politics 
Rusen Yasar 
PhD Candidate 
University of Cambridge 
This form is for you to state whether or not you agree to take part in the study as 
an interviewee. You can change your mind and withdraw from the study at a later 
date. Please complete the form if: 
- you think that you have been given sufficient information, 
- you find the confidentiality measures satisfactory, 
- you agree to voluntarily take part in the study, 
- and you agree to the use of this interview for academic purposes. 
If you agreed to take part in this study, please state below your preferences for 
several specific issues about the way the information that you provide will be 
handled. You can still take part in the study without agreeing to any of the 
following, and you can change your preferences at a later time. 
Do you agree to this interview being 
audio-recorded? 
Yes No 
Do you agree to your real name being used 
in the research? 
Yes No 
Do you agree to the name of your 
organization being used in the research? 
Yes No 
 
Date: 
 
Name: 
 
Signature: 
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C.2 Qualitative interview guidelines
C.2.1 General questions for members
1. (If the interviewee is a member of both organizations) To what extent, in your
opinion, CoR and CLRAE are similar or different? (If the interviewee is
a member of one organization) How would you describe CoR/CLRAE in
general? With regard to:
– Their raison d’être,
– Their main missions,
– Their major strengths and weaknesses,
– The legal and political instruments at their disposal.
2. How do you see the past and the future of CoR and CLRAE? With regard
to:
– Whether they have become more powerful since their establishment,
– The reasons for their successes and failures,
– Your expectations of them to become more or less powerful in the future.
3. Both CoR and CLRAE are organized around two pillars: national dele-
gations and political groups. How would you compare these two pillars in
both institutions? With regard to:
– The level of influence of political groups in both institutions,
– The level of influence of national delegations in both institutions,
– Which one is more effective in ensuring coherence among members,
– Whether you think your national delegation and your political group are
different from other delegations and groups.
4. How would you describe the conception of multilevel governance for these
organizations? With regard to:
– The emphasis of CoR on promoting multi-level governance,
– A potential role for CLRAE in promoting multi-level governance,
– The meaning of multilevel governance with or without the European level.
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C.2.2 Questions specific to parties and delegations
1. How would you describe the way political groups / national delegations
work? With regard to the role of the political group / national delegation in:
– Shaping draft opinions,
– Encouraging members to take common positions on the issues discussed
in CoR,
– Shaping the discussions during plenary sessions and commission meet-
ings,
– Ensuring cooperation and communication between members when they
are not together in Brussels.
2. What are the differences between political groups / national delegations?
With regard to:
– The distinguishing features of your group/delegation in terms of the main
missions of CoR/CLRAE,
– The main position of your group/delegation in terms of the focus of CoR
on multilevel governance and/or the place of CLRAE regarding the con-
cept of multilevel governance,
– The support of your group/delegation for the Charter and the White Paper
on multilevel governance?
3. What are the differences and relationships between political groups and
national delegations? With regard to:
– The tendency of members to follow the positions set by national delega-
tions or political groups,
– Different national backgrounds of the members of the political group, or
party differences within the national delegation.
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C.3 Details of interviews
Table C.1: List of qualitative interviews
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